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Web spamming has tremendously subverted the ranking mechanism of information 
retrieval in Web search engines. It manipulates data source maliciously either by 
contents or links with the intention of contributing negative impacts to Web search 
results. The altering order of the search results by spammers has increased the 
difficulty level of searching and time consumption for Web users to retrieve relevant 
information. In order to improve the quality of Web search engines results, the design 
of anti-Web spam techniques are developed in this thesis to detect and demote Web 
spam via trust and distrust and Web spam classification.  
 
A comprehensive literature on existing anti-Web spam techniques emphasizing on 
trust and distrust model and machine learning model is presented. Furthermore, 
several experiments are conducted to show the vulnerability of ranking algorithm 
towards Web spam. Two public available Web spam datasets are used for the 
experiments throughout the thesis - WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007.  
 
Two link-based trust and distrust model algorithms are presented subsequently: Trust 
Propagation Rank and Trust Propagation Spam Mass. Both algorithms semi 
automatically detect and demote Web spam based on limited human experts’ 
evaluation of non-spam and spam pages. In the experiments, the results for Trust 
Propagation Rank and Trust Propagation Spam Mass have achieved up to 10.88% and 
43.94% improvement over the benchmark algorithms.  
 
Thereafter, the weight properties which associated as the linkage between two Web 
hosts are introduced into the task of Web spam detection. In most studies, the weight 
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properties are involved in ranking mechanism; in this research work, the weight 
properties are incorporated into distrust based algorithms to detect more spam. The 
experiments have shown that the weight properties enhanced existing distrust based 
Web spam detection algorithms for up to 30.26% and 31.30% on both aforementioned 
datasets. 
 
Even though the integration of weight properties has shown significant results in 
detecting Web spam, the discussion on distrust seed set propagation algorithm is 
presented to further enhance the Web spam detection experience. Distrust seed set 
propagation algorithm propagates the distrust score in a wider range to estimate the 
probability of other unevaluated Web pages for being spam. The experimental results 
have shown that the algorithm improved the distrust based Web spam detection 
algorithms up to 19.47% and 25.17% on both datasets. 
 
An alternative machine learning classifier - multilayered perceptron neural network is 
proposed in the thesis to further improve the detection rate of Web spam. In the 
experiments, the detection rate of Web spam using multilayered perceptron neural 
network has increased up to 14.02% and 3.53% over the conventional classifier – 
support vector machines. At the same time, a mechanism to determine the number of 
hidden neurons for multilayered perceptron neural network is presented in this thesis 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
According to a survey conducted by an Internet service company - NetCraft, an 
estimation of 629,939,191 Web sites are scattered around in the World Wide Web 
(Netcraft 2013). Nowadays, the Web search engine has become default information 
retrieval tool to ease Web users’ needs to extract relevant information; however 
searching for relevant data in this information warehouse can be a challenging task 
since the World Wide Web is known to be the largest knowledge repository mankind 
ever created. 
 
Traditionally, Web search engines did not take the ranking order of Web documents 
into serious consideration. The search engines employed a computer program known 
as Web crawlers or Web spiders to find and download Web pages, and incorporate 
another program to arrange the documents based on some wordings such as domain 
name, headings of Web page, page title, anchor text and meta data (Kobayashi and 
Takeda 2000; Baeza-Yates and Ribeiro-Neto 1999). In recent years, Web search 
engines have incorporated hyperlinks into the ranking mechanism. Authors of Web 
pages created hyperlinks as references to link up with another Web page. These 
referrals provide valuable information between documents and records of user 
behaviour. The idea of studying these referrals in information retrieval is commonly 
known as link analysis (Henzinger 2000). 
  
Link analysis is an emerging technology that tries to comprehend the relationships 
between Web documents, thus providing an order of search results according to its 
importance and relevance based on users’ queries. This technology developed 
algorithms: The first link analysis algorithm was developed by Li YanHong, is the 
RankDex technology (Li 1998); It was incorporated in the search engine to measure 
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the quality of Websites ("About Rankdex"  1997). PageRank (Brin and Page 1998), 
developed by Sergey Brin and Larry Page, which was used in the famous Google 
search engine, modelled its algorithm based on probability of a random surfer for their 
search engine. Jon Kleinberg (Kleinberg 1999) proposed of hyperlink-induced topic 
search (HITS), which introduced the authorities and hubs of a Web page to rate Web 
pages. And lastly, stochastic approach for link-structure analysis (Lempel and Moran 
2001) also known as SALSA, proposed by Lempel and Moran, examined random 
walks on graphs derived from the link-structure to rank Web pages. Borodin et al. 
(Borodin et al. 2005) had already provided a detailed study on link analysis algorithms, 
including its background theory and experimental results. 
 
With exponential growth of the World Wide Web, retrieving the right information in a 
short time remains a challenging task. Web users only look at the top few pages of the 
search results (Jansen, Spink, and Saracevic 2000). This is one of the reasons the 
commercial industries are striving to have their Web sites appear at the top of search 
results. As more viewers visit, the more financial gain one would be generated. 
  
In recent times, there are a lot of indecent tricks used by the content providers to have 
their pages rank higher than they deserved. This is because the order of the results is 
highly correlated to the profit gain of one business model. The most efficient way is to 
manipulate the link analysis algorithms. This unethical way of affecting the ranking 
order of search engines has evolved into Web spamming, also known as spamdexing 
(Gyöngyi and Garcia-Molina 2005). 
  
In 2006, it was estimated that approximately one seventh of English webpages were 
spam, which became obstacles in users’ information-acquisition process (Wang, Ma, 
et al. 2007). In 2007, the cost of Web spam was estimated at US$ 100 billion globally 
and United States alone suffered an estimated cost of US$ 35 billion (Bauer, Eeten, 
and Wu 2008). The intention of Web spam is to mislead search engines by boosting 
one page to undeserved rank. Consequently, it leads Web user to the irrelevant 
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information. This kind of exploitation degrades the Web search engines by providing 
inappropriate or bias query results. Henzinger et al. (Henzinger, Motwani, and 
Silverstein 2002) have identified Web spam as one of the most important challenges in 
Web search engine industries. Many people become frustrated by constantly finding 
spam sites when they look for legitimate content. In addition, Web spam has an 
economic impact since a high ranking provides large free advertising and so an 
increase in the Web traffic volume (Araujo and Martinez-Romo 2010). Even worse, at 
least 1.3% of all search queries directed to the Google search engine contain results 
that link to malicious pages (Egele, Kolbitsch, and Platzer 2011). In addition, one 
consultancy estimated that Russian spammers earned roughly US$2–3M per year and 
one IBM representative claimed that a single spamming botnet was earning close to 
$2M per day (Kanich et al. 2011). Search engine companies generally employ human 
experts who specialized in detecting Web spam, constantly scanning the web looking 
for spamming activities. However, the spam detection process is time-consuming, 
expensive and difficult to automate. 
 
Gyongyi et al. (Gyöngyi and Garcia-Molina 2005) raised the interest of the anti-Web 
spam community by writing a comprehensive taxonomy of all spamming techniques 
including boosting and hiding techniques. Boosting techniques refer to methods that 
achieve high relevance or importance for one page; hiding techniques refer to methods 
that do not influences the ranking of search engine but assist boosting techniques from 
the view of the user, one example is to manipulate the color scheme of the anchor text. 
Boosting techniques can be further expanded into term spamming (which also refers as 
content spamming) and link spamming while hiding techniques can be expanded into 
content hiding, cloaking and redirection as shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
In addition, Wu and Davison (Wu and Davison 2005a) did a detailed research on 
cloaking and redirection. Cloaking can be explained by giving the Web user different 
content from what a search engine sees. Redirection on the other hand can be 
explained by sending the Web user to another URL (Uniform Resource Locator) while  
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Figure 1.1: Categorization of Web spamming techniques 
loading current URL. Content hiding refers to spam terms or links in a Web page that 
are invisible to the user. 
  
Understanding spamming techniques is important in order to propose the appropriate 
counter-measures. In Wu’s dissertation (Wu 2009), he mentioned different approaches 
to combat Web Spam (shown in Figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1.2: Different approaches to combat Web spam 
 
Among the anti-Web spam techniques, trust or badness based method (or trust and 
distrust model) algorithms have shown significant results in eliminating Web spam 
(Zhang, Wang, et al. 2011). Initially the algorithms run a seed selection process, which 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
5 
a portion of a large Web is selected and evaluated as spam or non-spam to form seed 
sets. Based on the evaluated seed sets, spam and non-spam are used to propagate 
distrust for detection and trust for demotion of Web spam. 
 
Trust and distrust model can be categorized into two types of algorithms: Web spam 
detection and Web spam demotion. Both detection and demotion of Web spam are 
equally important in combating Web spam. Demotion of Web spam can act as a 
counter-bias in reducing possible rank boosts from spam whereas detection of Web 
spam can help out in removing them at the earliest stage. 
Besides trust or badness based method, machine learning methods have been actively 
used for detection of Web spam in recent years. Machine learning approach in 
anti-Web spam community can be divided into two sections: feature and structure. A 
feature is an individual specification of an attribute whereas structure is a machine 
learning model that takes features for classification purpose. Some of the 
aforementioned trust or badness based algorithms are used as features to assist 
machines to learn the underlying patterns of Web spam. 
 
The research objectives of this thesis are to develop anti-Web spam algorithms based 
on trust and badness model for detection and demotion of Web spam and to propose an 
alternative machine learning model to assist human experts in the task of Web spam 
classification.  
 
The notion of content trust was first introduced by Gil et al. to solve the problem of 
reliability of the Web resource (Gil and Artz 2007). Trust is an integral component in 
many kinds of human interaction, allowing people to act under uncertainty and with 
the risk of negative consequences (Wang and Zeng 2007; Wang, Zeng, et al. 2007). 
Thus, trust is used to model the reliability of the information and solve the problem of 
Web spam detection. On the other hand, since spammers employ propagandistic 
techniques, it makes sense to design anti-propagandistic methods for defending them 
(Metaxas 2009b). These methods need to be user-initiated, that is the user decides 
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which Web site not to trust and then seeks to distrust those supporting the 
untrustworthy Web site (Metaxas 2009a). Furthermore, among the anti-Web spam 
techniques, link-based trust and distrust algorithms that propagate human experts’ 
judgments over a set of seed pages are the most promising, considering the 
effectiveness, efficiency and simplicity (Zhang, Wang, et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2013).  
 
The development of an automatic Web spam detection system is an interesting 
problem as it concerns massive amounts of data to be analysed, the involvement of 
multi-dimensional attribute space with potentially hundreds or thousands of 
dimensions, and the extremely dynamic nature for novel spamming techniques that 
emerge continuously (Sydow et al. 2007). Often, large amount of Web spam pages are 
generated using machines by stitching together grammatically from a large collection 
of sentences (Fetterly, Manasse, and Najork 2005). Thus, machine learning method 
provides an ideal solution due to its adaptive ability to learn the underlying patterns for 
classifying spam and non-spam (Erdélyi, Garzó, and Benczúr 2011).  
 
In this thesis, a proposed trust propagation algorithm is developed to assist in detection 
and demotion of Web spam. Subsequently, existing anti-Web spam algorithms 
combine with proposed extracted-host weight feature are developed to enhance the 
Web spam detection experience. Thereafter, a distrust seed set propagation algorithm 
also combining with anti-Web spam algorithms is proposed to increase the detection 
rate of Web spam. Lastly, the application of machine learning technique namely 
multilayered perceptrons neural network is proposed to classify Web pages into spam 
and non-spam. 
 
The thesis organization is stated in the following: 
 
In Chapter 2, the mathematical model for Web graph is presented to formulate the 
algorithms effectively. After that, two large public available datasets – 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007 and their provided features vectors 
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which are used in machine learning are thoroughly described. The parameters setting 
and performance evaluation for all the algorithms end with this chapter. 
 
In Chapter 3, a comprehensive study on two anti-Web spam techniques is presented – 
trust and badness based method, and machine learning method. Firstly, a trust model 
link-based anti-Web spam algorithm – TrustRank (Gyöngyi, Garcia-Molina, and 
Pedersen 2004) is presented to show the effectiveness of the trust model. The 
weaknesses of TrustRank came up with the proposed of its derivatives. Thus, the 
derivatives of TrustRank which include Anti-TrustRank (Krishnan and Raj 2006), 
Topical TrustRank (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006b), DiffusionRank (Yang, King, and 
Lyu 2007) and Link-Variable TrustRank (Qi, Song-Nian, and Sisi 2008) are presented. 
The experiments between TrustRank and HostRank  (Eiron, McCurley, and Tomlin 
2004) shows the vulnerability of link analysis algorithms towards spam. After that, 
other trust and distrust model based algorithms are briefly explained. Lastly, the 
machine learning techniques that are used in combating Web spam are further 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 4 covers the trust model algorithms – Trust Propagation Rank (TPRank) and 
Trust Propagation Spam Mass (TP Spam Mass). TrustRank (Gyöngyi, Garcia-Molina, 
and Pedersen 2004) and Spam Mass (Gyöngyi et al. 2006) offer the advantage of the 
trust evaluations and propagate trust to demote and detect Web spam. The proposed 
trust propagation algorithms further improve the aforementioned algorithms and the 
experiments have shown that the proposed trust propagation algorithms outperform 
both TrustRank and Spam Mass based on the same small amount of evaluated sites. 
 
Chapter 5 introduces weight properties feature extracted from Host graph to enhance 
the existing Web spam detection algorithms. Weight properties can be defined as the 
influences of one Web node towards another Web node. Weight properties had been 
investigated by other researchers (Xing and Ghorbani 2004; Nemirovsky and 
Avrachenkov 2008; Li, Shang, and Zhang 2002) to achieve better results for ranking 
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algorithms based on PageRank and their derivatives. However, there are no studies 
focusing on the incorporation of weight properties in detecting Web spam hence this 
method is implemented in this research.  It is found that the experimental results 
shows that the weight properties have improved the existing Web spam detection 
algorithms like Anti-TrustRank (Krishnan and Raj 2006), Wu et al. Distrust (Wu, Goel, 
and Davison 2006a) and Nie et al. Distrust (Nie, Wu, and Davison 2007). 
 
Chapter 6 presents a distrust seed set propagation (DSP) algorithm to enhance existing 
Web spam detection algorithms. The distrust seed set propagation algorithm calculates 
the likelihood of other Web pages of becoming spam based on some untrustworthy 
seeds. Three Web spam detection algorithms that are experimented in Chapter 5 are 
attached with DSP to compare with the original. The results show that DSP enhanced 
the baseline algorithms and detected 17.73% more spam hosts in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and detected 8.59% more spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
Chapter 7 proposes the application of machine learning technique to do Web spam 
detection. In this chapter, the structure for machine learning model is focused. C4.5 
decision tree (Quinlan 1993) and support vector machines (Chang and Lin 2011) are 
two well-known machine learning models used in Web spam detection. Some 
researchers (Yuchun et al. 2008; Abernethy, Chapelle, and Castillo 2010; Zhiyang et al. 
2012) have shown support vector machines outperforms decision trees. However, 
support vector machines have its own demerits (Biggio, Nelson, and Laskov 2012). 
Therefore, multilayered perceptrons neural network (Haykin 1998) is proposed for 
Web spam classification due to its flexible structure and non-linearity transformation 
to accommodate latest Web spam patterns. The experimental results have shown that 
multilayered perceptrons neural network has better web spam detection rate than 
support vector machines despite having the same features. 
 
Finally in Chapter 8, the results of all chapters are summarized and concluded with a 
couple of future directions.
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Chapter 2 Preliminaries 
 
In this chapter, a foundation on the Web graph mathematical model is presented as it is 
used for all solutions in the rest of the chapters. Nevertheless, two standard Web spam 
datasets and their provided features are also presented. Finally, the parameters settings 
for all algorithms and performance evaluation are introduced at the end of this chapter. 
 
2.1 WEB MODEL 
Let a graph where  is a set of vertices and  is a set of edges. If two 
vertices  and  form an edge, denoted as , thus  consist an ordered pairs 
 of vertices such that . The in-degrees of  is the number of edges 
towards  and out-degrees of  is the number of edges leaving . Therefore, the 













qpqp  (2.1) 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Simple Web graph 
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Consider a direct Web graph where  FEDCBA ,,,,, showing in Figure 2.1, the 
in-degrees of  is equal to the out-degrees of   where: 
 
 
    6degdeg     
 
In a Web model, the vertices  and the edges  is denoted as Web pages and 
hyperlinks respectively. However, a Web graph can be decomposed into a host graph 
),( HHHG   where  denote as a set of host vertices and denote as a set of 
ordered pair of hosts. A host consists of a set of Web pages under the same domain 
name. Assume that there are two host vertices  and ,  and  are 
connected such that  if some pages under  are pointing to some 
pages under where , , and 
, , . Consider Figure 2.2 where host vertices 
and , there exist direct edges , 
,  and such that , thus and  
are connected. 
 




A B A B
  HBA  , A
B  AnAAAA  ,,,, 321  n 1n
 BmBBBB  ,,,, 321  m 1m
},,{ 321  A },,{ 654  B  ),( 41
 ),( 61  ),( 42  ),( 53   HBA  , A B
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The vertices can be partitioned into two categories where .  
denotes as a set of evaluated vertices while  denotes as an unevaluated vertex, such 
that  where  stands for unknown vertices. Evaluated vertices  can 
be assessed as non-spam vertices N  and spam vertices  where ESN  ,  in 
which   SN  thus SNSNE   . 
 
A weighted directed host graph is a graph which each edge  has a weight 
function with each weight is a real number. A weighted directed 
host graph can be represented as ),,(  HHHG   where is the weight function of 
HG . 
  
Assume that there exists two element subset of such that , the weight 
function  of host a to host b written as , is denoted as the sum of number of 
pages in host a direct to the pages in host b where 
 
, , 
and ,  , . In other words, can 














Figure 2.3 illustrates two host vertices 1 and 2  where 1  consists of page vertices 
 131211 ,,  while 2  consists of page vertices 232221 ,,  . 
 EE   E
E
 XE   X E
S
),( ba




 anaaaa  ,...,,, 321 n
1n  bmbbbb  ,...,,, 321 m 1m ),( ba




Figure 2.3: Sample of weighted graph 
 
Assume  where some pages in host vertex are pointing to some pages 














The graph which is representing the Web model can be transformed into matrix form 
as follows: 
 

























Details on adjacency-matrix representations can refer to APPENDIX B – Adjacency 
-Matrix Representation. 
 ),( 21 1
2 1 2












2.2 DATASETS AND FEATURES 
Two public available datasets are used throughout the whole thesis – 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 (Castillo et al. 2006) and WEBSPAM-UK2007 (Yahoo! 2007). 
Both datasets are downloaded from the Laboratory of Web Algorithmics, Università 
degli Studi di Milano, with the support of the DELIS EU - FET research project. The 
former dataset is also used in part of a Web Spam Challenge in 2007 (Castillo, 
Chellapilla, and Davison 2007; Castillo, Davison, et al. 2007) while the later dataset is 
used in Web Spam Challenge 2008 (Castillo, Chellapilla, and Denoyer 2008). 
 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 consists of 77,741,046 Web pages while WEBSPAM-UK2007 
consists of 105, 896,555 Web pages. Due to the large collection, host level is 
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one consists of 114,529 hosts. 
 
Both datasets provide evaluated sets, SET 1 for training and SET 2 for testing as the 
motivation behind the Web Spam Challenge Series is to provide solution to combat 
Web spam from machine learning perspective. For the link-based propagation 
algorithms, since no training and testing are required, both evaluated sets are sum to 
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Table 2-1: Distributions of spam and non-spam in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 
 WEBSPAM-UK2006 WEBSPAM-UK2007 
SET 1 SET 2 TOTAL SET 1 SET 2 * TOTAL 
Spam 674 1250 1924 222 122 157 501 
Non-spam 4948 601 5549 3776 1933 3271 8980 
*Additional Set from WEBSPAM-UK2006 
 
Furthermore, the standard feature vectors as given in the Web Spam Challenge Series 
are used in the experiments. The features can be categorized into link-based and 
content-based features. Table 2-2 shows the types of features vector: 
 
Table 2-2: Distributions of the feature vectors 
Notation Feature Set No. of Features 
A Content-based Features 24 
B Full Content-based Features 96 
C Link-based Features 41 
D Transformed Link-based Features 138 
 
Feature A denotes the content-based features. Most of these features are extracted from 
Ntoulas et al. (Ntoulas et al. 2006) and they comprise of the number of words in the 
page, number of words in the title, average word length, fraction of anchor text and 
visible text, compression rate, corpus precision and corpus recall, query precision and 
query recall, independent trigram likelihood, and entropy of trigrams. In total, there 
are 24 content-based features. 
 
Feature B denotes the full content-based features. Since feature A are based on page 
feature, the authors (Castillo, Donato, et al. 2007) aggregate the content-based features 
for pages in order to obtain content-based features for hosts. Therefore, in total there 
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are 96 content-based features (4 x feature A). 
 
Feature C denotes the link-based features. Most are computed on the home page and 
also the page with the maximum PageRank in each host. The link-based features 
include degree-related measures like in-degree, out-degree, edge-reciprocity and 
assortativity coefficient. Besides this degree related features, PageRank, TrustRank, 
truncated PageRank and estimation of supporters are also included in this link-based 
features. In total there are 41 link-based features. 
 
Feature D denotes the transformed link-based features. They are just simple numeric 
transformations and combinations of the link-based features. After transformation, 
there are 138 transformed link-based features. 
 
Details on the standard feature vectors can be found in (Castillo, Donato, et al. 2007). 
More details on the link-based features can be found in (Becchetti et al. 2006b) while 
the content-based features can be found in (Ntoulas et al. 2006). 
 
2.3 PARAMETERS SETTINGS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, the parameters settings that are used throughout the thesis are discussed 
and so as the performance evaluation so that all algorithms are standardized. 
 
For all propagation algorithms, the decay factor  is set as 0.85 for the reason that it 
has become a standard since the first paper is published (Brin and Page 1998). For the 
seed selection regardless of spam seeds or non-spam seeds, 50 seeds are used for 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 while 100 seeds are used for WEBSPAM-UK2007 since there 
are less spam hosts in later datasets. Lastly, all the algorithms throughout the thesis 
execute in 50 iterations as this iteration is more than enough for the algorithms to reach 
convergence. 
 
For the performance evaluation, there are three sections – trust propagation, distrust 
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propagation and machine learning approach: 
 
Trust propagation 
 Number of non-spam hosts in each bucket 
 Incremental summation of reputable hosts for all buckets 
 Average promotion level for non-spam hosts (compare to benchmark) 
 Number of non-spam hosts being promoted (compare to benchmark) 
 Evaluated hosts represented in pages level 
 Propagation coverage 
Distrust propagation  
 Number of spam hosts in each bucket 
 Incremental summation of spam hosts for all buckets 
 Average promotion level for spam hosts (compare to benchmark) 
 Number of spam hosts being promoted (compare to benchmark) 
 Evaluated hosts represented in pages level 
For Machine Learning 
 AUC (Area Under an Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve) 
 
For trust propagation and distrust propagation, the acquired results from the derived 
algorithms will be sorted in descending order and divided into 10 or 20 buckets for 
performance evaluation. The number of non-spam hosts or spam hosts in each bucket 
indicates how much the algorithms have detected non-spam hosts or spam hosts. It is 
important to see more non-spam hosts in Web spam demotion algorithms and more 
spam hosts in Web spam detection algorithms as it shows the effectiveness of the 
algorithms. The second evaluation is the incremental summation of non-spam or spam 
hosts from the first to the last bucket. This evaluation shows how much the proposed 
algorithms have improved over all buckets. Next is the average promotion level for 
non-spam or spam hosts. It is used to track the movement of the particular non-spam or 
spam host from one bucket to the other. Let be the bucket position for the )( iO SP
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non-spam or spam hosts of the benchmark algorithm and  be the bucket 
position for the non-spam or spam hosts of the proposed algorithm. For each bucket, 
let be the labelled non-spam or spam hosts of the benchmark algorithms at the  
bucket, the average promotion at  bucket, can be defined as: 
  (2.3) 
This evaluation metric tracks the improvements for each bucket over the baseline 
algorithms. The derived unit from the metric is called bucket per level. Moreover, the 
number of non-spam or spam hosts being promoted is shown, this evaluation is 
correlated with the previous measurement.  
 
Throughout all experiments in this thesis, the datasets are conducted at the host level 
for the reason that assumed that if one host is a spam host, most likely the pages under 
this host are all spams. For the next experiment, the number of pages represented from 
the evaluated hosts is also presented.  By achieving this, the number of spam and 
non-spam has been promoted or demoted at the page level are presented while 
preserving the computation on a host level. The last measurements for the trust 
propagation algorithms is the propagation coverage of the algorithms, this evaluation 
illustrates how much trust have reached other hosts, denoted as Sn  and the 
percentage of trust propagated to evaluated hosts, denoted as  , this measurement has 
been introduced and used by some researchers (Zhang et al. 2009). 
 
For machine learning approach, the area under the receiver operating characteristic 
curve, also known as AUC is emphasize and is used to evaluate the Web spam 
detection performance because it does not depend on any threshold (Erdélyi, Garzó, 
and Benczúr 2011) like precision and recall, and it aims at measuring the performance 
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Chapter 3 Anti-Web Spam Techniques 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Various anti-Web spam techniques are constantly proposed to fight against Web spam. 
Among the techniques, trust and distrust model and machine learning model have 
shown significant results against Web spam. A comprehensive literature survey is 
provided on these models in this chapter. 
 
Firstly, a well-known trust based anti-Web spam algorithm – TrustRank (Gyöngyi, 
Garcia-Molina, and Pedersen 2004) is presented. However, there are few weaknesses 
on TrustRank, thus researchers (Krishnan and Raj 2006; Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006b; 
Yang, King, and Lyu 2007; Qi, Song-Nian, and Sisi 2008) come up with the 
derivatives for TrustRank which will be thoroughly explained. An experimental study 
is done on TrustRank and HostRank (Eiron, McCurley, and Tomlin 2004), and shows 
how vulnerable it is for spam to attack. Besides TrustRank and its derivatives, there are 
other trust and distrust model algorithms and these algorithms are briefly explained in 
this section. A table on trust and distrust model is provided for comparison. 
Subsequently, machine learning techniques in terms of features and structure are 
discussed for Web spam detection. 
 
3.2 TRUSTRANK AND ITS DERIVATIVES 
In this section, TrustRank and its derivatives which include Anti-TrustRank, Topical 
TrustRank, DiffusionRank and Link Variable TrustRank are presented. 
  
3.2.1 TrustRank 
Yang et al. (Yang, King, and Lyu 2007) mentioned that TrustRank has a strong 
theoretical relation with PageRank (Brinkmeier 2006). The algorithm 
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semi-automatically separate reputable good pages from spam, and trust flows from the 
link structure of the good pages to identify additional good pages. The intuition behind 
TrustRank is that good pages seldom point to bad pages. 
  
TrustRank starts by selecting seeds. Seed selection is done by applying inverse 
PageRank to the dataset in order to get pages that would be most useful to identify 
additional pages. The results are then ranked in descending order and choose the good 
pages from top L pages as good seed set because trust flows only from good seed set. 
TrustRank then normalizes the distribution vector and applies measurement using 
Equation 3.1, similar to PageRank with some minor changes: 
 
   )1(TRTTR  (3.1) 
 
For the Equation 3.1, α is the decay factor, usually sets 0.85, T is the transition matrix, 
while   is the distribution vector after normalization. As similar to PageRank, this is 
an iterative algorithm and calculated in M iterations. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Simple Web graph with PageRank and TrustRank results 
 
Assuming α decay factor is 0.85 running in M=50 iterations and set L = 3 with s
+
 = 
 F  and s- = ED, ; Figure 3.1 illustrates the results from both PageRank (upper with 
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non-bold) and TrustRank (lower with bold). Good page F propagates trust to page A, B 
and C and therefore the pages are having high PageRank values while page D and E 
having low PageRank values. Page F is promoted since it is a good page while page D 
and E are punished for being a bad page. 
 
3.2.2 Derivatives of TrustRank 
In this section, the derivatives of TrustRank such as Anti-TrustRank (Krishnan and Raj 
2006), Topical TrustRank (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006b), DiffusionRank(Yang, King, 





Figure 3.2: Simple Web graph with good pages (blue) and bad pages (red) 
 
Anti-TrustRank algorithm (Krishnan and Raj 2006) uses the same approximate 
isolation principle used by the TrustRank algorithm but Anti-Trust is propagated in the 
reverse direction along incoming links from a seed set of spam pages. A page is 
categorized as spam page if the Anti-TrustRank score of the page is more than a given 
threshold value. For example in Figure 3.2, assuming page A is a spam seed set, 
Anti-TrustRank would propagate to page B, and page B would propagate to page C and 
to page F if these pages are more than the threshold value. 
 
Firstly, Anti-TrustRank evaluates the dataset with PageRank algorithm and selects 
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spam pages seed set with high PageRank; Spam pages with high PageRank are most 
likely to be pointed by another spam pages with high PageRank. By achieving this, 
Anti-TrustRank able to detect another spam pages with high PageRank. After that, 
Anti-TrustRank runs the biased PageRank algorithm on the transpose matrix which 
represents the Web graph with the spam seed set. Finally, pages are ranked in 
descending order by their PageRank score to estimate the spam content. Pages with 
score greater than the threshold value given are marked as spam. 
 
Anti-TrustRank is able to report that the pages from which its seed set can be reached 
in short paths are untrustworthy. Also, the authors found that the average spam pages 
rank calculated by Anti-TrustRank is higher than the average spam pages rank 
calculated by TrustRank. In summary, Anti-TrustRank has the added benefit of 
returning spam pages with high precision. The intuition behind is that by starting with 
seed spam pages of high PageRank, it would expected that walking backward would 
lead to a good number of spam pages of high PageRank. 
 























pATR  (3.2) 
 
Where ATR represent Anti-TrustRank,   is a decay factor, )(deg q is the number of 
incoming links of host q and B(p) is the spam vector. 
 
3.2.2.2 Topical TrustRank 
Selecting seed function in TrustRank algorithm has a bias towards communities. The 
Web consists of large repositories from different kinds of topic. In addition to this, the 
seed set coverage used by TrustRank does not cover every topic exist on the Web. To 
address these issues, inspired by Topic Sensitive PageRank (Haveliwala 2002), Wu et 
Chapter 3 Anti-Web Spam Technqiues 
23 
al. (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006b) proposed Topical TrustRank which uses topical 
information to partition the seed set and calculate the trust score for each topic 
separately. 
 
Given a seed set, Topical TrustRank divides the seed set into different partitions 

















)(  (3.3) 
 
The equation is a version of the Linearity theorem proved by Jeh and Widom (Jeh and 
Widom 2003). Assume seed set T is given, it can be partitioned into n subsets, 
𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇3 where each containing mi· (1 ≤ i ≤ n) seeds. TR  represents the TrustRank 
scores calculated by using T as the seed set and ti·(1 ≤ i ≤ n) represents the TrustRank 
scores calculated by using Ti as the seed set. It shows that product of TrustRank score 
and the total number of seeds equals the sum of products of the individual 
partition-specific scores and the number of seeds in that partition. The transformation 















The authors introduced two techniques, which are called simple summation and 
quality bias to combine the generated topical trust score so as to present a single 
measure of trust for a page. Simple summation is calculated by adding up all trust 
scores by topic and applies on TrustRank, and then the Topical TrustRank score is 
generated. In the other hand, quality bias takes the average PageRank value of the seed 
pages of particular community into consideration. 
 
The authors also proposed three seed selection improvements for Topical TrustRank 
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algorithm. The improvements are seed weighting, seed filtering and finer topic 
hierarchy. In seed weighting, each node is assigned a constant value proportional to its 
quality; another way of saying is that some seed pages’ trust is generally higher than 
some other seed pages. In seed filtering, the quality of a page can be measured using 
PageRank or Topical TrustRank scores, low quality seed pages can be filtered out to 
improve the performance of the Topical TrustRank as low quality pages might include 
spam pages. For finer topic hierarchy, topic directories usually provide a tree structure 
for each topic and calculation is expensive to involve finer topics. However, finer topic 
hierarchy would be ideal to categories the Web. 
 
There is a trade-off for using simple summation. For that reason, the authors 
experiment using quality bias and the combination of seed weighting, seed filtering 
and finer topic hierarchy. The topical TrustRank results provided a reduction of 19% – 
43.1% in spam sites compare to TrustRank. 
 
3.2.2.3 DiffusionRank 
Motivated by the viewpoint of the Web structure and heat diffusion phenomena, Yang 
et al. (Yang, King, and Lyu 2007) proposed DiffusionRank, a generalization of 
PageRank which additionally has the ability to reduce the effect of link manipulations.  
Heat diffusion is a physical phenomenon in which heat always flow from high 
temperature position to low temperature position. 
 
The authors explained two points where PageRank is susceptible to Web spam. The 
two points are over-democratic and input-independent. The belief behind PageRank is 
that all pages are born equal; all pages have the right to vote in a summation of one for 
each page. Over-democratic can be explained when a large number of new pages are 
pointing to a page, since all new pages have the right to vote. For input-independent, 
PageRank is an iterative algorithm which it calculates until a point where it converged. 
Input-independent property makes it impossible to set an input to avoid Web spam, 
like large values for trusted pages and less or even negative value for spam sites. The 
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heat diffusion model has an advantage to avoid over-democratic and 
input-independent of PageRank. Therefore, the authors proposed DiffusionRank to 
view the Web from another perspective and calculate the ranking values. 
 





















Where h  is a diffusion score vector, M  is the number of iteration,   is thermal 
conductivity coefficient, N  is the number of elements where the elements refer to 
Web vertices and T  is the transition matrix. 
 
There are four advantages for DiffusionRank: two closed forms, group-group relations, 
graph cut and anti-manipulation. The two closed forms include discrete form and 
continuous form, the primary one has the advantage of fast computing while the 
secondary one has the advantage of being analysed easily from theoretical aspects. 
DiffusionRank is able to detect group-to-group relations easily because of the easy 
interpretation of the heat amount from one group to another. Another advantage is that 
it can partition the Web graph corresponding to the community by assigning positive 
and negative values among the communities. Lastly, DiffusionRank has the ability to 
reduce the effect of link manipulation as trusted Web pages are assigned with unit heat 
while all others are assigned with zero heat. The authors claimed manipulated Web 
pages will get lower rank until it is pointed by several good pages. 
 
3.2.2.4 Link Variable TrustRank 
Chen et al. (Qi, Song-Nian, and Sisi 2008) proposed Link Variable TrustRank 
algorithm (also known as LVTrustRank) based on the idea of using “bursts” of linking 
activity as a suspicious signal (Shen et al. 2006) with the combination of the original 
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TrustRank algorithm mentioned earlier. When there is a drastic change in the link 
structure of a spam site in a short period of time, LV TrustRank uses this opportunity to 
measure trust from the variance of the link structure and detect spam sites. 
 
Spammers intend to add links to pages which the intention of promoting particular 
page, Shen et al. (Shen et al. 2006) introduced in-link growth rate (IGR) to measure the 
ratio of the increased number of incoming links of a site to the number of original 















  (3.6) 
 
0  and 1  are two different timeline where )( 0inS is the set of in links of a site at 
time 0  and )( 1inS  is the set of in links of a site at time 1 . IGR is a good indicator 
to represent the variance of spam sites in link structure. 
 
LVTrustRank computes the TrustRank score )( 1TR  and )( 2TR  at different 
timeline and uses IGR to get the ratio of the variance of link structure. A joint formula 





















  (3.7) 
 
LVTrustRank performs well on detecting Web spam based on the variance of the link 
structure. However, there exist some spam sites that do not change their link structure 
and it is not possible for LVTrustRank to detect. Nevertheless, Shen et al. (Shen et al. 
2006) introduced the idea of using variance of link structure to detect spam can be 
explored further. 
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3.2.3 Experiments 
The experiments are conducted on two datasets – WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. Firstly, HostRank and TrustRank are compared and 
experimented to see the vulnerability of HostRank towards Web spam. After that, 
different TrustRank algorithms with various seeds (see Chapter 2 Preliminaries for 
parameters settings) are discussed. In WEBSPAM-UK2006, the TrustRank algorithms 
with 50, 75 and 100 seeds are experimented while 100, 150 and 200 seeds are 
experimented in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
Figure 3.3 and 3.5 show the comparison of HostRank and TrustRank on the ratio of 
non-spam sites and spam sites for each bucket in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. The dark blue bar denotes the non-spam sites of HostRank 
while the light blue bar denotes the non-spam sites of TrustRank. The empty spaces 
above the bars represent the spam sites in each individual buckets. 
 
Figure 3.3: Percentage of non-spam hosts in HostRank and TrustRank (50 Seeds) 
buckets on WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.6 show the percentages of non-spam hosts in TrustRank 
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of non-spam hosts in TrustRank (50, 75 and 100 Seeds) buckets 
on WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
Figure 3.5: Percentage of non-spam hosts in HostRank and TrustRank (100 Seeds) 
buckets on WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
In Figure 3.3, TrustRank (50 seeds) able to achieve more than 90% of non-spam hosts 
in top 5 buckets whereas in HostRank, the 4
th
 bucket alone already consists more than 
50% of spam hosts. In Figure 3.5, TrustRank outperforms HostRank by having less 
spam hosts as much as 7 buckets in top 9 buckets. It is important to return results in 
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Figure 3.6: Percentage of non-spam hosts in TrustRank (100, 150 and 200 Seeds) 
buckets on WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Accumulation of non-spam hosts on top 10 buckets for HostRank and 
TrustRank (50 Seeds) in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
 
Figure 3.7 illustrates the accumulation of non-spam hosts on top 10 buckets for 
HostRank and TrustRank (50 Seeds) in WEBSPAM-UK2006. At the end of the 10
th
 
bucket, HostRank able to reach 3091 non-spam hosts whereas TrustRank with only 50 
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TrustRank able to detect more trustworthy hosts as early as possible compare to 
HostRank. 
 
Figure 3.8: Accumulation of non-spam hosts on Top 10 buckets for TrustRank (50, 75 
and 100 Seeds) in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Number of non-spam hosts in TrustRank (100 Seeds) buckets over 































































HostRank Bucket Index 
Number of Non-spam Hosts in TrustRank Buckets over 
HostRank Buckets in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
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Figure 3.10: Number of non-spam hosts in TrustRank (100, 150 and 200 Seeds) 
buckets over HostRank buckets in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the accumulation of non-spam hosts on top 10 buckets on three 
TrustRank algorithms with different number of seeds (50, 75 and 100 Seeds) in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 dataset. At the end of the 10
th
 bucket, TrustRank with 100 seeds 
has the highest accumulative sum of non-spam hosts with an amount of 3423 
non-spam hosts. Second is TrustRank with 75 seeds with an amount of 3367 non-spam 
hosts and finally, TrustRank with 50 seeds with an amount of 3295 non-spam hosts. 
 
Figure 3.9 depicts the number of non-spam hosts in TrustRank (100 seeds) buckets 
over HostRank buckets in WEBSPAM-UK2007. As shown in the figure, all TrustRank 
(100 seeds) buckets have more trustworthy hosts than the HostRank algorithm. In 
addition, the 9
th
 bucket has the highest amount as much as 38 of non-spam hosts. 
 
Figure 3.10 further illustrates the number of non-spam hosts in three TrustRank 
algorithms (100, 150 and 200 seeds) buckets over HostRank buckets in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. TrustRank with 150 seeds has the highest score with the sum of 
186 non-spam hosts more than HostRank algorithm compare to TrustRank 200 with 
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non-spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. The two figures 
indicate the improvement over HostRank buckets. On the other hand, figure 3.12 and 
3.14 show the numbers of non-spam hosts are being promoted in HostRank buckets in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Average promotion level for non-spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2006 for 
TrustRank (50, 75 and 100 Seeds) buckets over HostRank buckets 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Number of non-spam hosts being promoted in HostRank buckets from 
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Figure 3.13: Average promotion level for non-spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2007 for 
TrustRank (100, 150 and 200 Seeds) buckets over HostRank buckets 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Number of non-spam hosts being promoted in HostRank buckets from 
TrustRank (100, 150 and 200 Seeds). 
From the observation on figure 3.11 and 3.12, even though TrustRank (50 Seeds) has 
the highest average promotion level – 5.18 at 15
th
 bucket, TrustRank (100 Seeds) has 
promoted the most number of non-spam hosts, a total of 3077, the second highest goes 





















HostRank Bucket Index 
Average Promotion Level for Non-spam Hosts  
in WEBSPAM-UK2007 




























HostRank Bucket Index 
Number of Non-spam Hosts being Promoted  
in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
TrustRank (100 Seeds) TrustRank (150 Seeds) TrustRank (200 Seeds)
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with 2639 non-spam hosts. 
 
In Figure 3.13, TrustRank (100 seeds) has the highest average promotion of 3.57 
non-spam host per level. However, TrustRank (200 seeds) has the highest number of 
promoted non-spam host, a total of 3471 non-spam hosts being promoted even though 
the highest individual bucket being promoted goes to TrustRank (100 seeds) on 19
th
 
bucket with a number of 343 non-spam hosts being promoted. 
 
Table 3-1 and 3-2 show the number of non-spam Web pages represented from the 
non-spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. The non-spam 
hosts are based on the accumulation for top 5 buckets. 
 




HostRank TrustRank   
(50 Seeds) 




1 4633746 5772732 5911439 6045772 
2 7878928 9405003 9538061 9339090 
3 10707594 12453809 12656345 12648555 
4 11860496 15018597 15006317 14940319 
5 14333206 17326257 17267232 17165337 
 









HostRank TrustRank   
(100 Seeds) 




1 5433512 5762322 6048337 6221612 
2 9514864 9798875 10029708 9981872 
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From both the table, it has clearly shown that all the TrustRank algorithms have 
detected more non-spam pages compare to HostRank algorithm. In Table 3-1, some 
TrustRank algorithm with more seeds might detect less non-spam pages than 
TrustRank with lesser seeds. This is due to more seeds might promote more spam 
pages too. Regardless of this, the TrustRank algorithms still outperforms the HostRank 
algorithm. 
 
Table 3-3: Propagation coverage in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007 
 
Datasets Algorithms )( ESn   )( NSn   )( SSn   N  S  
WEBSPAM- 
UK2006 
TrustRank (50 Seeds) 8564 4223 1374 86.20 13.80 
TrustRank (75 Seeds) 8766 4388 1381 90.01 9.99 
TrustRank (100 Seeds) 8922 4519 1384 92.84 7.16 
WEBSPAM- 
UK2007 
TrustRank (100 Seeds) 73790 6603 242 98.98 1.02 
TrustRank (150 Seeds) 75629 6780 249 99.15 0.85 
TrustRank (200 Seeds) 76759 6858 260 99.26 0.74 
 
Table 3-3 shows the propagation coverage from the TrustRank algorithms in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. Observed from the table, the more 
seeds TrustRank has, the more non-spam and spam hosts able to reach. Even though 
more spam hosts are reached if more seeds are used, the trust propagation propagates 
to non-spam hosts is still more than spam hosts – in WEBSPAM-UK2006, TrustRank 
(100 Seeds) propagates 92.84% trust to non-spam hosts and 7.16% to spam hosts 
3 12113172 12601227 12790826 12721565 
4 14570132 15149195 15107725 15151087 
5 16374587 16952324 17088503 17095291 
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whereas in WEBSPAM-UK2007, TrustRank (200 Seeds) propagates 99.26% trust to 
non-spam hosts and 0.74% to spam hosts. The full results of all experiments in this 
chapter can refer to APPENDIX C - Chapter 3 Results. 
 
3.3 OTHER TRUST AND DISTRUST MODEL ALGORITHMS 
The very first algorithm to detect Web spam is the BadRank (Sobek 2002) algorithm. 
Based on the given spam seed set, distrust is propagated to measure the negative 
characteristics of one’s page and its principle is to link to bad neighbours. The formula 


















pBR  (3.8) 
 
Where BR(p) stands for BadRank of page p, ):( qp  denotes there is a direct link 
from page p to page q. j is the jump probability and )(deg q  is the number of 
incoming links of page q. According to (Sobek 2002), )( p is a special evaluation on 
page p which reflected whether this page is detected by a spam filter. 
 
Wu et al. (Wu and Davison 2005b) introduced a technique to identify link farm spam 
pages, this technique consists of three steps: Generating step, expansion step and 
ranking step. At first the algorithm generates a spam seed set by its common incoming 
and outgoing links. Then the authors use ParentPenalty to expand the seed set, the 
assumption is that if one page points to a bunch of bad pages, it is likely that the page is 
a bad page. Lastly, the authors rank the Web graph by down weighting the elements in 
the adjacency matrix. 
 
Gyongyi et al. (Gyöngyi et al. 2006) introduce the concept of spam mass to measure 
the impact of link spamming on PageRank (Brinkmeier 2006). Spam mass can identify 
pages that benefit from link spamming. Those pages which benefit from link 
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spamming is bias towards search engines, identifying them can help search engines 
remove them as early as possible. 
 
Wu et al. (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006a) proposed two algorithms – one based one 
trust model and another based on distrust model. After calculating two algorithms 
individually, the authors totalled up the score to detect Web spam and experimented on 
three splitting methods: equal splitting, constant splitting and logarithm splitting, and 
three accumulation steps: simple summation, maximum share and maximum parent. 
Maximum share and logarithm splitting for trust and distrust model is concluded to be 
able to achieve the best results.  
 
Nie et al. (Nie, Wu, and Davison 2007) did similar research with Wu et al. (Wu, Goel, 
and Davison 2006a) which proposed one trust and one distrust model algorithms. Two 
splitting methods and two accumulation steps are experimented: equal splitting and 
constant splitting, and simple summation and maximum share. The difference between 
their researches is that Wu et al. algorithms have a constant value which can be adjust 
to detect the most spam or demote the most spam whereas Nie et al. algorithms have a 
weighting value at the summation of trust and distrust algorithms. Nie et al. concluded 
that simple summation with constant splitting for trust and maximum share with 
constant splitting for distrust have the best performance. 
 
Liang et al. (Liang, Ru, and Zhu 2007) proposed R-SpamRank, which stands for 
reverse spam rank, which initially uses blacklist as spam Web pages as seeds, then 
expand it by applying a formula similar to BadRank. The authors claimed that the 
algorithm ideally detect spam pages in a link farm. 
 
Zhao et al. (Li, Qiancheng, and Yan 2008) proposed QoC-QoL algorithm to select bad 
seeds based on good seeds to combat Web spam. The authors concluded that using 
large good seeds with bad seeds is the best choice. 
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Zhang et al. (Zhang et al. 2009) explore the bidirectional links and proposed two page 
value metrics, AVRank and HVRank to detect spam easier. AVRank and HVRank are 
inspired by TrustRank and HITS algorithm also to expand the seed set trust 
propagation. The authors also proved that automatically identified large seed set works 
better than human manual identified seed set. 
 
Lastly, Trust-Distrust Rank (Zhang, Wang, et al. 2011) proposed by Zhang et al. make 
good use of good seeds and bad seeds and also overcomes the disadvantages of both 
existing trust and distrust propagation algorithms which is either trust or distrust is 
propagating in a non-differential way. 
 
A comparative study on all link-based trust and distrust model algorithms is listed as: 
 
Table 3-4: List of link-based trust and distrust algorithms. 
 
















2004   AltaVista Aug 03 
(31,003,946 sites) 
1000 sample sites; with 
178 good seeds, precision 
is 0.86 and recall is 0.55 
for top 10 buckets 
ParentPenalty 
(Wu and Davison 
2005b) 
2005   search.ch 
(350,000 sites) 
27,568 sites were 
expanded to additional 
42,833 spam sites 
Topical 
TrustRank  
(Wu, Goel, and 
Davison 2006b) 




Decrease spam by 19% - 
43.1% from the top ranked 
sites when compared with 
TrustRank 
Anti-TrustRank 
(Krishnan and Raj 
2006) 
2006   Web Graph 2002 
(18,500,000 pages) 
1.721% of spam pages found 
using Anti-TrustRank while 
0.28% spam pages found 
using PageRank for top 
100,000 pages 
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(Table 3-4 continued) 
Spam Mass 
(Gyöngyi et al. 
2006) 
2006   Yahoo! 2004 
(73,300,000 sites) 
Detected 10,000 link spam 
hosts 
Wu et al.  
(Wu, Goel, and 
Davison 2006a) 
2006   search.ch 
(350,000 sites) 
3,589 labelled spam sites; 
remove 80% of spam sites 
out of top 10 buckets 
DiffusionRank 
(Yang, King, and 
Lyu 2007) 
2007   Middle Size Graph 
(18,542 pages) 




DiffusionRank to be a 
candidate as a penicillin for 
Web Spamming 
Nie et al. (Nie, 
Wu, and Davison 
2007) 
2007   WEBSPAM-UK2006 
(11,402 hosts) 
Moving 23.4 more normal 
host to top 10 buckets while 
moving out 5.7 spam hosts 
R-SpamRank 
(Liang, Ru, and 
Zhu 2007) 
2007   Sogou.com 
(5,000,000 pages) 
Precision of 99.1% for top 




and Sisi 2008) 
2008   WEBSPAM-UK2007 
(114,529 hosts) 
By combining Inlink Growth 
Rate with TrustRank, the 
experiment shows the 
method is effective in 




and Yan 2008) 
2008   13.3 million Web pages 
and 232 million links 
Mixed seed set is effective 
in identifying Web spam 




(Zhang et al. 
2009) 
2009   Tianwang  
(358,245 hosts) 
By exploiting bidirectional 
links and large seed set, the 




(Zhang, Wang, et 
al. 2011) 




Overcome the disadvantages 





3.4 MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES 
In recent year, researchers in the adversarial information retrieval community have 
moved towards machine learning approach to detect Web spam. Actually the Web 
spam problem can be viewed as a classification problem. Machine learning 
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constructed Web spam classifiers have shown positive results due to their adaptive 
ability to learn the underlying patterns for classifying spam and non-spam. Machine 
learning approach can be divided into two categories – features and structures. The 
former depicts as the input used for classification while the latter define the machine 
learning algorithm that is used for learning. Some aforementioned link-based trust and 
distrust model algorithms are used as features to assist the machine learning model. 
 
The WEBSPAM-UK datasets have made a leap in Web spam community for using 
various machine learning models. In fact, previously there are few Web spam 
challenge series – Web spam challenge track I (Castillo, Chellapilla, and Davison 
2007), II (Castillo, Davison, et al. 2007) and III (Castillo, Chellapilla, and Denoyer 
2008) which aim is to bring both machine learning and information retrieval 
community to solve the Web spam labelling problem.  
 
In this sub-section, a comprehensive literature review on machine learning models that 
have been proposed is given throughout the years. The features for machine learning 
model are reviewed first follow by the structures of the machine learning model.  
 
Becchetti et al. (Becchetti et al. 2006b) study several link-based metrics which include 
rank propagation for links and probabilistic counting to improve the Web spam 
detection techniques. Moreover, the authors conducted another similar research 
(Becchetti et al. 2006a) which include more link-based metrics such as degree 
correlation and number of neighbours, and as a result the metrics achieve 80.4% 
detection rate with 1.1% false positive on WEBSPAM-UK2002 dataset. 
 
Besides link-based features, some researchers (Ntoulas et al. 2006) propose several 
content-based features for Web spam detection. The content of Web pages can be 
modified in order to attract Web users, a technique known as keyword-stuffing. The 
authors experiment on 105 million Web pages and 86.2% spam pages detected. 
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Stacked graphical learning (Kou 2007), a meta-learning scheme, has shown positive 
results in Web spam detection (Castillo, Donato, et al. 2007). Some researchers 
(László and Siklósi 2007) take advantage of stacked graphical learning by generating 
features by averaging known and predicted labels for similar nodes of the graph. The 
authors achieve improvement of 0.01% F-measure for small graph and 0.111% 
F-measure for large graph. 
 
Gan and Suel (Gan and Suel 2007) propose 8 content features, 14 link-based features 
and 3 additional features which include number of hosts in the domain, ratio of pages 
in this host to pages in this domain and number of hosts on the same IP address. The 
overall features achieved more than 90% F-measure for spam and non-spam detection 
in Swiss dataset. 
 
Castillo et al. (Castillo, Donato, et al. 2007) use the combination of link-based features 
from (Becchetti et al. 2006a) and content-based features from (Ntoulas et al. 2006) and 
experiment on WEBSPAM-UK2006 dataset and result in 88.4% of spam hosts 
detected with 6.3% false positive. 
 
A preliminary study on using linguistic features for Web spam detection is conducted 
by Piskorski et al. (Piskorski, Sydow, and Weiss 2008) and concluded by providing 
several discriminating Corleone and General Inquirer attributes that are promising 
enough to discriminate spam and non-spam. 
 
Becchetti et al. (Becchetti, Castillo, Donato, Baeza-YATES, et al. 2008) perform a 
detailed statistical analysis that only consider link structure of the Web for Web spam 
detection. Their experiments show that the performance of all combined features is 
comparable with that state-of-the-art spam classifier that use content attributes. 
 
Becchetti et al. (Becchetti, Castillo, Donato, Leonardi, et al. 2008) later use both link 
and content features to classify spam and non-spam. In addition, the authors use graph 
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clustering algorithms, propagation of predicted labels and stacked graphical learning 
to improve the classification accuracy. As a result, their proposed methodology 
manages to detect up to 88% of spam pages. 
 
Linked latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), an extension of LDA proposed by Bíró et al. 
is used for Web spam classification. The linked LDA technique consider linkage such 
as topics are propagated along links in such a way that the linked document directly 
influences the words in the linking Document. The authors concluded that linked LDA 
outperforms LDA and other baseline classifier about 3% to 8% in AUC performance. 
 
Historical Web page information is important for Web spam classification. Dai et al. 
(Dai, Davison, and Qi 2009) propose 1270 temporal features to improve the 
performance of Web spam classifiers. The features are experimented on 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 and have shown that their approach improves the F-measure by 
30% compared to the baseline classifier which only considers current page content. 
 
Martinez-Romo and Araujo (Martinez-Romo and Araujo 2009) presented 42 language 
model features to represent a Web document that calculate disagreement between two 
Web pages. The authors experiment on WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 and show that the language model features improve the 
F-measure of the former dataset by 6% and latter dataset by 2%. 
 
Later on, the authors combined their language model features with 12 qualified link 
analysis features (Araujo and Martinez-Romo 2010) along with both content and 
link-based features, the overall features achieve 0.86 F-measure and 0.88 AUC 
performance in WEBSPAM-UK2006, and 0.40 F-measure and 0.76 AUC 
performance in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
Abernethy et al. (Abernethy, Chapelle, and Castillo 2010) present WITCH (which 
stands for Web Identification Through Content and Hyperlinks) algorithm; not only 
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the authors use content and link-based features, the authors also include slack features 
and graph regularization features. The authors achieve 0.928 for AUC 10% and 0.963 
for AUC 100% in WEBSPAM-Uk2006 using support vector machine. 
 
Li et al. (Li et al. 2011) generate 10 new features from link features based on genetic 
programming and show that the new features are well performed than 41 standardized 
link-based features and also 138 transformed link-based features. 
 
A table which shows a list of features from various scientific publications for 
classification are given as: 
 




Structure Datasets Achieve 
163 Link-based 
Features (Becchetti et 
al. 2006a) 
Decision Tree with 
Boosting 
WEBSPAM-UK2002 80.4%% of detection 
rate with 1.1% false 
positive 
82 Link-based Features 
(Becchetti et al. 2006b) 
Decision Tree (Pruning 
with M = 5 and M = 10) 
WEBSPAM-UK2002 80% of spam pages 
detected with 2% false 
positive 
Content Features  
(Ntoulas et al. 2006) 
C4.5 Decision Tree MSN Search 105,484,446 Web 
pages 
86.2% spam pages 
detected 
Stack Graphical 
Learning (László and 
Siklósi 2007) 
C4.5 Decision Tree WEBSPAM-UK2006 0.01% F-measure 
improvement on small 
graph and 0.111% 
F-measure 
improvement on large 
graph 
8 Content Features, 14 
Link-based Features and 
3 Additional 
Features(Gan and Suel 
2007) 
C4.5 Decision Tree and 
Support Vector 
Machine 
Swiss ch 2005 (239272 hosts) More than 90% 





(Continued Next Page) 
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(Castillo, Donato, et al. 
2007) 
C4.5 Decision Tree WEBSPAM-UK2006 88.4% of spam hosts 
detected with 6.3% 
false positive 
208 Linguistic Features 
(Piskorski, Sydow, and 
Weiss 2008)  
- WEBSPAM-UK2006/2007 Certain linguistic 
features are useful for 
Web spam detection 
when combined with 
features studied 
elsewhere 
163 Link-based Features 
(Becchetti, Castillo, 
Donato, Baeza-YATES, 
et al. 2008) 
C4.5 Decision Tree 
with Bagging 




45 Link-based Features, 
18 Content based 
Features (Becchetti, 
Castillo, Donato, 
Leonardi, et al. 2008) 
 
C4.5 Decision Tree WEBSPAM-UK2006 Detected up to 88% of 
spam pages 
linked LDA Features 
(Bíró et al. 2009) 
Bayes Net, Support 
Vector Machine, C4.5 
Decision Tree 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 85.4% AUC (win 
84.8% Winner of Web 
Spam Challenge 2008) 
1270 Temporal Features 




WEBSPAM-UK2007 F-measure outperform 
by 30% 





sensitive Decision Tree 
with bagging) 






42 Language Model 





C4.5 Decision Tree WEBSPAM-UK2006/UK2007 Combined with Link 
and Content Features 
achieve AUC 
performance of 0.88 




(Continued Next Page) 
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(Table 3-5 continued) 
Slack Features, Graph 
Regularization Features 
(Abernethy, Chapelle, 
and Castillo 2010) 
Support Vector 
Machine 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 0.928 of AUC 10% 




(Li et al. 2011) 
Support Vector 
Machine and Genetic 
Programming 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 10 newly generated 
features are better than 
41 link features and 
138 transformed link 
features 
 
Besides features, the structure that is used to determine the machine to learn is also 
important. 
 
Noi et al. (Noi et al. 2010) present a spam detection approach based on probability 
mapping graph self-organizing maps (PM-GraphSOMs) for clustering Web pages 
and graph neural networks (GNNs) for classification. Their approaches achieved 
better results than those who participate in the Web spam challenge 2007 with 
F-measure of 0.9169 and AUC of 0.9301. However, using both unsupervised and 
supervised techniques are computationally expensive. 
 
A harmonic function based semi-supervised learning for Web spam detection is 
proposed by Zhang et al. (Zhang, Zhu, et al. 2011) and conducted the experiments by 
comparing with other semi-supervised learning methods and achieve the highest 
precision, recall and F-measure. 
 
Leon-Suematsu et al. (Leon-Suematsu et al. 2011) presented a Web spam detection 
algorithm that predicts the spamicity of subgraphs based on the bow-tie structure of 
Web graphs by a support vector machine. 0.83 precision, 0.94 recall and 0.88 
F-measure are achieved in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
Zhiyang et al. (Zhiyang et al. 2012) compare three machine learning models for Web 
spam detection: rule-based classifier, decision tree based and support vector 
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machine. The results have shown that support vector machine outperform both 
rule-based and decision tree based by precision, recall and f1-value. 
 
Fake medical websites are increasing widespread in recent years. Abbasi et al. 
(Abbasi et al. 2012) propose recursive trust relabeling, an adaptive learning 
algorithm which uses underlying content and graph-based classifiers, coupled with a 
recursive labeling mechanism, for enhanced detection of fake medical websites.  
There are researchers (Al-Kabi et al. 2012; Wahsheh, Al-kabi, and Alsmadi 2012) 
focuses on combating Arabic Web spam. The authors conducted experiments on 
various machine learning models such as naïve bayes, decision tree, support vector 
machine, k-nearest neighbor and logitboost, and achieve spam detection with more 
than 90% accuracy. 
 
Below shows a list of structure from various scientific publications for Web spam 
detection: 
Table 3-6: List of structures for classification 
 
Authors Structure Datasets Achieve 
(Noi et al. 2010) PM-GraphSOMs and 
Graph Neural Network 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 F-measure 0.9169 and 
AUC 0.9301 
(Zhang, Zhu, et al. 2011) Harmonic Functions 
Based Semi-supervised 
Learning 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 83.8% Precision, 
93.1% Recall, 88.2% 
F-measure 
(Leon-Suematsu et al. 
2011) 
Support Vector Machine WEBSPAM-UK2006 83% Precision, 94% 
Recall, F-measure 
88% 
(Zhiyang et al. 2012) Soft margin classifier - 
Support Vector Machine, 
Rule Based, Decision 
Trees 
137640 Web pages - 9634 





(Abbasi et al. 2012) Recursive Trust Labelling 930,000 Websites over 90% accuracy on 
three test bed 
 
(Continue next page) 
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(Table 3-6 continued) 
(Al-Kabi et al. 2012) Naïve Bayes, Decision 
Tree, Support Vector 
Machine, K-Nearest 
Neighbour, LogitBoost 
Arabic 15,000 Web Pages Decision Tree is the 
best with 99.521% 
accuracy 
(Wahsheh, Al-kabi, and 
Alsmadi 2012) 
Decision Tree, Naïve 
Bayes 
Arabic Link Spam Corpus 
(3,000 Web Spam pages) 
91.4706% Accuracy 
for Decision Tree, 
81.17655% Accuracy 
for Naïve Bayes 
 
Some researchers proposed their own features and structures in assist of Web spam 
detection. 
  
Tian et al.  (Tian, Weiss, and Ma 2007) employ a combinatorial feature-fusion 
method for compressing enormous amount of word-based features and produce 200 
combinatorial feature-fusion features. The researchers experiment on three learning 
models - alternating decision tree, sequential minimal optimization based support 
vector machine and naïve bayes, and their alternating decision tree achieve the best 
result with 0.931 AUC, 0.716 F-measure, 0.797 precision and 0.649 recall. 
 
Tang et al. (Tang et al. 2007) extract features from link-based data and combine with 
text-based data and produce 4,924,007 features for Web spam detection. However, 
the authors only select 28,051 features out of 4,924,007 features due to the limit of 
computation. Random forest and support vector machine with radial basis function 
are used for host classification while linear support vector machine is used for page 
classification. The authors experiment on WEBSPAM-UK2006 and achieve 
F-measure of 75.46% and 95.11% AUC for small dataset, 90.20% F-measure and 
98.92% AUC for large dataset. 
 
Except for content features and page-level link analysis feature, Geng et al. (Geng, 
Zhu, and Wang 2009) extract host-level link analysis feature for Web spam 
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classification. The researchers have shown that by incorporating the three feature set, 
the best performance can be achieved. 
 
Erdélyi et al. (Erdélyi, Garzó, and Benczúr 2011) propose a new feature set - a bag of 
words derived from BM25 term weighting scheme to improve classification tasks. 
The researchers experimented using various machine learning models such as 
ensemble selection, logitboost and random forest, and show that these three machine 
learning models improve the accuracy results.  
 
Even though there are plenty of algorithms and machine learning techniques used to 
combat Web spam, content providers still try to think another way to manipulate the 
search engines, this field is known as “Adversarial Information Retrieval (Adversarial 
IR)”, a war between search engines and those who tries to manipulate them (Castillo 
and Davison 2011). 
 
A list of scientific publications that use features and structures are shown in a table in 
the next page: 




Structure Datasets Achieve 
200 Combinatorial 
Feature-Fusion Features 






Machine) and Naïve 
Bayes 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 Alternating Decision 
Tree is the best 
classifier among with 
0.931 AUC, 0.716 
F-measure, 0.797 
Precision and 0.649 
Recall after 
Semi-supervised 
learning and Fusion. 
 
(Continue next page) 
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(Table 3-7 continued) 
28,051 features  










40 Host Graph based 
features (Geng, Zhu, and 
Wang 2009) 
C4.5 Decision Tree with 
Bagging, Adaboost with 
Decision Stump 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 85.5% Precision, 
88.7% Recall, 87.1% 
F1-measure, 97.1 
AUC 
10,000 BM25 Features 
(Erdélyi, Garzó, and 
Benczúr 2011) 
Bagged and Boost 
Decision Tree, Logistic 
Regression, naïve 
Bayes, random forest, 
Support Vector Machine 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 & 
DC-2010 
All 10273 including 
link, content and 
BM25 Features 
achieve 0.902 AUC 
 
3.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, two anti-Web spam techniques are covered – trust and distrust based 
model and machine learning model. TrustRank, a trust based anti-Web spam 
algorithm is presented based on some initial trustworthy seeds, and propagate trust to 
detect other trustworthy pages. However, there are some flaws in TrustRank 
algorithm. Thus, other researchers propose the derivatives of TrustRank such as 
Anti-TrustRank , Topical TrustRank , DiffusionRank  and Link Variable TrustRank . 
The derivatives of TrustRank algorithms are thoroughly described. 
 
Experiments are conducted for HostRank and TrustRank on two large public 
available datasets – WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007 to show how 
vulnerable it is for link analysis algorithms. As a result, TrustRank detect more 
trustworthy hosts and demote spam hosts. Furthermore, TrustRank has shown that 
more seeds eventually will lead to better performance. Other trust and distrust model 
algorithms are then briefly explained in this chapter. A comparison table for trust and 
distrust model algorithms is also presented. After that, machine learning approaches 
in Web spam detection are discussed which include features that assist machine to 
learn and structures that define the machine learning model.
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Chapter 4 Trust Propagation Algorithms 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The quantity and quality of the seed sets are the key factors for the success of trust and 
distrust based anti-Web spam algorithms. This kind of approach is simple and yet 
effective, but the manual evaluation of seed sets is very time-consuming. For this 
reason, the manual evaluation process becomes vital and valuable. 
  
In this chapter, Trust Propagation Rank (TPRank) is proposed with the idea of 
calculating trust scores for all pages based on limited evaluation of non-spam and 
spam seeds to demote Web spam. To enhance the proposed algorithm, “ugly” pages 
are underlined for the reason that the categorization of “ugly” pages and pure good 
pages can avoid promoting spam pages. Furthermore, spam pages are punished by 
giving them zero rank so that it would not affect the ranks of other pages. 
 
In addition to this proposed algorithm, Spam Mass (Gyöngyi et al. 2006) algorithm is 
modified with trust propagation into Trust Propagation Spam Mass (TP Spam Mass) to 
detect Web spam. Experiments are done on two available datasets 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 (Castillo et al. 2006) and WEBSPAM-UK2007 (Yahoo! 2007), 
and the results have shown that TPRank outperforms TrustRank in demotion of Web 
spam and TP Spam Mass outperforms Spam Mass in detection of Web spam. 
 
4.2 TRUST PROPAGATION 
In this section, the ugly vertices, a new trust score calculation and a way to handle 
spam vertices are introduced. Furthermore, two anti-Web spam algorithms are 
proposed – Trust Propagation Rank (TPRank) and Trust Propagation Spam Mass (TP 
Spam Mass). 
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4.2.1 Definition 
The definitions are provided for the ease of understanding the algorithms in the rest of 
the chapter. 
 
Unevaluated vertices, denoted as X , refer to unknown pages which are not evaluated. 
Non-spam vertices, denoted as 
N , refer to reputable pages that provide reliable 
content to the users. The opposite is spam pages, denoted as 
S , which refer to pages 
that deliberately provide unreliable content to the user. TrustRank follows the intuition 
that non-spam pages seldom point to spam pages and trust flows. However, it does not 
work in the real Web. Spammers can get lots of incoming links from non-spam pages 
using indecent ways (Qi, Song-Nian, and Sisi 2008). One way of doing this is by 
leaving comments on accessible pages, i.e. pages that can be edited by external like 
blog and Wikipedia. This kind of pages are distinguished as ugly pages 
U  which 
apart from the pure good pages 
G . Ugly pages refer to the aforementioned accessible 
pages or reputable pages that unintentionally link to spam pages. The ugly pages are 
one of the reasons that spam pages got promoted easily. On the other hand, pure good 
pages are reputable pages that there is no way that one would link to spam pages. 
 
For the assessment of ugly vertices 
U , this can be done after the evaluation of 
non-spam vertices N  and spam vertices S . For all non-spam vertices N , if any of 
the outgoing vertices of the non-spam vertex is a spam vertex, the non-spam vertex 
then categorize into set of ugly vertices 
U , otherwise set of pure good vertices G . 
 
4.2.2 Trust Score Calculation 
A new trust score calculator is introduced to calculate the trust score of the unknown 
vertices X . The ugly vertices that introduced earlier are used to enhance the new trust 
score calculation. The equation of the trust score calculator is written as 


















pt is the trust score for unknown vertex p. Gi is the number of pure good vertices while 
Xi is the number of unevaluated vertices. The vertices in Gi , Xi  and qt vertices refer 
to the incoming vertices. The new trust score of page p is calculated by the trust score 
of the incoming links. For all incoming links, spam vertices and ugly vertices are 
simply ignored for the reason that their trust is not trustworthy as the vertices might be 
pointing to spam pages. 
  
 
Figure 4.1: Three examples of trust score calculation 
 
Assume page A where it is pointed by two G  and two X  (showing in the left in 
Figure 4.1), the new trust score is calculated as: 
 























Assume page B where it is pointed by one S , one U , one G  and one X (showing 
in the middle in Figure 4.1), the new trust score is calculated as: 
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Assume page C where it is pointed by one G , two X and one S  (showing in the 
right in Figure 4.1), the new trust score is calculated as: 
 























4.3.3 Handling Spam Vertices 
During the assessment of the seed set, both non-spam seeds and spam seeds are 
evaluated. Often either one of the seed sets is used to propagate trust or distrust, for 
example TrustRank only uses non-spam seed set to propagate trust with the spam seed 
set remain unused. Seed sets are expensive to be evaluated and should therefore make 
good use of both non-spam and spam seed set. TrustRank has shown that non-spam 
vertices will receive high trust score while spam vertices receive low trust score. Even 
though it is low, spam vertices can work together and boost one target page. In other 
words, spam vertices can still affect other vertices. ParentPenalty (Wu and Davison 
2005b; Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006a) penalize non-spam vertices that point to spam 
vertices. However, non-spam vertices might unintentionally point to spam vertices; 
spammers might leave comments to make non-spam vertices point to them. In this 
research, the spam vertices are punished by giving them zero rank. By achieving this, 
the spam vertices have no chance of affecting non-spam vertices with low trust score 
and will not get ranked even though pointed by other vertices. 
 
4.3.4 Trust Propagation Rank (TP Rank) 
Trust Propagation Rank (TPRank), a Web spam demotion algorithm that works similar 
to TrustRank is proposed but propagates trust further based on the same limited set of 
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evaluation seeds. Unlike TrustRank, TPRank use both non-spam seed set and spam 
seed set to demote spam. The seeds are selected based on inverse PageRank for the 
reason that to choose the seeds that propagate the widest coverage (Gyöngyi, 







)1(    (4.2) 
 
Where IPR  is the inverse PageRank score,   is a decay factor usually set as 0.85, 
I is the inverse transition matrix of the Web graph and N  is the number of the 
vertices. During the process of seed selection, spam seeds are collected too. After the 
collection, both ugly vertices and pure good vertices can be extracted out of the 
non-spam vertices. 
  
Algorithm Trust Propagation Rank (TPRank) 
Input  
 T  Transition matrix 
 N  number of pages 
   decay factor  
 M  number of iterations 
 𝜎(𝑖)  ith vertex 
 t  trust score 
 𝑡̅  trust score 
 𝑖𝐺  Number of incoming pure good vertices of page i 
 𝑖𝑋  Number of incoming unknown vertices of page i 
Output  
 TPR  TPRank scores 
Begin 
Assume that the seeds are evaluated as ugly vertices 
U , pure good vertices 
G  and spam vertices S . 
 
(See next page) 
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1) //calculate trust score for unknown pages 
 for i = 1 to N do 
         if 














 end if 
 end for 
 
2) // normalize trust score vector 
||/ ttt   
3) // compute TPRank scores 
tTPR   
for i = 1 to M do 




Figure 4.2: Trust Propagation Rank (TPRank) Algorithm 
 
4.2.5 Trust Propagation Spam Mass (TP Spam Mass) 
In (Gyöngyi et al. 2006), the authors proposed the concept of Spam Mass, a measure 
for the impact of link spamming on PageRank. By estimating Spam Mass, it can help 
by identifying pages that significantly benefit from link-spamming. Spam Mass is 







  (4.3) 
 
where SM  stands for Spam Mass, PR  stands for PageRank and TR  stands for 
TrustRank. A vertex’s Spam Mass is calculated based on its PageRank score minus 
TrustRank score and divided by its PageRank score. Note that both PageRank and 
TrustRank should be normalized first before proceed. 
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In this research, Trust Propagation Rank (TPRank) can be extended to Trust 






_  (4.4) 
 
where SMTP _ stands for Trust Propagation Spam Mass and TP  stands for Trust 
Propagation Rank. It has shown that Spam Mass works more effective than 
Anti-TrustRank (Qureshi 2011). Equation 4.3 and Equation 4.4 are important to show 
the detection of Web spam. 
 
4.2.6 Example  
 
Figure 4.3: Sample Web graph 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates a sample Web graph which contains 4 non-spam vertices 
(highlighted in white box) and 2 spam vertices (highlighted in black box). 
 
An example on the above figure is provided in this sub-section by executing 
TrustRank and TPRank. In addition, the results on Spam Mass and TP Spam Mass are 
also provided. 
 
Firstly, non-spam seeds are selected based on inverse PageRank (see Equation 4.2), 
this is similar to TrustRank (Gyöngyi, Garcia-Molina, and Pedersen 2004) seed 
selection method as the inverse PageRank selected seeds have the most widest 
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propagation. In this example, top three seeds are selected and evaluate: 
 
  EBAE ,, ,  EAN , ,  BS   
 
Since  EAN ,  and vertex E is pointing to vertex B, a spam vertex, then N  can 
be further categorize into U , set of ugly vertices and G , set of good vertices such as 
 EU   and  AE  . N  is used in TrustRank  while S , U and G  are used 
in TPRank to find the trust score for the vertices. The trust scores are: 
 
In TrustRank,  
  05.00005.0t ; 
  
In TPRank,  
  33.033.000033.0t . 
 
After that, the results from both algorithms are used for Spam Mass (see Equation 4.3) 
and TP Spam Mass (see Equation 4.4). 
 
The results are shown below: 
 
Table 4-1: Results from various algorithms on sample Web graph 
Algorithms 
Vertices 
A B C D E F 
TrustRank 0.147 0.066 0.027 0.019 0.155 0.126 
TPRank 0.139 0 0.025 0.018 0.147 0.168 
Spam Mass -0.072 0.279 0.652 0.645 -0.109 0.082 
TP Spam Mass -0.201 0.322 0.675 0.667 -0.046 -0.229 
Chapter 4 Trust Propagation Algorithms  
58 
As shown in Table 4-1, TPRank actually punishes vertex B for being a spam vertex. In 
TrustRank, spam vertex B is actually higher than vertex C and D for the reason that the 
unevaluated vertices are treated the same status even though spam vertices have 
various way to get rank higher than some innocent unknown vertices. In Spam Mass 
and TP Spam Mass comparison, the biggest difference is vertex F where it shows 
negative value in TP Spam Mass while Spam Mass is showing a positive value 
(negative value actually shows how trustworthy it is while positive value shows its 
spamicity). In TP Spam Mass, trust are propagated to vertex F as it is pointed to vertex 
A and E, thus it is most likely that this vertex is a non-spam vertex. 
 
4.3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In the experiment, 50 non-spam seeds are used for WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 100 
non-spam seeds are used for WEBSPAM-UK2007. During the selection for the good 
seeds, 179 spam seeds are detect in WEBSPAM-UK2006 while in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007, 214 spam seeds are detected. For TPRank purpose, the ugly 
seeds are evaluated based on non-spam seeds and spam seeds. As a result, there are 20 
ugly vertices and 30 pure good vertices in non-spam seeds for WEBSPAM-UK2006 
and 24 ugly vertices and 76 pure good vertices in non-spam seeds for 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 


































Percentage of Non-spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
TrustRank
TPRank
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of non-spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the percentage of non-spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2006 while 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the percentage of non-spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
TPRank able to detect more non-spam hosts than TrustRank for the first twelve 
buckets in WEBSPAM-UK2006 shown in Figure 4.4 and for the first seven buckets in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 show in Figure 4.5. It is important to demote spam hosts as early 
as possible so that spam hosts do not appear much at the top results. 
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Figure 4.7: Non-spam hosts gap in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
 
Observed from Figure 4.6, TrustRank detects 3799 non-spam hosts and TPRank 
detects 4201 non-spam host in the 12
th
 bucket in WEBSPAM-UK2006, it has the 
biggest improvement with 402 non-spam hosts detected. On the other hand for 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 showing in Figure 4.7, the 7
th
 bucket has the biggest 
improvement gap of 34 non-spam hosts detected. There is only a slight improvement 
for WEBSPAM-UK2007 dataset for the reason that the number of label spam hosts is 
small, thus it is relatively hard to see the improvement of the non-spam hosts. 
Nevertheless, it has shown that TPRank able to detect more non-spam hosts compare 
to TrustRank algorithm. 
 
Figure 4.8 to Figure 4.11 illustrate the average promotion for non-spam hosts and the 
number of non-spam hosts promoted from TPRank over TrustRank buckets in 
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Figure 4.8: Number of non-spam hosts promoted in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Average non-spam host promoted in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
 
Observed from Figure 4.8 and 4.9, the 18
th
 bucket has the highest improvement with 
an average non-spam hosts promotion of 8.388 bucket per level promoting 224 
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Figure 4.10: Number of non-spam hosts promoted in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
 
  
Figure 4.11: Average non-spam host promoted in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
 
In Figure 4.10 and 4.11, the highest average non-spam host promotion is the 9
th
 bucket 
with the promotion of 2.746 bucket per level and the bucket that has the highest 
number of promoted non-spam hosts is the 16
th
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Figure 4.12: Percentage of spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
 
Apart from Web spam demotion algorithm, two Web spam detection algorithm – Spam 
Mass and TP Spam Mass are discussed. Figure 4.12 and 4.13 illustrates the percentage 
of spam hosts and the summation of all spam hosts on WEBSPAM-UK2006. Figure 
4.14 and 4.15 illustrates the percentage of spam hosts and the summation of all spam 
hosts on WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
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Figure 4.14: Percentage of spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Summation of spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
In Figure 4.12, TP Spam Mass has shown that the algorithm detect more spam hosts 
than Spam Mass for the first seven buckets in WEBSPAM-UK2006 but for 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 showing in Figure 4.14, the result is not so clear for the reason 
that the spam seed set for the dataset is relatively small. However as shown in Figure 
4.15, TP Spam Mass actually accumulate more spam hosts as the bucket moves further 
even though Spam Mass manages to detect more spam at the second bucket. As for 
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spam hosts for all buckets compare to Spam Mass algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Average spam hosts promoted in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
In Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17, TP Spam Mass promotes as much as 10.38 bucket per 
level for spam host with the 5
th
 bucket promoting 158 spam hosts which is an 
improvement of 42.36% on detection of Web Spam over Spam Mass algorithm in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006. For WEBSPAM-UK2007 showing in Figure 4.18 and Figure 
4.19, TP Spam Mass able to promote up to 5.875 bucket per level in the last bucket and 
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Figure 4.18: Average spam hosts promoted in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
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TrustRank TPRank Spam Mass TP Spam Mass 
1 5772732 5105405 151418 92751 
2 9405003 8617492 1548226 1545822 
3 12453809 11389610 2496185 3922350 
4 15018597 13548654 2963797 5340260 
5 17326257 15972170 3510497 6723305 
6 19436425 18080304 3701269 7640583 
7 21183616 19746985 4329449 8539854 
8 23057903 21699476 4854187 9318171 
9 24886572 23498479 5513986 9680861 
10 26594747 25371805 5962484 9929897 
 







TrustRank TPRank Spam Mass TP Spam Mass 
1 5762322 5893117 5278 5288 
2 9798875 9487775 6684 6436 
3 12601227 12041690 7385 7286 
4 15149195 14092532 8013 8866 
5 16952324 16163390 9342 9310 
6 18311165 17929892 9519 9532 
7 19565437 19312567 16486 19081 
8 20322920 20280246 19305 20145 
9 21056879 20846941 20188 155152 
10 21581252 21627362 63341 157259 
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Table 4-2 and 4-3 illustrate the number of Web pages represented from evaluated hosts 
in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. The evaluated hosts are retrieved 
from Figure 4.13 and 4.15 where the summation of hosts is shown from the first bucket 
to the last bucket. However, only the top 10 buckets for evaluation are concerned. 
From the tables, it shows that TP Spam Mass actually detected more spam hosts than 
Spam Mass. However TPRank does not really outperform TrustRank in terms of 
number of Web pages represented from the evaluated hosts. It is believe that 
TrustRank choose the seeds with the largest propagation but TPRank propagates trust 
to the widest seeds, therefore TrustRank able to detect more Web pages compare to 
TPRank. However, TPRank still outperforms TrustRank in term of host level. 
 
Table 4-4 illustrates the propagation coverage denote as Sn  from the evaluated 
vertices E , non-spam vertices N  and spam seeds S ; In addition, the percentage 
of trust that have propagated to non-spam and spam hosts are in the table. 
 
Table 4-4: Propagation coverage in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007  
 
Datasets Algorithms )( ESn   )( NSn   )( SSn   N  S  
WEBSPAM-UK2006 TrustRank 8564 4223 1374 86.20% 13.80% 
TPRank 10183 5242 1553 98.02% 1.98% 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 TrustRank 73790 6603 242 98.98% 1.02% 
TPRank 95192 7900 353 99.54% 0.46% 
 
)( ESn   denotes the number of hosts that are covered from the seed set. )( NSn 
denotes the number of non-spam hosts while )( SSn  denotes the number of spam 
hosts propagated. N  denotes the percentage of trust propagated to non-spam hosts 
and S  denotes the percentage of trust propagated to spam hosts. From Table 4-4, it 
has shown that TPRank has propagated trust to more non-spam hosts just so as spam 
hosts over TrustRank algorithm. Even though spam hosts are propagated more in 
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TPRank, the trust propagated to spam hosts are relatively small compare to TrustRank, 
1.98% than 13.80% in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 0.42% than 1.18% in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 for the reason that TPRank actually propagate trust more 
towards non-spam hosts. The full results of all experiments in this chapter can refer to 
APPENDIX D - Chapter 4 Results. 
 
Aside from TrustRank and Spam Mass, TPRank outperform T-Rank (Zhang, Wang, et 
al. 2011) and TP Spam Mass outperform LVTrustRank (Qi, Song-Nian, and Sisi 2008) 
in detection and demotion of Web spam on WEBSPAM-UK2007. The parameter 
settings are similar to this thesis; in the T-Rank experiments, T-Rank obtained around 
100 spam sites but TPRank obtained 20 spam sites after demotion for the top five 
buckets; in the LVTrustRank experiments, the algorithm detects up to 6% for the first 
three buckets but TP Spam Mass detects at least 8% for the first three buckets with 2
nd
 
bucket detects 13% of spam sites. 
 
The proposed trust propagation algorithm can be further improves existing link-based 
trust model algorithms such as Topical TrustRank (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006b), Wu 
et al. trust algorithm (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006a), DiffusionRank (Yang, King, and 
Lyu 2007), Nie et al. trust algorithm (Nie, Wu, and Davison 2007), LVTrustRank (Qi, 
Song-Nian, and Sisi 2008), QoC-QoL algorithm (Li, Qiancheng, and Yan 2008), 
AVRank & HVRank (Zhang et al. 2009), and T-Rank (Zhang, Wang, et al. 2011). By 
incorporating the proposed trust propagation algorithm into existing link-based trust 
model algorithms, little computation is needed (prove in next section) while the 
enhancement of Web spam demotion is achieved. 
 
4.4 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
In terms of time complexity, assume a graph G  where it consists of vertices   and 
edges  . The new trust score calculation checks all the connected vertices of all 
vertices, thus the operation costs )(  O  . In TrustRank, the algorithm just assigns 
Chapter 4 Trust Propagation Algorithms  
70 
the trust scores so therefore operate in of )(O time. The core operation in both 
algorithms is where for all vertices, all the incoming links of the vertices is checked; 
this operation cost )(  O  in both algorithms. So in total time, in worst case both 
algorithms still run in )(  O time. Details on Big O  notation can refer to 
APPENDIX A - Asymptotic Notation. For Spam Mass and TP Spam Mass, PageRank 
algorithm costs )(  O , similar to the core operation in TrustRank and TPRank, 
while both TrustRank and TPRank cost )(  O . So therefore for Spam Mass and TP 
Spam Mass, both algorithms in worst case operate in )(  O  time. 
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
Various link-based Anti-Web spam techniques are constantly proposed in recent years. 
Trust Propagation Rank (TPRank) is proposed to demote Web spam and Trust 
Propagation Spam Mass (TP Spam Mass) to detect Web spam. The proposed 
algorithms are experimented on two large public available dataset 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007, and have shown that the proposed 
algorithms outperform both TrustRank and Spam Mass in various measurements. 
TPRank has improved the detection rate over TrustRank up to 10.88% in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and up to 1.08% in WEBSPAM-UK2007. TP Spam Mass has 
improved the detection rate over Spam Mass up to 43.94% in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
and up to 16.17% in WEBSPAM-UK2007. In terms of host to page level, TP Spam 
Mass has shown significant results compare to Spam Mass, for up to 106% 
improvement in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 668% improvement in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. In terms of propagation coverage, TPRank has also shown 
significant results as the algorithm has propagated to more trust scores to non-spam 
hosts compare to TrustRank. Even though it is slightly more computation in TPRank 
compare to TrustRank, the experiments have shown noteworthy results that both 
TPRank and TP Spam Mass are worthy in exchange for better performance
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Chapter 5 Incorporating Weight Properties 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The weight properties in the Web model indicate the value of linkage between two 
unknown Web vertices. These weight properties have been exploited by other 
researchers to achieve better relevancy in query results for link analysis algorithms 
such as weighted PageRank (Xing and Ghorbani 2004; Nemirovsky and Avrachenkov 
2008) and weighted HITS algorithm (Li, Shang, and Zhang 2002). Link spam, a broad 
class of Web spam on other hand, tries to attack link analysis algorithm by 
manipulating the linkages between vertices in the Web. Undoubtedly, there are some 
associates between weight properties in the Web model and link spamming. However, 
no research has been done correlating these two. 
 
In this chapter, a novel metric is proposed based on weight properties to enhance the 
detection rate for distrust based Web spam detection algorithms. This metric calculates 
the weights based on outgoing links of the vertices which indicate the relevancy 
linkage between two vertices. The weights are used along with distrust based Web 
spam detection algorithms such as Anti-TrustRank (Krishnan and Raj 2006), Wu et al. 
Distrust algorithm (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006a) and Nie et al. Distrust algorithm 
(Nie, Wu, and Davison 2007) to detect more spams. The experimental results have 
shown that by incorporating weight properties, it enhanced the detection rate by 30.25% 
for Anti-TrustRank, 12.14% for Wu et al. Distrust algorithm and 10.92% for Nie et al. 
Distrust algorithm in WEBSPAM-UK2006, and 31.30% for Anti-TrustRank, 26.38% 
for Wu et al. Distrust algorithm and 20.31% for Nie et al. Distrust in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
In most studies, the weight properties has been widely used to achieve better results for 
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link analysis algorithms based on PageRank (Brinkmeier 2006) and their derivative. 
However in this work, the weight properties are incorporated for the purpose of 
detecting Web spam. 
 
5.2 APPROACH 
In this section, the seed selection, weight function and some modified algorithms 
along with the new weight function are discussed. In addition, some examples are 
provided to give an insight on the new weight function. 
 
5.2.1 Seed Selection 
The seed selection process for trust and distrust model Web spam algorithms either 
select spam seeds to propagate distrust or select non-spam seeds to propagate trust to 
filter Web spam. 
 
In this research, Web spam detection algorithms are focused, in which spam seeds are 
crucial to propagate distrust to detect Web spam. According to Krishnan and Raj 
(Krishnan and Raj 2006), the seed selection algorithm that efficiently detects more 
spam with high PageRank is the PageRank algorithm (Brinkmeier 2006). High 
PageRank spam seeds travel in the reverse direction to detect additional high 
PageRank spam. Detection of high PageRank spam is important as the spam pages 
manipulate other Web pages easily. In this research, HostRank (Eiron, McCurley, and 
Tomlin 2004) is used rather than PageRank as the ranking mechanism is implemented 


























Where HR(p) is the HostRank result on host p,   is a decay factor, )(q  is the 
number of outgoing links of host q. Top rank results are then evaluated as spam seed 
set and selected seeds are labelled as spam to form spam vector Β, where, 
















Spam vector Β then normalized by, 
 
 BBB /  (5.3) 
 
The normalized spam vector B  is used later in both the original and modified version 
of Web spam detection algorithms to propagate distrust to detect more spam. 
  
5.2.2 Weight Function 
Assume a weighted graph is given; a weighted graph associates a label with every edge 
in the graph. The weights denote as the number of outgoing links between one host 
towards another host. The computeOLweight metric is introduced which compute and 








pqp  (5.4) 
 
Where   stands for the total weight for host p, ),( qp  denotes as there is a direct 
connection from host p to host q, 
pq  is a weight vector which denote as the number 
of pages from host p to host q of the weighted graph.  
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The row vector, 

































Then, let the sum of elements for each of the row, 
mr  in matrix T applied into 










),(  (5.6) 
 





pqO   (5.7) 
 
pqO  
is the new weight which indicates the normalized  
 
Note that, the transition matrix T  is basically a matrix form of representation on each 
of the weight function in a weighted graph. Hence, 
 
 
),( qpT  . (5.8) 
 
Each row vectors are multiplied with the corresponding reciprocal of the summation 
for each row respectively in order to normalize the transition weight matrix to a 
transition weight matrix. 
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  (5.10) 
 
This weight gives us valuable information on how much one host is affecting another 
host. This approach is similar to the act of Web spamming, which is boosting one 
targeted page or host. In later section, the weight features along with the Web spam 
detection algorithms are experimented.  
 
5.2.3 Algorithms 
Let weighted host graph represented as   ,,WG , where   is a set of vertices, 
  is a set of edges and   is a weight function that denotes the number of pages for 
each edge of the weighted directed graph WG . The weight function mentioned in the 
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previous sub-section is then applied onto the weighted host graph WG  to get the new 
weight O  which denote as the outgoing links of one host to another. The weight is 
used to modify existing Web spam detection algorithm to enhance the Web spam 
detection. The Web spam detection algorithms that are presented here to modify and 
show comparisons are Anti-TrustRank (Krishnan and Raj 2006), Wu et al. distrust 
algorithm (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006a) and Nie et al. distrust algorithm (Nie, Wu, 
and Davison 2007). 
  
The principle of Anti-TrustRank is based on the intuition that pages that point to spam 
pages are likely to be spam pages themselves. Unlike TrustRank (Gyöngyi, 
Garcia-Molina, and Pedersen 2004), Anti-TrustRank travel in the reverse direction 
from a set of high PageRank spam seeds to detect more spam pages. The 
Anti-TrustRank algorithm can be seen in Equation 3.2. The algorithm is then modified 





















)(   (5.11) 
 
Where WATR(p) is the result of the weighted Anti-TrustRank algorithm of host p,   
is a decay factor, )(deg q  is the number of incoming links of host q, Opq is the new 
weight function from host p to host q and B(p) is the spam vector. 
 
Wu et al.  (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006a) proposed the combination of both trust and 
distrust to demote Web spam and experimented on three types of summation steps and 
two types of splitting steps for both trust and distrust, the summation steps are simple 
summation, maximum share and maximum parent while the splitting steps are 
constant splitting and logarithm splitting. The authors have shown that by combining 
the two propagations, it will improve the overall performance score. However, only 
the distrust is concerned as it is used to detect Web spam. The authors have shown that 
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using maximum share for accumulation and logarithm splitting for splitting with 
constant c of 0.9 has the best performance for detecting Web spam. The Wu et al. 





























   
  (5.12) 
Where DISTR stands for weighted Wu et al. distrust algorithm. MaxShare is a function 
that only takes the maximum distrust values from the children. 
  
































  (5.13) 
Where WDISTR stands for weighted Wu et al. distrust algorithm.  
 
The next Web spam detection algorithm is Nie et al. (Nie et al., 2007) algorithm. 
Similar with Wu et al. (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006a), the authors use both trust and 
distrust propagation. The authors calculate the overall trust score by also including the 
subtraction of the distrust score. The authors found that using maximum share for 
accumulation and equal splitting for splitting actually achieves the best performance. 



































 Where Distrust(p) represent Nie et al. Distrust algorithm. 
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The best performance of Nie et al. distrust algorithm is modified by including the 
































  (5.15) 
Where WDistrust stands for Nie et al. distrust algorithm.  
 
For the next sub-section, the algorithms are executed on a sample weighted Web graph 




Figure 5.1: Sample weighted Web graph 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates a Web graph where  BAS ,  and },,,{ FEDCN  . Initially, 
HostRank is applied to select the spam hosts. Assume that the jumping probability j is 
0.85, running in 20 iterations, the HostRank results on Figure 5.1 are: 
 
 148.0271.0162.0071.0215.0133.0HR  
 
From the result, top HostRank hosts are selected to evaluate. Assume that top three 
hosts are evaluated; the evaluated hosts  EDBE ,,  where }{BS   and 
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},{ EDN  . The spam vector B would give 
 
 000010B  
 
The spam vector B  is now ready to apply into the Web spam detection algorithms. 
Before that, the new weight O  is calculated for the modified algorithms. Below are 
the step based on the graph in Figure 5.1. 
 






























   
 
The row vectors of the matrix T can be written as: 
 
 0000301 r ;  3507052 r ;  0030003 r ; 
  
 0500004 r ;  2020205 r ;  0300026 r . 
 
Then the summation of each row can be written as: 
 
311 r ; 2022 r ; 333 r ; 
 
544 r ; 655 r ; 566 r . 
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Figure 5.2: Sample weighted Web graph after computeOLweight metric 
 
The normalized weight is also shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
After the spam vector B and new weight O  are calculated, both spam vector and the 
new weight are applied into both original and weighted Web spam detection 
algorithms individually. Assume that the jumping probability is 0.85 and run in 20 
iterations, the results for the algorithms are: 
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Table 5-1: Host results on different Web spam detection algorithms 
Web Spam  
Detection Algorithms 
Hosts 
A B C D E F 
Anti-TrustRank 0.156 0.368 0.029 0.069 0.243 0.135 
Wu et al. Distrust 0.197 0.286 0.075 0.108 0.197 0.137 
Nie et al. Distrust 0.204 0.337 0.050 0.082 0.204 0.123 
Weighted Anti-TrustRank 0.268 0.363 0.049 0.066 0.135 0.119 
Weighted Wu et al. Distrust 0.305 0.287 0.091 0.085 0.101 0.131 
Weighted Nie et al. Distrust 0.312 0.367 0.050 0.059 0.104 0.108 
 
Table 5-1 shows the results of both the original and weighted Web spam detection 
algorithms. Observed from the table, all the algorithms gave host B the highest rank as 
it is a spam host. However, not all algorithms able to detect host A as a spam host. The 
closest original algorithms are Wu et al. distrust and Nie et al. distrust as both these 
algorithms gave the same rank values for host A and host E. With the computed weight, 
the modified version of the algorithms able to give a high rank to host A and host B for 
the reason that host A is performing link exchange with spam host B only. 
 
5.3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, the proposed algorithms are experimented on two public available 
datasets – WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007 (See Chapter 2 for more 
details on datasets). The percentages of spam hosts, summation of spam hosts, average 
spam host promotion, number of spam hosts promoted and number of Web pages 
represented from the evaluated spam hosts are shown in the experiments.  
 
Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.8 illustrate the percentage of spam hosts for Anti-TrustRank 
versus Weighted Anti-TrustRank, Wu et al. Distrust versus weighted Wu et al. Distrust, 
Nie et al. Distrust vs. weighted Nie et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of spam hosts for Anti-TrustRank and weighted 
Anti-TrustRank in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Percentage of spam hosts for Anti-TrustRank and weighted 
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of spam hosts for Wu et al. Distrust and weighted Wu et al. 
Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Percentage of spam hosts for Wu et al. Distrust and weighted Wu et al. 
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Figure 5.7: Percentage of spam hosts for Nie et al. Distrust vs weighted Nie et al. 
Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Percentage of spam hosts for Nie et al. Distrust vs weighted Nie et al. 
Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
The figures (Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.8) under the same dataset show similar patterns. In 
WEBSPAM-UK2006, the benchmark algorithm works slightly better than the 
weighted one for the first bucket but from the second bucket to the fifth bucket, the 
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weighted Anti-TrustRank managed to detect more spam host for the first five bucket 
than Anti-TrustRank. However, weighted Wu et al. Distrust and weighted Lan Nie et 




Figure 5.9: Summation of spam hosts for Anti-TrustRank and weighted 
Anti-TrustRank in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Summation of spam hosts for Anti-TrustRank and weighted 
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Figure 5.9 to Figure 5.14 illustrate the summation of spam hosts for Anti-TrustRank 
versus weighted Anti-TrustRank, Wu et al. Distrust versus weighted Wu et al. 
Distrust, Nie et al. Distrust vs. weighted Nie et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
and WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
Figure 5.11: Summation of spam hosts for Wu et al. Distrust and weighted Wu et al. 
Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Summation of spam hosts for Wu et al. Distrust and weighted Wu et al. 
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Figure 5.13: Summation of spam hosts for Nie et al. Distrust and weighted Nie et al. 
Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Summation of spam hosts for Nie et al. Distrust and weighted Nie et al. 
Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
Figure 5.9 to Figure 5.14 is highly correlated to the previous figure - Figure 5.3 to 
Figure 5.8 as the figures show the summation of each bucket for various algorithms in 
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algorithms accumulated more spam hosts until it reached the same point at 15
th
 bucket 
in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 13
th
 bucket in WEBSPAM-UK2007. The biggest gap for 
the summation of spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2006 is Anti-TrustRank versus 
weighted Anti-TrustRank (showing in Figure 5.9) with 192 spam hosts difference in 
the 6
th
 bucket. On the other hand, the biggest gap for summation of spam hosts in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 is also Anti-TrustRank versus weighted Anti-TrustRank 




Figure 5.15 to Figure 5.18 show the average spam hosts promotion and number of 




Figure 5.15: Average spam hosts promotion for weighted Anti-TrustRank over 
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Figure 5.16: Number of spam hosts promoted for weighted Anti-TrustRank over 
Anti-TrustRank in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
Figure 5.17: Average spam hosts promotion for weighted Anti-TrustRank over 
Anti-TrustRank in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 In WEBSPAM-UK2006, the highest average spam host promotion came from 12
th
 
bucket with 7.67 bucket per level. However, the most spam hosts that a bucket 
promoted is the 2
nd
 bucket where it promotes 85 spam hosts. In WEBSPAM-UK2007, 
a sum of 113 spam hosts being promoted and the largest number of spam hosts being 
promoted is the 13
th
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Figure 5.18: Number of spam hosts promoted for weighted Anti-TrustRank over 
Anti-TrustRank in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 
Figure 5.19: Average spam hosts promotion for weighted Wu et al. Distrust over Wu et 
al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
Figure 5.19 to Figure 5.22 illustrate the average spam hosts promotion and number of 
spam hosts being promoted for weighted Wu et al. Distrust over the benchmark Wu et 
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Figure 5.20: Number of spam hosts promoted for weighted Wu et al. Distrust over Wu 
et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
 
Figure 5.21: Average spam hosts promotion for weighted Wu et al. Distrust over Wu et 
al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
In WEBSPAM-UK2006, the highest average spam host promotion bucket goes to 11
th
 
bucket with bucket per level of 7.47 but the highest number of spam hosts bucket is the 
2
nd
 bucket with 76 spam hosts. On the other hand in WEBSPAM-UK2007, the bucket 
with the largest average spam host promotion is 13
th
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6.55 bucket per level. The total sum of spam host being promoted in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 by weighted Wu et al. Distrust is 101 spam hosts. 
 
 
Figure 5.22: Number of spam hosts promoted for weighted Wu et al. Distrust over Wu 
et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
  
Figure 5.23: Average spam hosts promotion for weighted Nie et al. Distrust over Nie et 
al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
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in term of average spam hosts promotion and number of spam hosts promoted in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 
Figure 5.24: Number of spam hosts promoted for weighted Nie et al. Distrust over Nie 
et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
  
Figure 5.25: Average spam hosts promotion for weighted Nie et al. Distrust over Nie et 
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Figure 5.26: Number of spam hosts promoted for weighted Nie et al. Distrust over Nie 
et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
For WEBSPAM-UK2006, weighted Nie et al. Distrust has the highest average spam 
host promotion over the benchmark algorithm at the 10
th
 bucket with bucket per level 
of 6.18. However the bucket that promotes the most spam hosts is the 2
nd
 bucket, just 
like weighted Anti-TrustRank and weighted Wu et al. Distrust over their benchmark 
algorithms. For WEBSPAM-UK2007, similar to previous weighted algorithms, there 
is almost no spam host being promoted at the last few buckets. This is because the 
amount of spam hosts is not large enough compare to the WEBSPAM-UK2007 
dataset. Despite of this, the weighted algorithm promoted up to 3.62 bucket per level 
and promotes up to 13 spam hosts for each bucket. 
 






ATR WATR DISTR WDISTR Distrust WDistrust 
1 1313291 1349790 1622823 1295424 1653512 1273941 
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(Table 5-2 continued) 
3 2841133 3780350 3336290 3681108 3438744 3821501 
4 3063894 4282150 3739390 4124931 3929221 4296223 
5 3204105 4461991 3945059 4454984 3995253 4448293 
6 3370887 4570601 4049277 4546177 4166130 4566529 
7 3508984 4615278 4094948 4632867 4282662 4639370 
8 3754869 4727802 4282774 4749903 4369946 4694204 
9 4061543 4792877 4506142 4806178 4445917 4797769 
10 4214193 4857809 4631553 4921995 4713938 4919528 
 






ATR WATR DISTR WDISTR Distrust WDistrust 
1 929200 970876 947715 892901 960910 910721 
2 1005378 1069127 1026238 1025691 1020807 1063244 
3 1012441 1101626 1058704 1077870 1057994 1079379 
4 1037990 1115851 1075044 1139643 1076417 1110244 
5 1064091 1120334 1112379 1181418 1117387 1116103 
6 1080294 1148771 1115044 1188373 1126445 1120537 
7 1099606 1149016 1115320 1190689 1134084 1130236 
8 1107402 1190866 1131098 1207496 1136708 1190857 
9 1139103 1191074 1164160 1207522 1184168 1206430 
10 1198849 1216639 1203615 1207579 1205119 1206584 
*ATR – Anti-TrustRank, , WATR – Weighted Anti-TrustRank,  
DISTR. – Wu et al. Distrust, WDISTR – Weighted Wu et al. Distrust,  
Distrust – Nie et al. Distrust, WDistrust – Weighted Nie et al. Distrust 
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Table 5-2 and 5-3 shows the number of Web pages represented from evaluated hosts in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. The tables show each bucket with its 
accumulating Web pages. The evaluated hosts are retrieved from previous experiments 
in Figure 5.9 to Figure 5.14. However, only the top 10 buckets are shown for the 
reason that detection of Web spam in early buckets are more important. As shown in 
the tables, at the 10
th
 bucket, the weighted algorithms detect more spam Web pages 
than the benchmark algorithms. Both weighted Wu et al. Distrust and weighted Nie et 
al. Distrust did not managed to detect more spam pages at the first few buckets. 
However, both the algorithms managed to detect more in later buckets. For example , 
weighted Wu et al. Distrust move close to the bench algorithm at the 2
nd
 bucket and 
catch up in 3
rd
 bucket and so on in both Web spam datasets. Weighted Nie et al. 
Distrust algorithm manages to detect more spam pages at the 2
nd
 bucket onwards. The 
full results of all experiments in this chapter can refer to APPENDIX E - Chapter 5 
Results. 
 
Aside from the aforementioned Web spam detection algorithms, the weighted 
algorithms (i.e. weighted Anti-TrustRank, weighted Wu et al. Distrust and weighted 
Nie et al. Distrust) outperform LVTrustRank (Qi, Song-Nian, and Sisi 2008) by the 
average detection of spam sites for the top five buckets in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
LVTrustRank has an average detection of 4% while the weighted algorithms achieve 
average demotion of 7.8%, 7.7% and 7.4% individually for the top five buckets. 
 
The weight properties can further improve the Web spam detection experience of other 
link-based distrust model algorithms such as ParentPenalty (Wu and Davison 2005b), 
R-SpamRank (Liang, Ru, and Zhu 2007), QoC-QoL (Li, Qiancheng, and Yan 2008), 
AVRank & HVRank (Zhang et al. 2009), and also Trust-Distrust Rank (Zhang, Wang, 
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5.4 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
Consider a weighted directed host graph   ,,WG , with   as a set of vertices,   
as a set of edges and   is the weight of the edges. Initially, Equation 5.4 sums the out 
degree weights for each vertex of the graph. This operation can be divided into two 
steps which are one, )(O   time for summation of weights, shown in Equation 5.5 
and two, )(O time for performing on all vertices, shown in Equation 5.6. Thus the 
total time devoted for this operation is )(  O . The weight is calculated by 
multiplying every weight of the edges with the reciprocal of the summation weight for 
every vertex, shown in Equation 5.7. The time spent on visiting all edges is )(O  
while )(O  for all vertices. Therefore, this operation costs )(  O . To summarize, 
the total operations for performing weight function is )(  O time. The weight is an 
important feature for detection of Web spam; this method is definitely worthy in 
exchange of better performances. Details on Big O  notation can refer to APPENDIX 
A - Asymptotic Notation. 
  
5.6 SUMMARY 
Many unethical ways have been adopted by the commercial industries to make their 
website appear at the top of the search results and thus undermining the web users’ 
interests. Many anti-link spam techniques have been constantly proposed. In this 
chapter, the incorporation of weight properties is proposed to enhance the Web spam 
detection algorithms. In the experiment section, three well known Web spam detection 
algorithms are modified and compared with the original algorithms. The results have 
shown that based on the same quantity of spam seeds, the weight has greatly improved 
the baseline algorithm up to 30.25% at the host level and 39.76% at the page level in 
detection of Web spam for WEBSPAM-UK2006 while up to 31.30% at the host level 
and 8.81% at the page level for WEBSPAM-UK2007 dataset. 
Chapter 6 Distrust Seed Set Propagation Algorithm 
98 
 
Chapter 6 Distrust Seed Set Propagation Algorithm 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The process of carefully choosing pages for propagation purpose is known as seed 
selection process. The seed selection process is crucial in terms of quality and quantity 
towards the performance of these trust and distrust models (Zhang, Han, and Liang 
2009). For trust propagation, seeds are selected based on their outgoing links to 
identify pages that give the broadest propagation, as that of how HITS is calculating 
the hub score. Conversely, for distrust propagation, seeds are selected based on their 
incoming links, as that of PageRank is calculating the authority score. Krishnan and 
Raj (Krishnan and Raj 2006) use high PageRank spam seeds to detect more spam sites 
because high PageRank spam seeds are likely to detect other spam sites with relatively 
high PageRank. Despite the quality of the seeds, the quantity is still a problem. Manual 
evaluation for the seed set is tremendously expensive in terms of both cost and also in 
not be enough to cover the Web. 
 
These problems have been noticed by few researchers (Zhang, Han, and Liang 2009; 
Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006b; Jiang et al. 2008). Automatic seed set expansion 
algorithm proposed by Zhang et al. (Zhang, Han, and Liang 2009) follows the intuition 
that if one page is pointed by many trustworthy pages, then that page can be trusted. 
Wu et al. (Wu and Davison 2005b) proposed Parent Penalty which follows the 
intuition that if one page is pointing to many spam pages, it is likely that this page is a 
spam page. These algorithms are the only two that expand the seed set to combat Web 
spam. Both however, use threshold to separate spam and non-spam. Due to the 
enormity of the Web, threshold is very hard to determine. 
 
In this chapter, the purpose is to detect more spam pages which are more concern to 
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Web search engines. The distrust seed set propagation algorithm (DSP) is proposed 
which act as an extension to the spam seed set to calculate the distrust score for 
unevaluated pages. Unlike the expand seed set algorithms that mentioned earlier, the 
intention is to assist the manual evaluation by calculating the likelihood of other pages 
becoming spam based on the seed set. The experiments are done on 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 (Castillo et al. 2006) and WEBSPAM-UK2007 (Yahoo! 2007) 
and have shown that DSP algorithm works well with existing Web spam detection 
algorithms. 
 
6.2 DISTRUST SEED SET PROPAGATION 
In this section, a detailed explanation is given on distrust seed set propagation 




Web spam detection is more effective at host level rather than page level for the reason 
that if one page is a spam host, it can be assumed that all pages under this host are all 
spams. A host is denoted as a set of Web pages under the same domain name. 
Consequently, algorithms are all done at the host level. 
 
The seed selection process for trust and distrust model Web spam algorithms either 
select spam seeds to propagate distrust or select trustworthy seeds to propagate trust to 
filter Web spam. Since distrust seed set propagation algorithm is correlated to Web 
spam detection algorithm, the seed selection process for DSP therefore select spam 
seeds to propagate distrust to detect Web spam.  
 
According to Krishnan and Raj (Krishnan and Raj 2006), the seed selection algorithm 
that efficiently detects more high PageRank spam vertices is the PageRank algorithm 
(Brinkmeier 2006). Actually it is HostRank (Eiron, McCurley, and Tomlin 2004) since 
the experiments are done at the host level.  
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pHR  (6.1) 
 
Where HR(p) is the HostRank score on host p,   is a decay factor, )(deg q  is the 
number of outgoing links of host q. 
 
Assume that a host graph ),( HHHG  where H  is a set of host vertices and H  is 
a set of ordered pair of hosts. Initially HostRank are executed on the host graph H and 
top selected HostRank vertices are evaluated and assigned with an initial distrust score 
















where the initial distrust score of host p 1d  is 1 if host p is a spam host, 0 otherwise. 







d   (6.3) 
Such that 
 
  1 Hid   (6.4) 
 
 
Note that the initial distrust score is similar to the results from the evaluation process 
for the Web spam detection algorithms. The difference is that the distrust score 
calculated by the distrust seed set propagation algorithm is an iterative process. Thus, 
Chapter 6 Distrust Seed Set Propagation Algorithm 
101 
at the next iteration, while the distrust score of evaluated vertices remains, the distrust 

















where )( pdi  is the new distrust score of page p at i
th 
iteration; (p,q) denotes as there 
is a hyperlink from page p to page q; )(deg p denotes the number of outgoing links of 
page p. After the distrust scores for the unevaluated vertices are calculated, the distrust 
scores then again normalized using Equation 6.3 and 6.4. The distrust seed set 
propagation algorithm is an iterative process where the iteration is dependent to the 
size of the Web graph, the iteration will reach until one point where it start to converge. 
The equivalent matrix equation form of Equation 6.5 is: 
 
 1
 ii dIsd  (6.6) 
 
where id  is the distrust score vector, I is an inverse adjacent matrix represent the Web 
structure, in which T(p,q) is 1 if page p is pointing to page q, otherwise 0. s is a vector 
which represent )(deg1 p  where )(deg p  is the number of outgoing links of page 
p. Figure 6.1 illustrates the distrust seed set propagation algorithm.  
 
In this experiment, three well-known Web spam detection algorithms are chosen and 
compared with those along with the distrust seed set propagation algorithm – 
Anti-TrustRank (Krishnan and Raj 2006) refer to Equation 3.2, Wu et al. (Wu, Goel, 
and Davison 2006a) distrust algorithm refer to Equation 5.12 and Nie et al. (Nie, Wu, 
and Davison 2007) distrust algorithm refer to Equation 5.14. 
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Figure 6.1: The distrust seed set propagation (DSP) algorithm. 
 
6.2.2 Example 
Consider Figure 6.2 as shown below. 
 
Figure 6.2: Sample Web graph. 
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The distrust seed set propagation algorithms would run in an iterative computation to 
assure the propagation spread further. Assume that Page B is a spam seed; at the first 
iteration where Equation 6.2 is applied, the distrust score vector d is given: 
 
 0000101 d  
 
After that, the distrust score vector d is applied onto Equation 6.5 iteratively to assure 
that the distrust is propagating. The intention of the distrust seed set propagation 
algorithm is to find the probability of other unevaluated pages being spam. Table 6-1 
illustrates the distrust score vector on Figure 6.2 for 10 iterations. 
 
In Table 6-1, assume page A is a spam seed; the likelihood for the unevaluated pages 
becoming a spam is counted iteratively where each iteration is normalized to the sum 
of 1. A page will only become dishonest if it points to spam seeds. While observing the 
2
nd
 iteration, since page A and page C pointing to page B, there is a possibility that both 
page A and page C are spam. Distrust is propagated further as more iteration is done.  
The distrust distribution in Table 6-1 is applied into Anti-TrustRank algorithm with 
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DSP in Equation 6.6, the decay factor   is set to 0.85 and run in 20 iterations; the 
results are shown in Table 6-2. 




A B C D E F 
𝑑1̅̅ ̅ 0 1 0 0 0 0 
𝑑2̅̅ ̅ 0.25 0.50 0.25 0 0 0 
𝑑3̅̅ ̅ 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.20 0 0 
𝑑4̅̅ ̅ 0.167 0.333 0.167 0.167 0.167 0 
𝑑5̅̅ ̅ 0.143 0.285 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 
𝑑6̅̅ ̅ 0.187 0.25 0.187 0.125 0.125 0.125 
𝑑7̅̅ ̅ 0.177 0.235 0.176 0.176 0.118 0.118 
𝑑8̅̅ ̅ 0.167 0.222 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.111 
𝑑9̅̅ ̅ 0.158 0.211 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 
𝑑10̅̅ ̅̅  0.175 0.200 0.175 0.150 0.150 0.150 
 




A B C D E F 
𝑑1̅̅ ̅ 0.164 0.359 0.164 0.141 0.125 0.053 
𝑑2̅̅ ̅ 0.180 0.312 0.180 0.164 0.133 0.059 
𝑑3̅̅ ̅ 0.164 0.281 0.164 0.180 0.148 0.066 
𝑑4̅̅ ̅ 0.172 0.297 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.070 
𝑑5̅̅ ̅ 0.164 0.281 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.094 
𝑑6̅̅ ̅ 0.164 0.297 0.164 0.180 0.148 0.090 
𝑑7̅̅ ̅ 0.156 0.281 0.156 0.172 0.148 0.090 
𝑑8̅̅ ̅ 0.156 0.281 0.156 0.18 0.156 0.090 
𝑑9̅̅ ̅ 0.156 0.281 0.156 0.172 0.156 0.098 
𝑑10̅̅ ̅̅  0.164 0.266 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.094 
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Observed from Table 6-2, note that 𝑑1̅̅ ̅  actually is the original algorithm. When 
applied the distrust seed set algorithm, the distrust values are propagating around, this 
enhanced the Web spam detection algorithms. The experiments are done in a large 
dataset namely WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007 that the algorithms 
work well with distrust seed set algorithm and reached convergence after the 5
th
 
distrust score vector. 
 
6.3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In the experiments, distrust seed set propagation is performed for 10 iterations on 
well-known three Web spam detection algorithms – Anti-TrustRank (Krishnan and 
Raj 2006), Wu et al. Distrust (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006a) and Nie et al. Distrust 
(Nie, Wu, and Davison 2007) in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007 (See 
Chapter 2 for more details on datasets). Even though the results are distributed in 20 
buckets, only the top 10 buckets are concerned because early buckets is crucial for 
Web spam detection. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Number of spam hosts summing to the 10th bucket for Anti-TrustRank and 
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Figure 6.3 to Figure 6.8 illustrate number of spam hosts summing to the 10
th
 bucket in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and spam hosts gap in top 10 buckets in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
for Anti-TrustRank, Wu et al. Distrust and Nie et al. Distrust versus the DSP 




Figure 6.4: Spam hosts gap in Top 10 buckets for Anti-TrustRank DSP over 
Anti-TrustRank in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Number of spam hosts summing to the 10th bucket for Wu et al. Distrust 
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Figure 6.6: Spam hosts gap in Top 10 buckets for Wu et al. Distrust DSP over Wu et al. 
Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Number of spam hosts summing to the 10th bucket for Nie et al. Distrust 
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Figure 6.8: Spam hosts gap in Top 10 buckets for Nie et al. Distrust DSP over Nie et al. 
Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
To summarize, the DSP 2
nd
 iteration improve Anti-TrustRank up to 5.57%, Wu et al. 
Distrust up to 3.54% and Nie et al. Distrust up to 4.21% in WEBSPAM-UK2006. For 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 on the other hand, the DSP 2
nd
 iteration improve Anti-TrustRank 
up to 3.7%, Wu et al. Distrust up to 11.83% and Nie et al. Distrust up to 10.26%. Even 
though it is a small improvement, the distrust seed set algorithm did improve the 
baseline algorithms. In later experiments, the results on summation of 10 buckets of 
spam hosts are presented for these algorithms along with 10 iterations DSP. 
Table 6-3: Summation of 10 buckets of spam hosts for DSP  





































































































Lan Nie et al. Distrust Bucket Index 
Spam Hosts Gap in Top 10 buckets in WEBSPAM-UK2007 
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Table 6-4: Summation of 10 buckets of spam hosts for DSP  



















































































*ATR – Anti-TrustRank, Wu – Wu et al. Distrust, Nie – Nie et al. Distrust 
 
Table 6-3 and 6.4 show the summation of spam hosts for 10 buckets for the baseline 
algorithms along with the distrust seed set algorithm from 2
nd
 iteration to 10
th
 iteration 
for WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. The percentages of improvement 
over the baseline algorithms are also shown in the tables. Note that the 1
st
 iteration 
DSP is the standard propagation for all trust and distrust algorithms. In 
WEBSPAM-UK2006, all algorithms with DSP managed to detect the most spam hosts 
at the 8
th
 iteration while reaching convergence at the 5
th
 iteration. The biggest 
improvement goes to Anti-TrustRank on 8
th
 iteration DSP with an improvement of 
16.54% detecting 888 spam hosts. Despite of this, the most spam hosts detected is Nie 
et al. Distrust on 8
th
 iteration DSP with 944 spam hosts detected at the 10th bucket. 
For WEBSPAM-UK2007, both Anti-TrustRank and Nie et al. Distrust detect the most 
spam hosts with 9
th
 iteration DSP while Wu et al. Distrust detect the most spam hosts 
with 7
th
 iteration DSP. Regardless of this, the three algorithms reach convergence after 
the 5
th
 iteration. The most spam hosts detected and also the biggest improvement goes 
to Nie et al. Distrust at 9
th
 iteration DSP with an improvement of 10.05% detecting 230 
spam hosts. 
 
Figure 6.9 to Figure 6.12 illustrate the average spam hosts promotion and number of 
spam hosts promoted for Anti-Trustrank on 8
th
 iteration DSP in WEBSPAM-UK2006 








Figure 6.9: Average spam hosts promotion for Anti-TrustRank on 8th iteration DSP 
over Anti-TrustRank in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Number of spam hosts promoted for Anti-TrustRank on 8th iteration DSP 
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Figure 6.11: Average spam hosts promotion for Anti-TrustRank on 9th iteration DSP 
over Anti-TrustRank in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Number of spam hosts promoted for Anti-TrustRank on 9th iteration DSP 
over Anti-TrustRank in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
In WEBSPAM-UK2006, the highest average spam host promotion is the 12
th
 bucket 
where it promotes 6.04 bucket per level for the spam hosts. However the most spam 
hosts being promoted is the 13
th
 bucket with 56 spam hosts promoted. In 
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benchmark algorithm, the highest average spam hosts promotion is the 13
th
 bucket 
with 4.25 bucket per level. 
 
  
Figure 6.13: Average spam hosts promotion for Wu et al. Distrust on 8th iteration DSP 
over Wu et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Number of spam hosts promoted for Wu et al. Distrust on 8th iteration 






















Wu et al. Distrust Bucket Index 




























Wu et al. Distrust Bucket Index 
Number of Spam Hosts Promoted in WEBSPAM-UK2006 
Chapter 6 Distrust Seed Set Propagation Algorithm 
113 
 
Figure 6.15: Average spam hosts promotion for Wu et al. Distrust on 7th iteration DSP 
over Wu et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 
Figure 6.16: Number of spam hosts promoted for Wu et al. Distrust on 7th iteration 
DSP over Wu et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
Figure 6.13 to Figure 6.16 illustrate the average spam hosts promotion and number of 
spam hosts promoted for Wu et al. Distrust on 7
th
 iteration DSP in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and on 8
th
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benchmark algorithm – Wu et al. Distrust. From the figures, the highest bucket per 
level in WEBSPAM-UK2006 is the 11
th
 bucket where it promotes 7.1 bucket per level 
for the spam hosts. Still, the bucket that promotes the most spam hosts is the 2
nd
 bucket 
promoting 45 spam hosts. WEBSPAM-UK2007 on the other hand, the highest bucket 
per level is 4.75 bucket per level for the spam hosts while the highest number of spam 
hosts promoted is the 11
th
 bucket promoting 13 spam hosts. 
 
Figure 6.17: Average spam hosts promotion for Nie et al. Distrust on 8th iteration DSP 
over Nie et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2006. 
 
Figure 6.18: Number of spam hosts promoted for Nie et al. Distrust on 8th iteration 
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Figure 6.19: Average spam hosts promotion for Nie et al. Distrust on 9th iteration DSP 
over Nie et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 
Figure 6.20: Number of spam hosts promoted for Nie et al. Distrust on 9th iteration 
DSP over Nie et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
Figure 6.17 to Figure 6.20 illustrate the average spam hosts promotion and number of 
spam hosts promoted for Nie et al. Distrust on 8
th
 iteration DSP in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and on 9
th
 iteration DSP WEBSPAM-UK2007 over its 
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The highest bucket per level in WEBSPAM-UK2006 is the 13
th
 bucket as high as 7.21 
bucket per level for spam hosts while the bucket with the biggest number of spam 
hosts promoted is the 2
nd
 bucket with 73 spam hosts promoted. For 
WEBSPAM-UK2007, the highest average spam hosts promotion is the 15
th
 bucket 
with 8.5 bucket per level for spam hosts. The total sum of spam hosts being promoted 
by Nie et al. Distrust with 9
th
 iteration DSP over Nie et al. Distrust in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 is 108 spam hosts. 
 





















1 1313291 1298996 1622823 1588293 1653314 1539283 
2 2456555 2694632 2728892 2856597 2832581 3003471 
3 2841133 3535509 3336290 3841061 3438744 4171748 
4 3063894 3845866 3739390 4132319 3929393 4619347 
5 3204105 4024198 3945059 4279553 3995253 4944029 
6 3370887 4316557 4049277 4488813 4166130 5240632 
7 3508984 4448721 4094948 4591742 4282662 5284677 
8 3754869 4529346 4282774 4676556 4369946 5352723 
9 4061543 4832617 4506142 4780965 4440319 5536531 
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1 937106 932239 973094 995268 1005285 1003788 
2 1009426 1032782 1027670 1064206 1022486 1068011 
3 1014809 1034819 1079967 1064527 1079508 1120374 
4 1039525 1060942 1096300 1078740 1112970 1193032 
5 1065252 1078895 1133635 1148592 1138692 1195269 
6 1084178 1085877 1136315 1158840 1150000 1220140 
7 1103333 1087342 1139671 1168950 1155144 1228255 
8 1147566 1169866 1153311 1185852 1157171 1258372 
9 1163808 1225869 1183984 1228032 1189461 1258837 
10 1200058 1226594 1194601 1242814 1205620 1309149 
 
Table 5 and 6 depicts number of Web pages represented from evaluated hosts in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. At the 10
th
 bucket, both tables have 
shown that the algorithms with distrust seed set propagation have detected more spam 
pages than the benchmark algorithms. Some DSP algorithms in different datasets are 
not able to detect more spam pages at the first bucket, but the algorithms have shown 
that more spam pages are detected in later buckets. The algorithm that performs the 
best in both tables is Nie et al. Distrust with DSP which detect 17.73% more spam 
hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and detected 8.59% more spam hosts in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. The full results of all experiments in this chapter can refer to 
APPENDIX F - Chapter 6 Results. 
 
In the experiments, DSP algorithm has improved the Web spam detection experience 
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of Anti-TrustRank, Wu et al. Distrust and Nie et al. Distrust. Besides the 
aforementioned algorithms, DSP able to enhanced existing link-based distrust model 
algorithms such as ParentPenalty (Wu and Davison 2005b), R-SpamRank (Liang, Ru, 
and Zhu 2007), QoC-QoL (Li, Qiancheng, and Yan 2008), AVRank & HVRank 
(Zhang et al. 2009), and also Trust-Distrust Rank (Zhang, Wang, et al. 2011). 
 
6.4 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
In terms of computational complexity, assume that a Web graph G consists of a set of 
vertices   and a set of edges  . The most effective seed selection process for spam 
detection is to select seeds using HostRank algorithm which cost O(   ) time. Then 
the seeds are moved to the propagation phase where in the baseline algorithm, it runs 
for O( ) time. In DSP however, the algorithm went through all vertices and checks the 
edges that are connected to the particular vertices. Therefore in the worst case scenario, 
the algorithm run in O(   ) time. Overall, the running time complexity is O(   ) 
time. In previous experiments, distrust seed set propagation algorithm significantly 
improved the performance of the baseline algorithms. Details on Big O  notation can 
refer to APPENDIX A - Asymptotic Notation. 
 
6.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, distrust seed set propagation algorithm (DSP) is proposed to propagate 
distrust further in order to detect more spam. In the experiment section, three modified 
Web spam detection algorithms are applied with DSP and shown that it enhanced the 
baseline algorithms and detected up to 17.73% more spam hosts in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and up to 8.59% more spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2007 at the 
host level, up to 5.33% more spam pages in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and up to 8.75% 
more spam pages in WEBSPAM-UK2007. The impact of this proposed algorithm in 
practical can increase the number of spam pages detected in order to clean them as 
soon as possible. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The application of machine learning method in Web spam classification has shown 
positive results due to their adaptive ability to learn the underlying patterns for 
classifying spam and non-spam data. Even though the Web spam features are highly 
correlated with the success for Web spam detection, the structure of classifiers also 
play an important role. C4.5 decision tree (DT) (Quinlan 1993) and support vector 
machine (SVM) (Cortes and Vapnik 1995) are two commonly used machine learning 
approaches among the adversarial information retrieval community. However, there 
were some evidences showing that SVM actually outperforms DT. Abernethy et al. 
(Abernethy, Chapelle, and Castillo 2010) obtained the best result in Web Spam 
Challenge 2007 with the AUC performance of 0.963 using SVM compared to C4.5 DT 
with the AUC performance of 0.935. Yuchun et al. (Yuchun et al. 2008) obtained 
higher AUC results with less time and space using SVM than DT in spam senders 
behaviour analysis. Zhiyang et al. (Zhiyang et al. 2012) did some simulation research 
on machine learning models for Web spam detection and their results showed that 
SVM outperformed both rule-based classifier and decision tree classifier in terms of 
precision, recall and F1-value. 
 
In spite of this, researchers have shown that the outcome of SVM is easily manipulated 
in adversarial classification tasks like spam filtering (Biggio, Nelson, and Laskov 
2011). Furthermore, recent scientific researches (Biggio, Nelson, and Laskov 2012; 
Xiao, Xiao, and Eckert 2012) indicated that by injecting contaminated training data, 
the accuracy of the SVM will be significantly degraded. 
 
Aside from SVM and DT, neural networks have emerged as a vital classification tool 
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and have been demonstrated to be a competitive alternative to traditional classifiers 
(Zhang 2000). There are few researchers using neural networks for Web spam 
classification. Both Ntoulas et al. (Ntoulas et al. 2006) and Mahmoudi et al. 
(Mahmoudi, Yari, and Khadivi 2010) used neural networks but the authors did not 
mention the architecture of the neural networks. Closest to this chapter research in this 
chapter is Noi et al. (Noi et al. 2010) who use probability mapping graph 
self-organizing maps for clustering, and then graph neural network for classifying task. 
However, the training time for a mixture of unsupervised and supervised network is 
computational expensive. 
 
In this chapter, a multilayer perceptrons (MLP) neural network is proposed for Web 
spam classification due to its flexible structure and non-linearity transformation to 
accommodate latest Web spam patterns. Using the right learning algorithm and 
selecting the right number of hidden neurons are crucial to obtain the optimal results. 
Therefore, scaled conjugate gradient (Møller 1993) algorithm is selected to supervise 
MLP network’s weight because it could offer faster learning speed and better 
performances than other standard back propagation algorithms. The experiments are 
done on two public available Web spam datasets – WEBSPAM-UK2006 (Castillo, 
Chellapilla, and Davison 2007; Castillo, Davison, et al. 2007) and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 (Castillo, Chellapilla, and Denoyer 2008). The experimental 
results have shown that MLP has improved the AUC performance up to 14.02% over 
SVM on former dataset and up to 3.53%% over SVM on later dataset. In addition, 
based on the experimental results, 3 fixed number of hidden neurons are concluded as 
parameters that are close to optimal results. 
 
7.1 MULTILAYERED PERCEPTRONS NEURAL NETWORK 
For the machine learning model, multilayered perceptrons neural network is used for 
the role of Web spam detection. MLP neural network is a non-linear feed-forward 
network model which maps a set of inputs x  onto a set of outputs y  using multi 
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weights connections. A basic structure of MLP is illustrated in Figure 7.1. It consists of 
an input layer, an output layer and one hidden layer. The input layer has p  number of 
neurons relying on the input features. The output layer has r  number of neurons 
depending on the number of classifying task. The hidden layer has q  number of 
hidden neurons and the number of hidden neurons is varied from  ,2  (Haykin 
1998). It depends on the linearity of the mapping data. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The structure of multilayer perceptrons neural network 
 
Let x  be the input which comprising of a column vector  Tp21 xxx ,,,   while the 
superscript T denotes as matrix transpose. Let mw  be the weight where the superscript 
denotes as the layer between the input layer and hidden layer. The summation of input 









  (7.1) 
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Where i  and j  are the iterative variable for input and hidden neurons respectively, 
  is a bias term that regulates the degree of an activation to induce firing. The 
resultant value a , acts as the input to q  number of hidden neurons. 
 
The activation functions  .F  and  .H  are implemented onto all weighted sum inputs 
for all neurons in the input layer and hidden layer or hidden layer and output layer. It 
usually refers to a sigmoid function due to the reason that it is a strictly increasing 
function that exhibits smoothness and has the desired asymptotic properties (Jain, 
Jianchang, and Mohiuddin 1996). Thus, the output of the hidden neurons denoted by 












  (7.2) 
 
The input c  for the neuron r  in the output layers is calculated by multiplying the 
output of the hidden neurons b  with the weight nw  (the superscript n  denotes as 
the nodes between the hidden layer and the output layer) and k is the iterative variable 










  (7.3) 
 














The output y  from the output layer is also known as the actual output. The notation 
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d , on the other hand, denotes the desired output. The performance of MLP is 
evaluated by computing the difference between the actual output and the desire output. 
The difference is also known as error, which is denoted as  . The errors are then 
passed to the weight adaption rules, to adaptively update all weights in order to 
increase the performance of MLP by recognizing spam and non-spam. Scaled 
conjugate gradient algorithm is used as the weight adaption rule in this research; it will 
be thoroughly explained in the next section. 
 
7.3 SCALED CONJUGATE GRADIENT 
Weights updating algorithm is highly required to obtain an optimum solution for 
classifying a particular task. In this context, the task refers to web spam detection. One 
output neuron is set in the Web spam classification, where the output '0' indicates 
non-spam and the output '1' indicates spam. A set of training data with its relatively 
desired outputs is inserted to MLP neural network to iteratively adjust the weights 
based on the back propagated errors. Various weight updating techniques have been 
reviewed in (Levenberg 1944; Riedmiller 1994). 
 
A supervised learning algorithm namely scaled conjugate gradient (SCG) (Møller 
1993) is used for the reason that it has a faster learning speed and better performance 
than the standard back propagation algorithm (BP) (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams 
1988), conjugate gradient algorithm with line search (CGL) (Johansson, Dowla, and 
Goodman 1991) and the one-step Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) 
memoriless quasi-Newton algorithm (Battiti and Masulli 1990). 
  
The notations and variables that are used throughout the algorithm descriptions are: w  
denotes the weight vector,   denotes a scaling value which set between 0 and 10
-4
, 
  and   denote another scaling values which are set between 0 and 10
-6
,   denotes 
the conjugate gradient direction,   denotes the steepest descent direction,  E  
Chapter 7 Neural Network based Application 
124 
denotes the global error function,  E  denotes the gradient to global error function, 
 E   denotes the Hessian Matrix to global error function, u  denotes the iterations, 
  denotes the second order information, o  denotes the step size, u  denotes the 
comparison parameter and   denotes the total number of weights linkage. Note that 
superscript T  is denoted as transpose. 
 
Assume the inputs 1w , ,   are given and   is set as 0, at the first iteration sets 
1u  where, 
 
  )( uuu E w  (7.5) 
 
Initially, the algorithm calculates the second order information u  where, 
 




uu EE  ))())(( ww   (7.7) 
 




)( uuuuu    (7.8) 
 
If the u  is less or equal to 0, then the algorithm make the Hessian matrix positive 




uuuu    (7.9) 
 



















uuuuuuu oEE   ww  (7.13) 
 
The comparison parameter u  is used to check whether a reduction in error can be 
made, thus if u  is greater or equal to 0, then the new weight vector is, 
 
 uuuu o ww 1  (7.14) 
 
 
)( 11   uu E w  (7.15) 
 
 
0u  (7.16) 
 
At this point, if the number of iteration u  is equal to the number of weights  , then 
the algorithm is restarted with 
 
 11 
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Even if the comparison parameter u  is greater or equal to 0, if the comparison 
parameter u  has a big value that is greater or equal to 0.75, the scale parameter    
is reduced, where 
 
 4uu    (7.19) 
 
On the other hand, if the comparison parameter u  is less than 0, then 
 
 uu    (7.20) 
 
If the comparison parameter u  has a small value that is lesser than 0.25, the scale 




uuuuu    (7.21) 
 
After all these calculations, if the steepest descent direction   is not equal to 0, the 
iteration u  is increment with 1 and goes back to Equation 7.6. Otherwise, the desired 
weight w  is given.  
 
The SCG algorithm outperforms the BP algorithms as it does not need any user 
dependent parameters. Furthermore, the algorithm does not compute the expensive 
line search per learning iteration by using a step size scaling mechanism which makes 
SCG perform faster than CGL and BFGS. 
 
7.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, an open source machine learning tool namely Weka (Hall et al. 2009), 
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version 3.6 is used to conduct the experiments. The feature sets from two datasets - 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007 are provided for this experiments. 
The feature sets are based on content-based such as Feature A and B, and link-based 
such as Feature C and D (Refer to Chapter 2 for more details on datasets and features). 
These features were fed into machine learning methods to evaluate the performance of 
web spam classification. The measurement unit in this section is AUC for the reason 
that it does not depend on any threshold like precision and recall (Erdélyi, Garzó, and 
Benczúr 2011).  
 
Two machine learning methods were compared in the experiment, i.e. SVM and MLP. 
In SVM network structure, radial basis function (RBF) kernel is used for its promising 
performance as it non-linearly maps samples to a higher dimensional space. The sigma 
value of RBF is varied from 1 to 50 to obtain the optimal results. Besides RBF sigma, 
the scalar value are tweaked for soft margin to find a hyper plane that splits the 
examples as clean as possible; the range of the scalar value is set between 1 to 50. For 
MLP, the aforementioned scaled conjugate gradient algorithm is incorporated as a 
supervised learning algorithm. The weights between the neurons are randomly set 
between 0 and 1. Assume the datasets have K  number of features; the model is 
executed based on 1000 epoch from 1 to K  number of features. Since the weights 
between neurons are randomly generated, the process is executed 20 times to get the 
average for every epoch. 
 
After gathering all experimental results, the main result in SVM is selected based on 
the best parameters given. As for MLP, the main result is calculated by averaging 
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Features SVM MLP Improvement 
AUC AUC 
A 24 0.7511 0.7987 6.34 
B 96 0.8084 0.8704 7.67 
C 41 0.7280 0.8301 14.02 
D 138 0.7988 0.8276 3.61 
A + C 65 0.8051 0.8688 7.91 
B + D 234 0.8387 0.8869 5.75 
 




Features SVM MLP Improvement 
AUC AUC 
A 24 0.6782 0.7025 3.53 
B 96 0.7420 0.7470 0.67 
C 41 0.6218 0.6236 0.29 
D 138 0.6613 0.6691 1.18 
A + C 65 0.7234 0.7352 1.63 
B + D 234 0.7524 0.7685 2.13 
 
The performance comparison of SVM and MLP network was tabulated in Table 7-1 
and Table 7-2 using extracted features from WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 respectively In Table 7-1, it was obviously shown that MLP 
outperformed SVM for all features. Of all features classification performance, the 
greatest improvement comes from Feature C where MLP improve SVM for 14.02% on 
the AUC performance. For single set features (Feature A, B, C and D), the AUC 
results generated from SVM range from 0.73 to 0.81 whereas the AUC results 
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generated from MLP range from 0.80 to 0.87. Regardless of this, the best AUC results 
come from the combination of Feature B and D as it gives 0.87 in SVM and 0.89 in 
MLP. 
 
In Table 7-2, Feature A has the biggest improvement among all feature sets where 
MLP improved 3.53% over SVM on the AUC performance. Feature C in this dataset 
does not give much improvement unlike the one in Table 7-1. In spite of everything, 
the best AUC results come from the combination of Feature B and D as it gives 0.75 in 
SVM and 0.77 in MLP, a 2.13% Improvement. 
 
From the observation of both Table 7-1 and 7-2, it showed that content-based features 
contributed higher AUC performance than link-based features. However, the best 
AUC performance comes from the combination of both content and link-based 
features. 
 
Note that the AUC results for MLP in Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 are based on the average 
of all results from various hidden neurons number. In later experiments, all the AUC 
performances from various numbers of hidden neurons are presented based on 
different feature sets. 
 
Figure 7.2 to Figure 7.7 shows the number of hidden neurons contributed to the varied 
of AUC performance in a certain pattern on various feature sets. Due to the variation of 
the results, quadratic function was used to model the AUC curve to a better 
representation. The highest performance point of each AUC curve was marked in a 
relative to its number of hidden neurons used in MLP network. 
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Figure 7.4: Feature set C AUC performance in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 
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Figure 7.7: Feature set B + D AUC performance in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 
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From the observation of Figure 7.2 to Figure 7.7, at most of the times, the highest plots 
either fall at the start or the end of the quadratic curves. In other cases, it falls slightly 
after the middle of the curve where the points reach convergences such as Feature B + 
D in WEBSPAM-UK2006, Feature B and Feature D in WEBSPAM-UK2007. Based 
on this observation and assume that there are K  number of features, the convergences 
are estimated at K6.0  of the curve.  
 
Table 7-3: The AUC results on average, 2 neurons, K6.0  neurons and K  neurons 
from MLP in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
 WEBSPAM-UK2006 WEBSPAM-UK2007 
 Average 2 K6.0  K  Average 2 K6.0  K  
A 0.7987 0.7953 0.7996 0.8003 0.7025 0.6590 0.7033 0.7144 
B 0.8704 0.8597 0.8722 0.8730 0.7470 0.6695 0.7612 0.7532 
C 0.8301 0.8353 0.8276 0.8272 0.6236 0.6247 0.6216 0.6229 
D 0.8276 0.8380 0.8297 0.8291 0.6691 0.6583 0.6762 0.6628 
A + C 0.8688 0.8688 0.8673 0.8677 0.7352 0.7451 0.7371 0.7423 
B + D 0.8869 0.8847 0.8881 0.8878 0.7685 0.7843 0.7514 0.7194 
 
Table 7-3 illustrates the AUC results on average AUC, 2 neurons, K6.0  neurons 
and K  neurons from MLP on WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007. The 
highlighted bold results in Table 7-3 indicate the highest AUC performances among 
the results generated from the three fixed hidden neurons. As shown in Table 7-3, all 
highlighted bold results are actually having higher AUC than the average AUC which 
is shown in Table 7-1 and Table 7-2. This is a very significant finding for the reason 
that the computation becomes much slower when more features and more neurons are 
used. However, by plotting these three fixed number of hidden neurons – 2 neurons, 
K6.0  neurons and K  neurons, optimal AUC performance is achieved from MLP 
on Web spam detection. The full results of all experiments in this chapter can refer to 
APPENDIX G - Chapter 7 Results. 
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Abernethy et al. (Abernethy, Chapelle, and Castillo 2010) achieved 0.963 AUC using 
their proposed Web spam features while Li et al. (Li et al. 2011) have developed 10 
new features generated by genetic programming that work better than 41 link-based 
features and 138 transformed link features. The authors’ results are obtained on 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 using support vector machines. As it is indicated earlier in this 
chapter, the outcome of SVM is easily manipulated filtering (Biggio, Nelson, and 
Laskov 2011). Thus, an alternative classifier – MLP neural network is suggested for 
Web spam classification. Furthermore, the experiments have shown that MLP able to 
achieve better AUC performance than SVM in various feature sets.  
 
Other features such as language models and qualified links achieved 0.88 and 0.76 for 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and WEBSPAM-UK2007 using C4.5 Decision Tree (Araujo 
and Martinez-Romo 2010). In recent years, some researchers have shown that SVM 
works better than C4.5 Decision Tree (Yuchun et al. 2008; Abernethy, Chapelle, and 
Castillo 2010; Zhiyang et al. 2012); while in this chapter, it has shown that MLP works 
better than SVM. Using the standard feature sets, MLP achieved 0.8881 on 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 0.7842 on WEBSPAM-UK2007, it is suggested that the 
AUC performance using language models and qualified links features can be further 
improved using MLP network. 
 
7.5 SUMMARY 
An alternative classification tool – MLP neural network is proposed in this chapter for 
Web spam classification. Scaled conjugate gradient algorithm is used to train MLP 
network for its fast learning speed and better performance than other supervised 
learning algorithm. Experimental results have shown that MLP network improve the 
AUC performance up to 14.02% on WEBSPAM-UK2006 and up to 3.53% on 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 over SVM based on various set of feature. 
  
Determining the number of hidden neurons in MLP network is always a computational 
task as different number of input size requires a change in MLP hidden layer, which 
Chapter 7 Neural Network based Application 
134 
dramatically affects the performance of classification. Therefore, a mechanism of 
determining a MLP network structure has been proposed in this chapter. Instead of 
monitoring the AUC curve varied with the number of hidden neuron, the optimal 
performance for Web spam detection could actually be obtained by evaluating three 
types of hidden neuron numbers, i.e. 2 neurons, K6.0  neurons and K  neurons. 
The experiment has proved that one of these neuron numbers could achieve a 
promising performance with the highest point.  
 
With the amount of Web spam features given, choosing the appropriate machine 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
Web spam has been heavily deteriorated the quality of Web search engines such as 
providing unrelated information to mislead Web users, and thus this disrupt the quality 
of search results provided by the search engines. In solving the aforementioned 
problem, this research involved the implementation of the link-based techniques to 
reduce or eliminate the problem arises by Web spam. 
 
In Chapter 3, a comprehensive literature review on trust and distrust model algorithms 
and machine learning model are presented. TrustRank and its derivatives are selected 
as the model algorithms as TrustRank has provided more advantages in eliminating 
Web spam. The investigation of TrustRank and HostRank on WEBSPAM-UK2006 
and WEBSPAM-UK2007 shows the vulnerability of HostRank in Web spam. The 
comparison of TrustRank and HostRank with 50, 75 and 100 non-spam seeds in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and with 100, 150 and 200 non-spam seeds in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 are made to show the vulnerability of link-analysis algorithms 
when it comes to Web spam. Experimental results from TrustRank shows that it 
promoted up to 22.45% non-spam hosts based on 50 non-spam seeds in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and up to 1.08% based on 100 non-spam seeds in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. In terms of non-spam Web pages promotion, TrustRank has 
promoted up to 26.63% non-spam Web pages over HostRank based on 50 non-spam 
seeds in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and up to 6.05% based on 100 non-spam seeds in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007. It is evident that TrustRank is able to achieve better 
performance when more seeds are used. TrustRank from WEBSPAM-UK2006 based 
on 100 non-spam seeds has improved HostRank up to 24.13%  by promoting 
non-spam hosts and 30.47% by promoting Non-spam Web pages. It is found that for 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 based on 200 non-spam seeds, the non-spam host improvement 
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over HostRank is the same as the one with 100 non-spam seeds. However, TrustRank 
with 200 non-spam seeds is able to achieve up to 14.50% in terms of non-spam Web 
pages promotion instead of 6.05% with 100 non-spam seeds. 
 
In Chapter 4, two trust propagation algorithms namely Trust Propagation Rank 
(TPRank) and Trust Propagation Spam Mass (TP Spam Mass) are presented. The trust 
score for other unevaluated vertices are calculated based on the current evaluated 
vertices to both demote and detect Web spam. The sets of ugly vertices are introduced 
as a subset of non-spam vertices to assist in the algorithms. For the experiments, 
TPRank is compared with TrustRank while TP Spam Mass is compared with Spam 
Mass based on limited evaluated seeds in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 datasets. As a result, TPRank outperforms TrustRank up to 
10.88% on promoting non-spam hosts and achieves average promotion of 8.39 bucket 
per level for non-spam hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2006, and up to 1.08% on promoting 
non-spam hosts and achieves average promotion of 2.75 bucket per level for non-spam 
hosts in WEBSPAM-UK2007. In terms of non-spam Web pages, TPRank improves 
the promotion up to 2.14% in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and 2.27% in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 over TrustRank. On the other hand, TP Spam Mass outperforms 
with Spam Mass up to 43.94% in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and up to 16.17% in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 on detection of Web spam. In term of spam pages detection, TP 
Spam Mass has achieved up to 106.43% improvement in WEBSPAM-UK2006 and up 
to 668.54% improvement in WEBSPAM-UK2007. 
 
In Chapter 5, a novel metric based on weight properties to enhance the detection rate of 
distrust based Web spam detection algorithms is presented. The novel metric 
calculates the weights based on the outgoing links of the vertices which indicate the 
relevancy linkage between two vertices. The weights used along with several distrust 
based Web spam detection algorithms such as Anti-TrustRank (Krishnan and Raj 
2006), Wu et al. Distrust algorithm (Wu, Goel, and Davison 2006a) and Nie et al. 
Distrust algorithm (Nie, Wu, and Davison 2007) to detect additional Web spam. The 
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results have shown the improvement on the detection of spam hosts up to 30.26% in 
Anti-TrustRank, 12.14% in Wu et al. Distrust and 10.92% in Nie et al. Distrust in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006, up to 31.30% in Anti-TrustRank, 26.38% in Wu et al. Distrust 
and 20.31% in Nie et al. Distrust in WEBSPAM-UK2007. In terms of Web spam pages, 
the weight properties have increased the detection rate for up to 39.76%, 13.14% and 
11.34% in WEBSPAM-UK2006, and 8.81%, 6.76% and 4.76% in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 on Anti-TrustRank, Wu et al. Distrust and Nie et al. Distrust 
algorithms. 
 
In Chapter 6, distrust seed set propagation algorithm (DSP) which act as an extension 
to the spam seed set to calculate the distrust score for unevaluated vertices are 
introduced. There are several iterations derived from DSP. In the experiments, 10 
iterations DSP are conducted on several Web spam detection algorithms, similarly to 
the experiments conducted as in Chapter 5. The results have shown that all 10 
iterations of DSP have improved the detection of Web spam over the baseline 
algorithms. Furthermore, the results from DSP in WEBSPAM-UK2006 has improved 
up to 18.6%, 7.95% and 19.47%, and 6.94%, 24.78% and 25.17% in 
WEBSPAM-UK2007 on Anti-TrustRank, Wu et al. Distrust algorithm and Nie et al. 
Distrust algorithm respectively. In terms of Spam pages detection, DSP in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 has made improvement up to 28.05%, 15.13% and 25.79% , and 
5.33%, 4.04 and 8.75% in WEBSPAM-UK2007 on Anti-TrustRank, Wu et al. Distrust 
algorithm and Nie et al. Distrust algorithm respectively. 
 
In Chapter 7, MLP neural network is proposed for Web spam classification due to its 
flexible structure and non-linearity transformation which can accommodate the latest 
Web spam patterns. From the experimental results, MLP is compared with the 
state-of-the-art SVM for Web spam classification. Scaled conjugate gradient training 
algorithm is applied to adaptively adjust the weight parameters in MLP network. As a 
result, MLP improve the AUC performance of SVM up to 14.02% in 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 and up to 3.53% in WEBSPAM-UK2007. Computing every 
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single hidden neurons in MLP is computationally expensive. Thus assuming there are 
K  number of features, it is found that 3 fixed numbers of hidden neurons as 
parameters are close to the optimal results – 2 neurons, K  neurons and K6.0  
neurons.  
 
For future work, it would be recommended to investigate the combination of the trust 
and distrust model techniques mentioned in above chapters (Chapter 3 to Chapter 6) to 
both detect and demote Web spam. The accumulation and splitting steps in this model 
are also crucial for the success of the algorithms, since limited studies are carried out in 
this area. Over the years, machine learning has grown rapidly and more Web spam 
features are constantly proposed for detection. In addition, finding alternatives for 
further enhancements and improvements on the multilayered perceptrons neural 
network can be incorporated into the link based technique which could increase the 








Abbasi, Ahmed, Fatemeh, Mariam, Zahedi, and Siddharth Kaza. 2012. "Detecting 
Fake Medical Web Sites Using Recursive Trust Labeling." ACM Trans. Inf. 
Syst. 30 (4): 1-36. doi: 10.1145/2382438.2382441. 
 
Abernethy, Jacob, Olivier Chapelle, and Carlos Castillo. 2010. "Graph Regularization 
Methods for Web Spam Detection." Mach. Learn. 81 (2): 207-225. doi: 
10.1007/s10994-010-5171-1. 
 
"About Rankdex." 1997.  About Rankdex.  Accessed 2 Jan 2013, 
http://www.rankdex.com/about.html. 
 
Al-Kabi, Mohammed, Heider Wahsheh, Izzat Alsmadi, Emad Al-Shawakfa, Abdullah 
Wahbeh, and Ahmed Al-Hmoud. 2012. "Content-Based Analysis to Detect 
Arabic Web Spam." J. Inf. Sci. 38 (3): 284-296. doi: 
10.1177/0165551512439173. 
 
Araujo, Lourdes, and Juan Martinez-Romo. 2010. "Web Spam Detection: New 
Classification Features Based on Qualified Link Analysis and Language 
Models." Trans. Info. For. Sec. 5 (3): 581-590. doi: 10.1109/tifs.2010.2050767. 
 
Baeza-Yates, Ricardo A., and Berthier Ribeiro-Neto. 1999. Modern Information 
Retrieval: Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc. 
 
Battiti, Roberto, and Francesco Masulli. 1990. "Bfgs Optimization for Faster and 
Automated Supervised Learning" International Neural Network Conference, 
INNC 90 PARIS: Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
 
Bauer, Johannes M., Michel J. G. van Eeten, and Yuehua Wu. 2008. "Itu Study on the 
Financial Aspects of Network Security: Malware and Spam." ICT 





Becchetti, Luca, Carlos Castillo, Debora Donato, Ricardo Baeza-YATES, and Stefano 
Leonardi. 2008. "Link Analysis for Web Spam Detection." ACM Trans. Web 2 
References 
140 
(1): 1-42. doi: 10.1145/1326561.1326563. 
 
Becchetti, Luca, Carlos Castillo, Debora Donato, Stefano Leonardi, and Ricardo 
Baeza-Yates. 2006a. "Link-Based Characterization and Detection of Web 
Spam" Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Adversarial 
Information Retrieval on the Web (AIRWeb), Seattle, USA. 
 
———. 2006b. "Using Rank Propagation and Probabilistic Counting for Link-Based 
Spam Detection" Proceedings of the Workshop on Web Mining and Web Usage 
Analysis (WebKDD 2006), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA: ACM Press.  
 
———. 2008. "Web Spam Detection: Link-Based and Content-Based Techniques" 
The European Integrated Project Dynamically Evolving, Large Scale 
Information Systems (DELIS): proceedings of the final workshop. 
 
Biggio, Battista, Blaine Nelson, and Pavel Laskov. 2011. "Support Vector Machines 
under Adversarial Label Noise" JMLR: Workshop and Conference 
Proceedings 20, Taoyuan, Taiwan: MIT Press.  
 
———. 2012. "Poisoning Attacks against Support Vector Machines" Proceeding of 
the 29
th
 International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2012), 
Edinburgh, Scotland, Great Britain: Omnipress.  
 
Bíró, István, Dávid Siklósi, Jácint Szabó, and András A. Benczúr. 2009. "Linked 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation in Web Spam Filtering." In Proceedings of the 5th 
International Workshop on Adversarial Information Retrieval on the Web, 
Madrid, Spain, 37-40.  1531922: ACM. doi: 10.1145/1531914.1531922. 
 
Borodin, Allan, Gareth O. Roberts, Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, and Panayiotis Tsaparas. 
2005. "Link Analysis Ranking: Algorithms, Theory, and Experiments." ACM 
Trans. Internet Technol. 5 (1): 231-297. doi: 10.1145/1052934.1052942. 
 
Brin, Sergey, and Lawrence Page. 1998. "The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual 
Web Search Engine." In Proceedings of the seventh international conference 
on World Wide Web 7, Brisbane, Australia, 107-117.  297827: Elsevier 
Science Publishers B. V.  
 
Brinkmeier, Michael. 2006. "Pagerank Revisited." ACM Trans. Internet Technol. 6 (3): 
282-301. doi: 10.1145/1151087.1151090. 
 
Castillo, Carlos, Kumar Chellapilla, and Brian D. Davison. 2007. "Web Spam 
Challenge Track I." In Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on 




Castillo, Carlos, Kumar Chellapilla, and Ludovic Denoyer. 2008. "Web Spam 
Challenge 2008." In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on 
Adversarial Information Retrieval on the Web (AIRWeb '08), Beijing, China. 
ACM, New York, NY, USA.  
 
Castillo, Carlos, and Brian D. Davison. 2011. "Adversarial Web Search." Found. 
Trends Inf. Retr. 4 (5): 377-486. doi: 10.1561/1500000021. 
 
Castillo, Carlos, Brian D. Davison, Ludovic Denoyer, and Patrick Gallinari. 2007. 
"Web Spam Challenge Track Ii." In ECML/PKDD Graph Labelling Workshop, 
Warsaw, Poland.   
 
Castillo, Carlos, Debora Donato, Luca Becchetti, Paolo Boldi, Massimo Santini, and 
Sebastiano Vigna. 2006. "A Reference Collection for Web Spam." SIGIR 
Forum 40 (2).  
 
Castillo, Carlos, Debora Donato, Aristides Gionis, Vanessa Murdock, and Fabrizio 
Silvestri. 2007. "Know Your Neighbors: Web Spam Detection Using the Web 
Topology." In Proceedings of the 30th annual international ACM SIGIR 
conference on Research and development in information retrieval, Amsterdam, 
The Netherlands, 423-430.  1277814: ACM. doi: 10.1145/1277741.1277814. 
 
Chang, Chih-Chung, and Chih-Jen Lin. 2011. "Libsvm: A Library for Support Vector 
Machines." ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol. 2 (3): 1-27. doi: 
10.1145/1961189.1961199. 
 
Cormen, Thomas H., Clifford Stein, Ronald L. Rivest, and Charles E. Leiserson. 2001. 
Introduction to Algorithms: McGraw-Hill Higher Education. 
 
Cortes, Corinna, and Vladimir Vapnik. 1995. "Support-Vector Networks." Machine 
Learning 20 (3): 273-297. doi: 10.1007/bf00994018. 
 
Dai, Na, Brian D. Davison, and Xiaoguang Qi. 2009. "Looking into the Past to Better 
Classify Web Spam." In Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on 
Adversarial Information Retrieval on the Web, Madrid, Spain, 1-8.  1531916: 
ACM. doi: 10.1145/1531914.1531916. 
 
Egele, Manuel, Clemens Kolbitsch, and Christian Platzer. 2011. "Removing Web 
Spam Links from Search Engine Results." Journal in Computer Virology 7 (1): 
51-62.  
 
Eiron, Nadav, Kevin S. McCurley, and John A. Tomlin. 2004. "Ranking the Web 
Frontier." In Proceedings of the 13th international conference on World Wide 





Erdélyi, Miklós, András Garzó, and András A. Benczúr. 2011. "Web Spam 
Classification: A Few Features Worth More." In Proceedings of the 2011 Joint 
WICOW/AIRWeb Workshop on Web Quality, Hyderabad, India, 27-34.  
1964121: ACM. doi: 10.1145/1964114.1964121. 
 
Fetterly, Dennis, Mark Manasse, and Marc Najork. 2005. "Detecting Phrase-Level 
Duplication on the World Wide Web" Proceedings of the 28th annual 
international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in 
information retrieval: ACM.  
 
Gan, Qingqing, and Torsten Suel. 2007. "Improving Web Spam Classifiers Using Link 
Structure." In Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Adversarial 
information retrieval on the web, Banff, Alberta, Canada, 17-20.  1244412: 
ACM. doi: 10.1145/1244408.1244412. 
 
Geng, Guanggang, Pengfei Zhu, and Deliang Wang. 2009. "Web Spam Detection with 
Feature Fusion " Journal of Computational Information Systems 5 (3): 
1511-1519.  
 
Gil, Yolanda, and Donovan Artz. 2007. "Towards Content Trust of Web Resources." 
Web Semantics: Science, Services and Agents on the World Wide Web 5 (4): 
227-239.  
 
Gyöngyi, Zoltán, Pavel Berkhin, Hector Garcia-Molina, and Jan Pedersen. 2006. 
"Link Spam Detection Based on Mass Estimation" Proceedings of the 32nd 
International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, Seoul, Korea, 1164166: 
VLDB Endowment.  
 
Gyöngyi, Zoltán, and Hector Garcia-Molina. 2005. "Web Spam Taxonomy" 
Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Adversarial Information 
Retrieval on the Web (AIRWeb), Chiba, Japan: 
http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/646/. 
 
Gyöngyi, Zoltán, Hector Garcia-Molina, and Jan Pedersen. 2004. "Combating Web 
Spam with Trustrank" Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Conference 
on Very Large Data Bases, Toronto, Canada, 1316740: VLDB Endowment.  
 
Hall, Mark, Eibe Frank, Geoffrey Holmes, Bernhard Pfahringer, Peter Reutemann, and 
Ian H. Witten. 2009. "The Weka Data Mining Software: An Update." SIGKDD 





Haveliwala, Taher H. 2002. "Topic-Sensitive Pagerank." In Proceedings of the 11th 
international conference on World Wide Web, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, 
517-526.  511513: ACM. doi: 10.1145/511446.511513. 
 
Haykin, Simon. 1998. Neural Networks: A Comprehensive Foundation: Prentice Hall 
PTR. 
 
Henzinger, Monika R., Rajeev Motwani, and Craig Silverstein. 2002. "Challenges in 
Web Search Engines." SIGIR Forum 36 (2): 11-22. doi: 
10.1145/792550.792553. 
 
Henzinger, Monika Rauch. 2000. "Link Analysis in Web Information Retrieval." IEEE 
Data Engineering Bulletin 23 (3): 3-8.  
 
Jain, A. K., Mao Jianchang, and K. M. Mohiuddin. 1996. "Artificial Neural Networks: 
A Tutorial." Computer 29 (3): 31-44. doi: 10.1109/2.485891. 
 
Jansen, Bernard J., Amanda Spink, and Tefko Saracevic. 2000. "Real Life, Real Users, 
and Real Needs: A Study and Analysis of User Queries on the Web." Inf. 
Process. Manage. 36 (2): 207-227. doi: 10.1016/s0306-4573(99)00056-4. 
 
Jeh, Glen, and Jennifer Widom. 2003. "Scaling Personalized Web Search." In 
Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web, 
Budapest, Hungary, 271-279.  775191: ACM. doi: 10.1145/775152.775191. 
 
Jiang, Qiancheng, Lei Zhang, Yizhen Zhu, and Yan Zhang. 2008. "Larger Is Better: 
Seed Selection in Link-Based Anti-Spamming Algorithms" Proceedings of the 
17th International Conference on World Wide Web, Beijing, China, 1367658: 
ACM, New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1145/1367497.1367658. 
 
Johansson, Erik M., Farid U. Dowla, and Dennis M. Goodman. 1991. 
"Backpropagation Learning for Multilayer Feed-Forward Neural Networks 
Using the Conjugate Gradient Method." International Journal of Neural 
Systems 2 (4): 291-301.  
 
Kanich, Chris, Nicholas Weaver, Damon McCoy, Tristan Halvorson, Christian 
Kreibich, Kirill Levchenko, Vern Paxson, Geoffrey M Voelker, and Stefan 
Savage. 2011. "Show Me the Money: Characterizing Spam-Advertised 
Revenue" USENIX Security Symposium. 
 
Kleinberg, Jon M. 1999. "Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked Environment." J. 





Kobayashi, Mei, and Koichi Takeda. 2000. "Information Retrieval on the Web." ACM 
Comput. Surv. 32 (2): 144-173. doi: 10.1145/358923.358934. 
 
Kou, Zhenzhen. 2007. "Stacked Graphical Learning." University of Massachusetts 
Amherst.  
 
Krishnan, Vijay, and Rashmi Raj. 2006. "Web Spam Detection with Anti-Trustrank" 
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Adversarial Information 
Retrieval on the Web (AIRWeb), Seattle, USA. 
 
László, A.A.B.K.C., and L.D. Siklósi. 2007. "Semi-Supervised Learning: A 
Comparative Study for Web Spam and Telephone User Churn" Graph 
Labelling Workshop and Web Spam Challenge. 
 
Lempel, R., and S. Moran. 2001. "Salsa: The Stochastic Approach for Link-Structure 
Analysis." ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. 19 (2): 131-160. doi: 
10.1145/382979.383041. 
 
Leon-Suematsu, Yutaka I., Kentaro Inui, Sadao Kurohashi, and Yutaka Kidawara. 
2011. "Web Spam Detection by Exploring Densely Connected Subgraphs." In 
Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web 
Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 01, Campus 
Scientifique de la Doua, Lyon, France, 124-129.  2052339: IEEE Computer 
Society. doi: 10.1109/wi-iat.2011.152. 
 
Levenberg, Kenneth. 1944. "A Method for the Solution of Certain Non-Linear 
Problems in Least Squares." Quarterly of Applied Mathematics 2: 164-168.  
 
Li, Longzhuang, Yi Shang, and Wei Zhang. 2002. "Improvement of Hits-Based 
Algorithms on Web Documents" Proceedings of the 11th international 
conference on World Wide Web: ACM.  
 
Li, Shengen, Xiaofei Niu, Peiqi Li, and Lin Wang. 2011. "Generating New Features 
Using Genetic Programming to Detect Link Spam" 2011 International 
Conference on Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation (ICICTA), 
Shenzhen, China, doi: 10.1109/icicta.2011.41. 
 
Li, Yanhong. 1998. "Toward a Qualitative Search Engine." IEEE Internet Computing 2 
(4): 24-29. doi: 10.1109/4236.707687. 
 
Li, Zhao, Jiang Qiancheng, and Zhang Yan. 2008. "From Good to Bad Ones: Making 
Spam Detection Easier" Computer and Information Technology Workshops, 




Liang, Chenmin, Liyun Ru, and Xiaoyan Zhu. 2007. "R-Spamrank: A Spam Detection 
Algorithm Based on Link Analysis." Journal of Computational Information 
Systems 3 (4): 1705-1712.  
 
Liu, Xinyue, You Wang, Shaoping Zhu, and Hongfei Lin. 2013. "Combating Web 
Spam through Trust-Distrust Propagation with Confidence." Pattern 
Recognition Letters.  
 
Mahmoudi, M., A. Yari, and S. Khadivi. 2010. "Web Spam Detection Based on 
Discriminative Content and Link Features" 5th International Symposium on 
Telecommunications (IST), 2010,  doi: 10.1109/istel.2010.5734084. 
 
Martinez-Romo, Juan, and Lourdes Araujo. 2009. "Web Spam Identification through 
Language Model Analysis." In Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop 
on Adversarial Information Retrieval on the Web, Madrid, Spain, 21-28.  
1531920: ACM. doi: 10.1145/1531914.1531920. 
 
Metaxas, Panagiotis. 2009a. "Using Propagation of Distrust to Find Untrustworthy 
Web Neighborhoods" Internet and Web Applications and Services, 2009. 
ICIW'09. Fourth International Conference on: IEEE.  
 
Metaxas, Panagiotis Takis. 2009b. "On the Evolution of Search Engine Rankings" 
WEBIST. 
 
Møller, Martin Fodslette. 1993. "Original Contribution: A Scaled Conjugate Gradient 
Algorithm for Fast Supervised Learning." Neural Netw. 6 (4): 525-533. doi: 
10.1016/s0893-6080(05)80056-5. 
 
Nemirovsky, Danil, and Konstantin Avrachenkov. 2008. "Weighted Pagerank: 
Cluster-Related Weights." DTIC Document.  
 




Nie, Lan, Baoning Wu, and Brian D. Davison. 2007. "Winnowing Wheat from the 
Chaff: Propagating Trust to Sift Spam from the Web" Proceedings of the 30th 
Annual International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development 
in Information Retrieval, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1277950: ACM, New 
York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1145/1277741.1277950. 
 
Noi, Lucia Di, Markus Hagenbuchner, Franco Scarselli, and Ah Chung Tsoi. 2010. 
"Web Spam Detection by Probability Mapping Graphsoms and Graph Neural 
Networks" Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Artificial 
References 
146 
Neural Networks: Part II, Thessaloniki, Greece, 1889052: Springer-Verlag, 
Germany.  
 
Ntoulas, Alexandros, Marc Najork, Mark Manasse, and Dennis Fetterly. 2006. 
"Detecting Spam Web Pages through Content Analysis." In Proceedings of the 
15th international conference on World Wide Web, Edinburgh, Scotland, 83-92.  
1135794: ACM. doi: 10.1145/1135777.1135794. 
 
Piskorski, Jakub, Marcin Sydow, and Dawid Weiss. 2008. "Exploring Linguistic 
Features for Web Spam Detection: A Preliminary Study." In Proceedings of the 
4th international workshop on Adversarial information retrieval on the web, 
Beijing, China, 25-28.  1451990: ACM. doi: 10.1145/1451983.1451990. 
 
Qi, Chen, Yu Song-Nian, and Cheng Sisi. 2008. "Link Variable Trustrank for Fighting 
Web Spam" Proceedings of International Conference on Computer Science 
and Software Engineering, Wuhan, China, doi: 10.1109/csse.2008.1099. 
 
Quinlan, J. Ross. 1993. C4.5: Programs for Machine Learning: Morgan Kaufmann 
Publishers Inc. 
 
Qureshi, Muhammad Atif. 2011. "Improving the Quality of Web Spam Filtering by 
Using Seed Refinement." Department of Computer Science Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology.  
 
Riedmiller, Martin. 1994. "Advanced Supervised Learning in Multilayer Perceptrons - 
from Backpropagation to Adaptive Learning Algorithms." Special Issue on 
Neural Networks, International Journal Computer Standards & Interfaces 16 
(3): 265-278.  
 
Rumelhart, David E., Geoffrey E. Hinton, and Ronald J. Williams. 1988. "Learning 
Representations by Back-Propagating Errors."  In Neurocomputing: 
Foundations of Research, 696-699. MIT Press. 
 
Shen, Guoyang, Bin Gao, Tie-Yan Liu, Guang Feng, Shiji Song, and Hang Li. 2006. 
"Detecting Link Spam Using Temporal Information." In Proceedings of the 
Sixth International Conference on Data Mining, 1049-1053.  1193305: IEEE 
Computer Society. doi: 10.1109/icdm.2006.51. 
 
Sobek, Markus. 2002.  Pr0 - Google's Pagerank 0 Penalty.  Accessed 25 February, 
http://pr.efactory.de/e-pr0.shtml. 
 
Sydow, Marcin, Jakub Piskorski, Dawid Weiss, and Carlos Castillo. 2007. 




Tang, Y., Y. He, S. Krasser, and P. Judge. 2007. "Web Spam Challenge 2007 Track Ii 
Secure Computing Corporation Research" Graph Labelling Workshop and 
Web Spam Challenge. 
 
Tian, Ye, Gary M. Weiss, and Qiang Ma. 2007. "A Semi-Supervised Approach for 
Web Spam Detection Using Combinatorial Feature-Fusion" Proceeedings of 
The Graph Labelling Workshop and Web Spam Challenge, Warsaw, Poland. 
 
Wahsheh, Heider A., Mohammed N. Al-kabi, and Izzat M. Alsmadi. 2012. 
"Evaluating Arabic Spam Classifiers Using Link Analysis." In Proceedings of 
the 3rd International Conference on Information and Communication Systems, 
Irbid, Jordan, 1-5.  2222456: ACM. doi: 10.1145/2222444.2222456. 
 
Wang, Wei, and Guosun Zeng. 2007. "Content Trust Model for Detecting Web Spam."  
In Trust Management, 139-152. Springer. 
 
Wang, Wei, Guosun Zeng, Mingjun Sun, Huanan Gu, and Quan Zhang. 2007. 
"Evirank: An Evidence Based Content Trust Model for Web Spam Detection."  
In Advances in Web and Network Technologies, and Information Management, 
299-307. Springer. 
 
Wang, Yi-Min, Ming Ma, Yuan Niu, and Hao Chen. 2007. "Spam Double-Funnel: 
Connecting Web Spammers with Advertisers" Proceedings of the 16th 
international conference on World Wide Web: ACM.  
 
Wu, Baoning. 2009. Finding and Fighting Search Engine Spam: Algorithms and 
Evaluations: VDM Verlag. 
 
Wu, Baoning, and Brian D. Davison. 2005a. "Cloaking and Redirection: A 
Preliminary Study" Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on 
Adversarial Information Retrieval on the Web (AIRWeb), Chiba, Japan. 
 
———. 2005b. "Identifying Link Farm Spam Pages" Proceedings of Special Interest 
Tracks and Posters of the 14th International Conference on World Wide Web, 
Chiba, Japan, 1062762: ACM, New York, NY, USA. doi: 
10.1145/1062745.1062762. 
 
Wu, Baoning, Vinay Goel, and Brian D. Davison. 2006a. "Propagating Trust and 
Distrust to Demote Web Spam." In World Wide Web (WWW2006) Workshop on 
Models of Trust for the Web (MTW), Edinburgh, Scotland.   
 
———. 2006b. "Topical Trustrank: Using Topicality to Combat Web Spam" 
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on World Wide Web, 





Xiao, Han, Huang Xiao, and Claudia Eckert. 2012. "Adversarial Label Flips Attack on 
Support Vector Machines." In 20th European Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence (ECAI), Montpellier, France.   
 
Xing, Wenpu, and Ali Ghorbani. 2004. "Weighted Pagerank Algorithm" 
Communication Networks and Services Research, 2004. Proceedings. Second 
Annual Conference on: IEEE.  
 
Yahoo! 2007.  Web Spam Collections.  
http://barcelona.research.yahoo.net/webspam/datasets/. 
 
Yang, Haixuan, Irwin King, and Michael R. Lyu. 2007. "Diffusionrank: A Possible 
Penicillin for Web Spamming" Proceedings of the 30th Annual International 
ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Information 
Retrieval, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1277815: ACM, New York, NY, USA. 
doi: 10.1145/1277741.1277815. 
 
Yuchun, Tang, S. Krasser, He Yuanchen, Yang Weilai, and D. Alperovitch. 2008. 
"Support Vector Machines and Random Forests Modeling for Spam Senders 
Behavior Analysis" Global Telecommunications Conference, 2008. IEEE 
GLOBECOM 2008. IEEE,  doi: 10.1109/glocom.2008.ecp.419. 
 
Zhang, G. P. 2000. "Neural Networks for Classification: A Survey." Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, IEEE Transactions on 30 (4): 
451-462. doi: 10.1109/5326.897072. 
 
Zhang, Weifeng, Danmei Zhu, Yinzhou Zhang, Guoqiang Zhou, and Baowen Xu. 
2011. "Harmonic Functions Based Semi-Supervised Learning for Web Spam 
Detection." In Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied 
Computing, TaiChung, Taiwan, 74-75.  1982204: ACM. doi: 
10.1145/1982185.1982204. 
 
Zhang, Xianchao, Bo Han, and Wenxin Liang. 2009. "Automatic Seed Set Expansion 
for Trust Propagation Based Anti-Spamming Algorithms" Proceedings of the 
Eleventh International Workshop on Web Information and Data Management, 
Hong Kong, China, 1651596: ACM, New York, NY, USA. doi: 
10.1145/1651587.1651596. 
 
Zhang, Xianchao, You Wang, Nan Mou, and Wenxin Liang. 2011. "Propagating Both 
Trust and Distrust with Target Differentiation for Combating Web Spam" 
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Artificial Intelligence 





Zhang, Yan, Qiancheng Jiang, Lei Zhang, and Yizhen Zhu. 2009. "Exploiting 
Bidirectional Links: Making Spamming Detection Easier" Proceedings of the 
18th ACM conference on Information and knowledge management, Hong 
Kong, China, 1646244: ACM. doi: 10.1145/1645953.1646244. 
 
Zhiyang, Jia, Li Weiwei, Gao Wei, and Xia Youming. 2012. "Research on Web Spam 
Detection Based on Support Vector Machine" Communication Systems and 




Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of copyright 
material. I would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner who has been omitted 
















APPENDIX A - ASYMPTOTIC NOTATION 
 
 -notation 
For a given function )(ng , we denote by ))(( ng  the set of functions if there exist 
positive constant 1c , 2c , and 0n  such that )()()(0 21 ngcnfngc   for all 
0nn  . 
We say that )(ng  is an asymptotic tight bound for )(nf . 
 
O -notation 
For a given function )(ng , we denote by ))(( ngO  the set of functions if there exist 
positive constant c  and 0n  such that )()(0 ncgnf   for all 0nn  . 
We say that )(ng  is an asymptotic upper bound for )(nf . 
 
 -notation 
For a given function )(ng , we denote by ))(( ng  the set of functions if there exist 
positive constant c  and 0n  such that )()(0 nfncg   for all 0nn  . 
We say that )(ng  is an asymptotic lower bound for )(nf . 
 
Graphic examples of the  , O , and   notations. 
 
Taken from Cormen et al., Introduction to Algorithms (Cormen et al. 2001). 
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APPENDIX B – ADJACENCY -MATRIX REPRESENTATION 
 
For the adjacency-matrix representation of a graph ),( G , we assume that the 
vertices are numbered ,...,2,1  in some arbitrary manner. Then the adjacency-matrix 













An adjacency matrix can represent a weighted graph. If ),( G  is a weighted 
graph with edge-weight function  , we can simply store the weight ),( vu  of the 
edge Evu ),(  as the entry in row u  and column v  of the adjacency matrix. If an 
edge does not exist, we can store a NIL value as its corresponding matrix entry, though 
for many problems it is convenient to use a value such as 0 or  . 
 




APPENDIX C - CHAPTER 3 RESULTS 
 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 
*HR – HostRank, TR50 – TrustRank 50, TR75 – TrustRank 75, TR100 – TrustRank 
100, NS – Non-spam, S – spam 
A. Number of non-spam and spam hosts in each bucket 
 
Index 
HR TR50 TR75 TR100 
NS S NS S NS S NS S 
1 354 19 373 0 373 0 373 0 
2 362 11 368 5 369 4 373 0 
3 297 76 364 9 372 1 368 5 
4 185 188 362 11 364 9 373 0 
5 315 58 347 26 359 14 359 14 
6 338 35 320 53 352 21 357 16 
7 310 63 311 62 321 52 352 21 
8 313 60 293 80 301 72 307 66 
9 310 63 271 102 278 95 302 71 
10 307 66 286 87 278 95 259 114 
11 301 72 262 111 270 103 265 108 
12 306 67 242 131 237 136 252 121 
13 292 81 237 136 223 150 216 157 
14 275 98 221 152 221 152 207 166 
15 253 120 194 179 201 172 214 159 
16 219 154 205 168 170 203 159 214 
17 167 206 201 172 208 165 182 191 
18 157 216 252 121 246 127 226 147 
19 198 175 219 154 191 182 191 182 
20 290 96 221 165 215 171 214 172 
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B. Incremental summation of non-spam hosts for all buckets 
 
Index HR TR50 TR75 TR100 
1 354 373 373 373 
2 716 741 742 746 
3 1013 1105 1114 1114 
4 1198 1467 1478 1487 
5 1513 1814 1837 1846 
6 1851 2134 2189 2203 
7 2161 2445 2510 2555 
8 2474 2738 2811 2862 
9 2784 3009 3089 3164 
10 3091 3295 3367 3423 
11 3392 3557 3637 3688 
12 3698 3799 3874 3940 
13 3990 4036 4097 4156 
14 4265 4257 4318 4363 
15 4518 4451 4519 4577 
16 4737 4656 4689 4736 
17 4904 4857 4897 4918 
18 5061 5109 5143 5144 
19 5259 5328 5334 5335 










C. Average promotion level for non-spam hosts and number of non-spam hosts 
being promoted over HostRank 
 
 Average promotion level for 
non-spam hosts 
Number of non-spam hosts being 
promoted 
Index TR50 TR75 TR100 TR50 TR75 TR100 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 21 16 12 
3 1.320 1.179 1.171 25 28 41 
4 1.150 1.140 1.146 40 43 41 
5 1.189 1.193 1.245 212 218 220 
6 1.364 1.392 1.396 231 240 240 
7 1.471 1.498 1.569 225 241 239 
8 1.609 1.783 1.878 233 240 237 
9 1.682 1.841 1.991 214 233 235 
10 1.886 2.034 2.287 219 236 247 
11 1.884 2.050 2.286 164 200 213 
12 2.011 2.164 2.387 183 220 235 
13 2.543 2.532 2.639 175 205 227 
14 2.543 2.659 2.617 127 170 201 
15 5.183 4.504 3.988 109 131 165 
16 4.000 3.526 3.081 81 97 124 
17 2.415 2.528 2.394 53 53 66 
18 3.746 3.492 3.409 63 65 66 
19 2.698 2.655 2.490 149 148 149 





D. Evaluated non-spam host represented in pages level 
 
Index HR TR50 TR75 TR100 
1 4633746 5772732 5911439 6045772 
2 7878928 9405003 9538061 9339090 
3 10707594 12453809 12656345 12648555 
4 11860496 15018597 15006317 14940319 
5 14333206 17326257 17267232 17165337 
 
E. Propagation coverage 
 
 TR 50 TR 75 TR 100 
)( ESn   8564.00 8766.00 8922.00 
)( NSn   4223.00 4388.00 4519.00 
)( SSn   1374.00 1381.00 1384.00 
N  86.20 90.01 92.84 















*HR – HostRank, TR100 – TrustRank 100, TR150 – TrustRank 150, TR200 – 
TrustRank 200, NS – Non-spam, S – spam 
 
A. Number of non-spam and spam hosts in each bucket 
 
 HR TR100 TR150 TR200 
Index NS S NS S NS S NS S 
1 465 9 470 4 466 8 470 4 
2 467 8 469 6 469 6 467 7 
3 466 10 465 9 471 3 468 7 
4 460 14 468 7 469 6 469 5 
5 466 8 457 17 461 14 461 15 
6 447 27 460 16 455 20 460 15 
7 447 28 453 21 451 23 451 23 
8 450 24 460 14 453 21 447 27 
9 444 30 448 26 458 16 450 24 
10 451 24 437 37 443 31 452 22 
11 445 29 438 36 434 40 441 33 
12 448 26 437 37 438 37 432 43 
13 449 26 446 29 439 35 434 40 
14 449 25 443 31 442 32 445 29 
15 440 34 452 22 450 24 452 22 
16 441 33 445 29 449 25 450 24 
17 444 30 446 28 443 31 443 31 
18 435 39 446 28 445 29 443 31 
19 445 29 422 53 424 51 427 48 




B. Incremental summation of non-spam hosts for all buckets 
 
Index HR TR100 TR150 TR200 
1 465 470 466 470 
2 932 939 935 937 
3 1398 1404 1406 1405 
4 1858 1872 1875 1874 
5 2324 2329 2336 2335 
6 2771 2789 2791 2795 
7 3218 3242 3242 3246 
8 3668 3702 3695 3693 
9 4112 4150 4153 4143 
10 4563 4587 4596 4595 
11 5008 5025 5030 5036 
12 5456 5462 5468 5468 
13 5905 5908 5907 5902 
14 6354 6351 6349 6347 
15 6794 6803 6799 6799 
16 7235 7248 7248 7249 
17 7679 7694 7691 7692 
18 8114 8140 8136 8135 
19 8559 8562 8560 8562 









C. Average promotion level for non-spam hosts and number of non-spam hosts 
being promoted over HostRank 
 
 Average promotion level for 
non-spam hosts 
Number of non-spam hosts being 
promoted 
Index TR100 TR150 TR200 TR100 TR150 TR200 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 57 56 57 
3 1.067 1.115 1.159 89 78 82 
4 1.177 1.193 1.282 124 119 124 
5 1.319 1.343 1.468 182 181 173 
6 1.472 1.560 1.673 161 159 156 
7 1.674 1.779 1.873 175 172 173 
8 1.871 1.957 2.139 178 188 180 
9 2.078 2.105 2.163 167 172 172 
10 2.175 2.220 2.283 177 182 180 
11 2.469 2.493 2.581 194 207 210 
12 2.605 2.536 2.602 177 192 206 
13 2.887 2.809 2.787 204 215 221 
14 2.927 2.850 2.709 206 214 220 
15 3.014 3.221 3.063 209 208 222 
16 2.870 2.859 2.773 247 241 247 
17 2.668 2.663 2.486 238 249 253 
18 3.567 3.054 3.083 217 222 206 
19 1.548 1.431 1.475 343 288 280 






D. Evaluated non-spam host represented in pages level 
 
Index HR TR100 TR150 TR200 
1 5433512 5762322 6048337 6221612 
2 9514864 9798875 10029708 9981872 
3 12113172 12601227 12790826 12721565 
4 14570132 15149195 15107725 15151087 
5 16374587 16952324 17088503 17095291 
 
E. Propagation coverage 
 
 TR100 TR150 TR200 
)( ESn   73790 75629 76759 
)( NSn   6603 6780 6858 
)( SSn   242 249 260 
N  98.98 99.15 99.26 











APPENDIX D - CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 
*TR50 – TrustRank 50, TP50 – TPRank 50, SM – Spam Mass 50, TPSM – TP Spam 
Mass 50 
A. Number of non-spam and spam hosts in each bucket 
 
Index 
TR50 TP50 SM50 TPSM50 
NS S NS S NS S NS S 
1 373 0 372 1 204 169 194 179 
2 368 5 370 3 142 231 127 246 
3 364 9 369 4 213 160 78 295 
4 362 11 364 9 232 141 84 289 
5 347 26 363 10 189 184 153 220 
6 320 53 364 9 264 109 178 195 
7 311 62 364 9 215 158 210 163 
8 293 80 366 7 222 151 253 120 
9 271 102 357 16 254 119 300 73 
10 286 87 345 28 297 76 339 34 
11 262 111 310 63 325 48 364 9 
12 242 131 257 116 340 33 361 12 
13 237 136 215 158 355 18 365 8 
14 221 152 211 162 338 35 369 4 
15 194 179 181 192 344 29 367 6 
16 205 168 189 184 341 32 360 13 
17 201 172 134 239 345 28 362 11 
18 252 121 85 288 319 54 356 17 
19 219 154 123 250 324 49 355 18 
20 221 165 210 176 286 100 374 12 
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B. Incremental summation of non-spam hosts for TR50 and TP50 and spam hosts 
for SM50 and TPSM50 for all buckets. 
 
 Non-spam Spam 
Index TR50 TP50 SM50 TPSM50 
1 373 372 169 179 
2 741 742 400 425 
3 1105 1111 560 720 
4 1467 1475 701 1009 
5 1814 1838 885 1229 
6 2134 2202 994 1424 
7 2445 2566 1152 1587 
8 2738 2932 1303 1707 
9 3009 3289 1422 1780 
10 3295 3634 1498 1814 
11 3557 3944 1546 1823 
12 3799 4201 1579 1835 
13 4036 4416 1597 1843 
14 4257 4627 1632 1847 
15 4451 4808 1661 1853 
16 4656 4997 1693 1866 
17 4857 5131 1721 1877 
18 5109 5216 1775 1894 
19 5328 5339 1824 1912 








C. Average promotion level for non-spam hosts and spam hosts,  and number of 
non-spam and spam hosts being promoted  
 
TP50 over TR50 
Index Average promotion level 
 for non-spam hosts 
Number of non-spam hosts 
being promoted 
1 0.000 0 
2 1.000 14 
3 1.040 25 
4 1.217 23 
5 1.308 13 
6 1.455 22 
7 1.760 25 
8 1.786 42 
9 1.836 55 
10 2.034 89 
11 2.733 101 
12 3.233 103 
13 3.371 116 
14 3.430 142 
15 4.617 133 
16 5.874 175 
17 7.228 171 
18 8.388 224 
19 2.705 139 






TPSM50 over SM50 
Index Average promotion level  
for spam hosts 
Number of spam hosts  
being promoted 
1 0.000 44 
2 1.000 22 
3 1.000 23 
4 1.000 19 
5 1.462 17 
6 1.906 17 
7 2.496 12 
8 2.959 7 
9 3.021 11 
10 3.826 6 
11 3.804 2 
12 4.871 2 
13 6.000 3 
14 6.886 0 
15 8.125 5 
16 8.417 5 
17 8.286 0 
18 10.038 1 
19 10.383 0 








D. Evaluated host represented in pages level 
 
Index TR50 TP50 SM50 TPSM50 
1 5772732 5105405 151418 92751 
2 9405003 8617492 1548226 1545822 
3 12453809 11389610 2496185 3922350 
4 15018597 13548654 2963797 5340260 
5 17326257 15972170 3510497 6723305 
6 19436425 18080304 3701269 7640583 
7 21183616 19746985 4329449 8539854 
8 23057903 21699476 4854187 9318171 
9 24886572 23498479 5513986 9680861 
10 26594747 25371805 5962484 9929897 
 
E. Propagation coverage 
 
 TR50 TP50 
𝑆𝑛(𝑆) 8564.00 10183.00 
𝑆𝑛(𝑆𝐺) 4223.00 5242.00 
𝑆𝑛(𝑆𝐵) 1374.00 1553.00 
𝜂𝐺  86.20 98.02 











* TR100 – TrustRank 100, TP100 – TPRank 100, SM100 – Spam Mass 100, 
TPSM100 – TP Spam Mass 100 
 
A. Number of non-spam and spam hosts in each bucket 
 
Index 
TR100 TP100 SM100 TPSM100 
NS S NS S NS S NS S 
1 470 4 474 0 423 51 421 53 
2 469 6 472 2 415 60 432 43 
3 465 9 472 3 443 31 431 43 
4 468 7 469 5 454 20 444 30 
5 457 17 465 10 442 32 450 24 
6 460 16 467 7 452 22 445 29 
7 453 21 457 18 440 34 436 38 
8 460 14 449 26 442 33 433 41 
9 448 26 445 29 454 20 424 51 
10 437 37 439 35 435 39 444 31 
11 438 36 444 30 428 47 440 34 
12 437 37 438 37 445 29 436 38 
13 446 29 430 44 446 28 457 17 
14 443 31 438 36 462 13 463 14 
15 452 22 444 30 470 5 469 5 
16 445 29 445 29 470 4 471 3 
17 446 28 444 30 471 4 471 3 
18 446 28 438 36 466 8 474 0 
19 422 53 434 41 469 5 470 4 




B. Incremental summation of non-spam hosts for TR100 and TP100 and spam 
hosts for SM100 and TPSM100 for all buckets. 
 
 Non-spam Spam 
Index TR100 TP100 SM100 TPSM100 
1 470 474 51 53 
2 939 946 111 96 
3 1404 1418 142 139 
4 1872 1887 162 169 
5 2329 2352 194 193 
6 2789 2819 216 222 
7 3242 3276 250 260 
8 3702 3725 283 301 
9 4150 4170 303 352 
10 4587 4609 342 383 
11 5025 5053 389 417 
12 5462 5491 418 455 
13 5908 5921 446 472 
14 6351 6359 459 486 
15 6803 6803 464 491 
16 7248 7248 468 494 
17 7694 7692 472 497 
18 8140 8130 480 497 
19 8562 8564 485 501 







C. Average promotion level for non-spam hosts and spam hosts,  and number of 
non-spam and spam hosts being promoted  
 
TP 100 over TR 100 
Index Average promotion level 
 for non-spam hosts 
Number of non-spam hosts 
being promoted 
1 0.000 0 
2 1.000 27 
3 1.075 53 
4 1.220 59 
5 1.273 77 
6 1.688 109 
7 2.022 139 
8 2.654 153 
9 2.746 138 
10 2.110 154 
11 1.973 186 
12 1.643 210 
13 1.796 230 
14 1.644 222 
15 1.547 201 
16 1.743 237 
17 1.746 130 
18 1.078 77 
19 1.386 210 






TPSM50 over SM50 
Index Average promotion level  
for spam hosts 
Number of spam hosts  
being promoted 
1 0.000 0 
2 1.000 5 
3 1.000 21 
4 1.000 7 
5 1.583 12 
6 1.100 10 
7 1.500 14 
8 1.364 11 
9 2.000 8 
10 2.138 29 
11 2.161 31 
12 2.714 21 
13 2.957 23 
14 2.556 9 
15 3.200 5 
16 3.250 4 
17 4.750 4 
18 4.375 8 
19 5.600 5 









D. Evaluated host represented in pages level 
 
 Non-spam Spam 
Index TR100 TP100 SM100 TPSM100 
1 5762322 5893117 5278 5288 
2 9798875 9487775 6684 6436 
3 12601227 12041690 7385 7286 
4 15149195 14092532 8013 8866 
5 16952324 16163390 9342 9310 
6 18311165 17929892 9519 9532 
7 19565437 19312567 16486 19081 
8 20322920 20280246 19305 20145 
9 21056879 20846941 20188 155152 
10 21581252 21627362 63341 157259 
 
E. Propagation coverage 
 
 TR100 TP100 
𝑆𝑛(𝑆) 73790 95192 
𝑆𝑛(𝑆𝐺) 6603 7900 
𝑆𝑛(𝑆𝐵) 242 353 
𝜂𝐺  98.981 99.536 





APPENDIX E - CHAPTER 5 RESULTS  
 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 
*ATR – Anti-TrustRank, WATR – Weighted Anti-TrustRank, WU – Wu et al. Distrust, 
WWU – Weighted Wu et al. Distrust, NIE – Nie et al. Distrust, WNIE – Weighted Nie 
et al. Distrust 
A. Number of spam hosts in each bucket 
Index 
ATR WATR WU WWU NIE WNIE 
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S 
1 30 343 45 328 31 342 52 321 32 341 45 328 
2 193 180 97 276 152 221 110 263 135 238 106 267 
3 311 62 258 115 282 91 244 129 292 81 256 117 
4 345 28 313 60 329 44 326 47 319 54 306 67 
5 358 15 334 39 346 27 320 53 346 27 331 42 
6 351 22 349 24 331 42 354 19 354 19 351 22 
7 351 22 360 13 365 8 354 19 329 44 360 13 
8 341 32 363 10 359 14 359 14 362 11 361 12 
9 346 27 362 11 341 32 360 13 350 23 360 13 
10 342 31 358 15 353 20 358 15 350 23 361 12 
11 343 30 362 11 350 23 358 15 354 19 360 13 
12 342 31 360 13 346 27 364 9 354 19 360 13 
13 311 62 355 18 344 29 354 19 352 21 359 14 
14 335 38 356 17 349 24 341 32 345 28 354 19 
15 297 76 331 42 327 46 334 39 331 42 334 39 
16 194 179 220 153 202 171 236 137 202 171 219 154 
17 163 210 130 243 146 227 129 244 146 227 130 243 
18 210 163 210 163 210 163 210 163 210 163 210 163 
19 192 181 192 181 192 181 192 181 192 181 192 181 
20 194 192 194 192 194 192 194 192 194 192 194 192 
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B. Incremental summation of spam hosts for all buckets. 
 
Index ATR WATR WU WWU NIE WNIE 
1 343 328 342 321 341 328 
2 523 604 563 584 579 595 
3 585 719 654 713 660 712 
4 613 779 698 760 714 779 
5 628 818 725 813 741 821 
6 650 842 767 832 760 843 
7 672 855 775 851 804 856 
8 704 865 789 865 815 868 
9 731 876 821 878 838 881 
10 762 891 841 893 861 893 
11 792 902 864 908 880 906 
12 823 915 891 917 899 919 
13 885 933 920 936 920 933 
14 923 950 944 968 948 952 
15 999 992 990 1007 990 991 
16 1178 1145 1161 1144 1161 1145 
17 1388 1388 1388 1388 1388 1388 
18 1551 1551 1551 1551 1551 1551 
19 1732 1732 1732 1732 1732 1732 









C. Average promotion level for spam hosts,  and number of spam hosts being 
promoted  
 
 Average promotion level for 
non-spam hosts 














1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 85 76 88 
3 1.578 1.510 1.093 45 49 43 
4 1.833 1.897 1.457 18 29 35 
5 1.929 2.095 2.000 14 21 13 
6 3.381 1.528 2.182 21 36 11 
7 3.944 2.667 2.500 18 3 42 
8 5.033 4.429 4.300 30 7 10 
9 5.708 4.600 3.733 24 25 15 
10 6.407 5.067 6.176 27 15 17 
11 6.160 7.474 4.462 25 19 13 
12 7.667 5.450 4.714 27 20 14 
13 7.153 4.150 4.417 59 20 12 
14 6.250 5.500 3.765 28 10 17 
15 4.107 5.800 3.421 28 30 19 
16 2.750 2.444 1.231 24 36 13 
17 1.000 1.000 1.000 48 48 48 
18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 





D. Evaluated host represented in pages level 
 
Index ATR WATR WU WWU NIE WNIE 
1 1313291 1349790 1622823 1295424 1653512 1273941 
2 2456555 2901785 2728892 2613922 2822220 2872809 
3 2841133 3780350 3336290 3681108 3438744 3821501 
4 3063894 4282150 3739390 4124931 3929221 4296223 
5 3204105 4461991 3945059 4454984 3995253 4448293 
6 3370887 4570601 4049277 4546177 4166130 4566529 
7 3508984 4615278 4094948 4632867 4282662 4639370 
8 3754869 4727802 4282774 4749903 4369946 4694204 
9 4061543 4792877 4506142 4806178 4445917 4797769 




















*ATR – Anti-TrustRank, WATR – Weighted Anti-TrustRank, WU – Wu et al. Distrust, 
WWU – Weighted Wu et al. Distrust, NIE – Nie et al. Distrust, WNIE – Weighted Nie 
et al. Distrust 
 
A. Number of spam hosts in each bucket 
Index 
ATR WATR WU WWU NIE WNIE 
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S 
1 384 89 369 104 377 96 370 103 376 97 372 101 
2 448 25 441 32 456 17 444 29 454 19 440 33 
3 462 11 453 20 454 20 448 25 462 12 453 20 
4 468 6 458 16 456 18 459 16 455 19 460 15 
5 460 13 458 16 466 7 460 14 455 18 462 11 
6 459 15 466 7 470 3 465 8 465 8 462 11 
7 460 13 471 2 471 2 462 11 466 7 467 6 
8 465 8 465 8 455 18 464 9 460 13 467 6 
9 460 13 471 3 456 17 470 3 467 6 469 5 
10 463 10 466 7 465 8 469 4 462 11 465 8 
11 462 11 462 11 461 12 469 4 466 7 462 11 
12 466 7 464 9 463 10 467 6 464 9 464 9 
13 455 19 469 4 464 10 464 9 460 14 471 2 
14 452 21 451 22 450 23 453 20 452 21 450 23 
15 439 34 439 34 439 34 439 34 439 34 439 34 
16 430 43 430 43 430 43 430 43 430 43 430 43 
17 433 40 433 40 433 40 433 40 433 40 433 40 
18 430 43 430 43 430 43 430 43 430 43 430 43 
19 436 38 436 38 436 38 436 38 436 38 436 38 




B. Incremental summation of spam hosts for all buckets. 
 
Index ATR WATR WU WWU NIE WNIE 
1 89 104 96 103 97 101 
2 114 136 113 132 116 134 
3 125 156 133 157 128 154 
4 131 172 151 173 147 169 
5 144 188 158 187 165 180 
6 159 195 161 195 173 191 
7 172 197 163 206 180 197 
8 180 205 181 215 193 203 
9 193 208 198 218 199 208 
10 203 215 206 222 210 216 
11 214 226 218 226 217 227 
12 221 235 228 232 226 236 
13 240 239 238 241 240 238 
14 261 261 261 261 261 261 
15 295 295 295 295 295 295 
16 338 338 338 338 338 338 
17 378 378 378 378 378 378 
18 421 421 421 421 421 421 
19 459 459 459 459 459 459 









C. Average promotion level for spam hosts,  and number of spam hosts being 
promoted  
 
 Average promotion level for 
non-spam hosts 














1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 14 9 10 
3 1.500 1.273 1.125 8 11 8 
4 2.167 1.625 1.750 6 8 12 
5 2.800 2.500 2.500 10 6 10 
6 2.929 1.000 2.833 14 1 6 
7 2.583 3.000 2.800 12 2 5 
8 4.250 4.059 3.615 4 17 13 
9 5.077 5.000 2.000 13 16 4 
10 4.400 6.000 3.500 5 3 8 
11 5.000 3.857 3.250 7 7 4 
12 5.333 3.125 2.000 3 8 7 
13 2.800 6.556 2.600 15 9 10 
14 2.500 2.500 2.000 2 4 2 
15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 





D. Evaluated host represented in pages level 
 
Index ATR WATR WU WWU NIE WNIE 
1 929200 970876 947715 892901 960910 910721 
2 1005378 1069127 1026238 1025691 1020807 1063244 
3 1012441 1101626 1058704 1077870 1057994 1079379 
4 1037990 1115851 1075044 1139643 1076417 1110244 
5 1064091 1120334 1112379 1181418 1117387 1116103 
6 1080294 1148771 1115044 1188373 1126445 1120537 
7 1099606 1149016 1115320 1190689 1134084 1130236 
8 1107402 1190866 1131098 1207496 1136708 1190857 
9 1139103 1191074 1164160 1207522 1184168 1206430 















APPENDIX F - CHAPTER 6 RESULTS 
 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 
*ATR – Anti-TrustRank, ATR8 – Anti-TrustRank 8
th
 iteration DSP, WU – Wu et al. 
Distrust, WU8 – Wu et al. Distrust 8
th
 iteration DSP, NIE – Nie et al. Distrust, NIE8 – 
Nie et al. Distrust 8
th
 iteration DSP 
A. Number of spam hosts in each bucket 
Index 
ATR ATR8 WU WU8 NIE NIE8 
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S 
1 30 343 27 346 31 342 37 336 33 340 48 325 
2 193 180 153 220 152 221 134 239 133 240 97 276 
3 311 62 268 105 282 91 242 131 293 80 215 158 
4 345 28 338 35 329 44 331 42 318 55 285 88 
5 358 15 341 32 346 27 353 20 347 26 338 35 
6 351 22 341 32 331 42 348 25 354 19 347 26 
7 351 22 346 27 365 8 335 38 329 44 363 10 
8 341 32 349 24 359 14 353 20 362 11 364 9 
9 346 27 342 31 341 32 357 16 351 22 362 11 
10 342 31 337 36 353 20 356 17 349 24 367 6 
11 343 30 355 18 350 23 366 7 354 19 367 6 
12 342 31 354 19 346 27 350 23 354 19 362 11 
13 311 62 354 19 344 29 354 19 352 21 365 8 
14 335 38 351 22 349 24 349 24 345 28 370 3 
15 297 76 348 25 327 46 338 35 331 42 351 22 
16 194 179 186 187 202 171 204 169 202 171 206 167 
17 244 129 244 129 227 146 227 146 227 146 227 146 
18 242 131 242 131 242 131 242 131 242 131 242 131 
19 138 235 138 235 138 235 138 235 138 235 138 235 
20 135 251 135 251 135 251 135 251 135 251 135 251 
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B. Incremental summation of spam hosts for all buckets. 
 
Index ATR ATR8 WU WU8 NIE NIE8 
1 343 346 342 336 340 325 
2 523 566 563 575 580 601 
3 585 671 654 706 660 759 
4 613 706 698 748 715 847 
5 628 738 725 768 741 882 
6 650 770 767 793 760 908 
7 672 797 775 831 804 918 
8 704 821 789 851 815 927 
9 731 852 821 867 837 938 
10 762 888 841 884 861 944 
11 792 906 864 891 880 950 
12 823 925 891 914 899 961 
13 885 944 920 933 920 969 
14 923 966 944 957 948 972 
15 999 991 990 992 990 994 
16 1178 1178 1161 1161 1161 1161 
17 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 
18 1438 1438 1438 1438 1438 1438 
19 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 










C. Average promotion level for spam hosts,  and number of spam hosts being 
promoted  
 
 Average promotion level for 
non-spam hosts 














1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 32 45 73 
3 1.074 1.524 1.244 27 42 41 
4 1.417 1.313 1.472 12 32 36 
5 2.000 1.550 2.200 7 20 20 
6 2.900 1.333 2.722 20 6 18 
7 3.063 6.000 3.048 16 1 42 
8 4.087 3.250 5.000 23 8 10 
9 4.700 4.500 4.864 20 22 22 
10 5.333 3.091 6.500 24 11 22 
11 4.304 7.105 5.278 23 19 18 
12 6.040 3.895 5.167 25 19 18 
13 4.768 2.400 7.211 56 15 19 
14 5.065 1.900 6.550 31 10 20 
15 3.486 4.100 6.185 35 20 27 
16 3.375 1.500 2.765 24 4 17 
17 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 0 0 
18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 





D. Evaluated host represented in pages level 
 
Index ATR ATR8 WU WU8 NIE NIE8 
1 1313291 1298996 1622823 1588293 1653314 1539283 
2 2456555 2694632 2728892 2856597 2832581 3003471 
3 2841133 3535509 3336290 3841061 3438744 4171748 
4 3063894 3845866 3739390 4132319 3929393 4619347 
5 3204105 4024198 3945059 4279553 3995253 4944029 
6 3370887 4316557 4049277 4488813 4166130 5240632 
7 3508984 4448721 4094948 4591742 4282662 5284677 
8 3754869 4529346 4282774 4676556 4369946 5352723 
9 4061543 4832617 4506142 4780965 4440319 5536531 





















*ATR – Anti-TrustRank, ATR9 – Anti-TrustRank 9
th
 iteration DSP, WU – Wu et al. 
Distrust, WU7 – Wu et al. Distrust 7
th
 iteration DSP, NIE – Nie et al. Distrust, NIE9 – 
Nie et al. Distrust 9
th
 iteration DSP 
A. Number of spam hosts in each bucket 
Index 
ATR ATR9 WU WU7 NIE NIE9 
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S 
1 382 92 377 97 376 98 371 103 373 101 367 107 
2 449 25 453 21 459 15 437 38 458 16 437 37 
3 465 9 461 13 453 22 472 2 458 17 453 21 
4 467 8 466 9 458 17 463 11 458 17 452 24 
5 464 10 460 14 467 7 455 19 458 16 465 9 
6 457 18 458 17 470 4 463 12 466 8 462 12 
7 460 14 464 10 468 6 467 7 467 7 471 4 
8 466 8 460 14 457 17 465 9 462 12 466 8 
9 462 12 462 13 461 13 468 7 465 9 470 4 
10 466 8 465 9 465 9 465 9 468 6 470 4 
11 464 10 466 8 464 10 472 2 464 10 473 1 
12 466 8 465 9 464 10 462 12 465 9 471 3 
13 456 19 468 6 463 12 465 9 461 14 469 5 
14 453 21 452 22 452 22 452 22 454 20 451 23 
15 439 35 439 35 439 35 439 35 439 35 439 35 
16 431 43 431 43 431 43 431 43 431 43 431 43 
17 435 39 435 39 435 39 435 39 435 39 435 39 
18 432 42 432 42 432 42 432 42 432 42 432 42 
19 436 39 436 39 436 39 436 39 436 39 436 39 
20 430 41 430 41 430 41 430 41 430 41 430 41 
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B. Incremental summation of spam hosts for all buckets. 
 
Index ATR ATR9 WU WU7 NIE NIE9 
1 92 97 98 103 101 107 
2 117 118 113 141 117 144 
3 126 131 135 143 134 165 
4 134 140 152 154 151 189 
5 144 154 159 173 167 198 
6 162 171 163 185 175 210 
7 176 181 169 192 182 214 
8 184 195 186 201 194 222 
9 196 208 199 208 203 226 
10 204 217 208 217 209 230 
11 214 225 218 219 219 231 
12 222 234 228 231 228 234 
13 241 240 240 240 242 239 
14 262 262 262 262 262 262 
15 297 297 297 297 297 297 
16 340 340 340 340 340 340 
17 379 379 379 379 379 379 
18 421 421 421 421 421 421 
19 460 460 460 460 460 460 









C. Average promotion level for spam hosts,  and number of spam hosts being 
promoted  
 
 Average promotion level for 
non-spam hosts 














1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 4 7 11 
3 1.000 1.222 1.143 4 9 7 
4 1.000 1.667 1.714 2 3 7 
5 1.333 2.000 2.625 3 7 8 
6 2.000 3.333 2.300 5 3 10 
7 1.000 4.000 4.400 3 1 5 
8 1.600 2.000 4.000 5 1 4 
9 1.800 2.167 4.833 5 6 6 
10 1.000 4.500 5.125 1 12 8 
11 3.000 4.154 2.500 4 13 2 
12 2.500 4.750 8.333 6 4 6 
13 4.250 3.000 6.400 4 4 5 
14 3.600 1.500 5.375 5 2 8 
15 2.000 3.000 8.500 1 1 2 
16 3.167 4.250 7.556 6 4 9 
17 3.455 3.333 8.143 11 6 7 
18 1.333 1.000 2.000 3 1 3 
19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 





D. Evaluated host represented in pages level 
 
Index ATR ATR9 WU WU7 NIE NIE9 
1 937106 932239 973094 995268 1005285 1003788 
2 1009426 1032782 1027670 1064206 1022486 1068011 
3 1014809 1034819 1079967 1064527 1079508 1120374 
4 1039525 1060942 1096300 1078740 1112970 1193032 
5 1065252 1078895 1133635 1148592 1138692 1195269 
6 1084178 1085877 1136315 1158840 1150000 1220140 
7 1103333 1087342 1139671 1168950 1155144 1228255 
8 1147566 1169866 1153311 1185852 1157171 1258372 
9 1163808 1225869 1183984 1228032 1189461 1258837 



















APPENDIX G - CHAPTER 7 RESULTS 
 
WEBSPAM-UK2006 
*HD - Number of hidden neurons, AUC - Area under the receiver operating 
characteristic curve 
 
Feature Set A (24 Content Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.7953 11 0.7975 20 0.8000 
3 0.7972 12 0.7993 21 0.8004 
4 0.7953 13 0.7987 22 0.8006 
5 0.7967 14 0.7996 23 0.8003 
6 0.7972 15 0.8006 
7 0.7970 16 0.7997 
8 0.7978 17 0.7987 
9 0.7986 18 0.8003 
10 0.7993 19 0.7999 
 
Feature Set B (96 Full Content Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.7953 21 0.8688 40 0.8718 59 0.8704 78 0.8710 
3 0.7972 22 0.8705 41 0.8714 60 0.8689 79 0.8734 
4 0.7953 23 0.8691 42 0.8705 61 0.8730 80 0.8710 
5 0.7967 24 0.8704 43 0.8708 62 0.8721 81 0.8740 
6 0.7972 25 0.8706 44 0.8713 63 0.8716 82 0.8719 
7 0.7970 26 0.8686 45 0.8708 64 0.8719 83 0.8738 
8 0.7978 27 0.8694 46 0.8707 65 0.8715 84 0.8721 
9 0.7986 28 0.8699 47 0.8693 66 0.8723 85 0.8728 
10 0.7993 29 0.8705 48 0.8708 67 0.8710 86 0.8730 
11 0.8677 30 0.8698 49 0.8692 68 0.8654 87 0.8740 
12 0.8674 31 0.8705 50 0.8726 69 0.8690 88 0.8733 
13 0.8681 32 0.8699 51 0.8709 70 0.8728 89 0.8711 
14 0.8687 33 0.8698 52 0.8705 71 0.8717 90 0.8720 
15 0.8694 34 0.8712 53 0.8733 72 0.8713 91 0.8722 
16 0.8684 35 0.8702 54 0.8700 73 0.8736 92 0.8761 
17 0.8675 36 0.8692 55 0.8702 74 0.8726 93 0.8715 
18 0.8692 37 0.8695 56 0.8700 75 0.8723 94 0.8736 
19 0.8684 38 0.8710 57 0.8715 76 0.8695 95 0.8707 
20 0.8689 39 0.8708 58 0.8722 77 0.8737 96 0.8730 
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Feature Set C (41 Link-based Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.8353 11 0.8321 20 0.8314 29 0.8284 38 0.8273 
3 0.8333 12 0.8316 21 0.8315 30 0.8289 39 0.8274 
4 0.8346 13 0.8325 22 0.8314 31 0.8264 40 0.8272 
5 0.8329 14 0.8317 23 0.8301 32 0.8275 41 0.8272 
6 0.8336 15 0.8310 24 0.8278 33 0.8288   
7 0.8336 16 0.8299 25 0.8276 34 0.8273   
8 0.8320 17 0.8301 26 0.8282 35 0.8273   
9 0.8318 18 0.8319 27 0.8305 36 0.8276   
10 0.8327 19 0.8314 28 0.8278 37 0.8282   
Feature Set D (138 Transformed Link-based Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.8380 30 0.8270 58 0.8265 85 0.8262 113 0.8288 
3 0.8276 31 0.8281 59 0.8282 86 0.8268 114 0.8264 
4 0.8267 32 0.8270 60 0.8253 87 0.8301 115 0.8283 
5 0.8282 33 0.8234 61 0.8285 88 0.8257 116 0.8296 
6 0.8275 34 0.8245 62 0.8275 89 0.8294 117 0.8279 
7 0.8257 35 0.8271 63 0.8281 90 0.8298 118 0.8267 
8 0.8279 36 0.8249 64 0.8300 91 0.8304 119 0.8263 
9 0.8266 37 0.8274 65 0.8280 92 0.8277 120 0.8318 
10 0.8213 38 0.8289 66 0.8285 93 0.8284 121 0.8309 
11 0.8269 39 0.8261 67 0.8285 94 0.8277 122 0.8280 
12 0.8246 40 0.8327 68 0.8291 95 0.8270 123 0.8271 
13 0.8254 41 0.8245 69 0.8292 96 0.8295 124 0.8275 
14 0.8268 42 0.8239 70 0.8322 97 0.8280 125 0.8284 
15 0.8216 43 0.8259 71 0.8283 98 0.8277 126 0.8299 
16 0.8302 44 0.8249 72 0.8239 99 0.8263 127 0.8270 
17 0.8228 45 0.8250 73 0.8264 100 0.8287 128 0.8320 
18 0.8236 46 0.8242 74 0.8264 101 0.8271 129 0.8291 
19 0.8256 47 0.8254 75 0.8255 102 0.8289 130 0.8271 
20 0.8212 48 0.8261 76 0.8275 103 0.8277 131 0.8311 
21 0.8240 49 0.8291 77 0.8272 104 0.8297 132 0.8281 
22 0.8290 50 0.8278 78 0.8309 105 0.8290 133 0.8278 
23 0.8264 51 0.8248 79 0.8283 106 0.8277 134 0.8261 
24 0.8259 52 0.8261 80 0.8325 107 0.8269 135 0.8316 
25 0.8249 53 0.8277 81 0.8278 108 0.8262 136 0.8282 
26 0.8247 54 0.8282 82 0.8263 109 0.8293 137 0.8314 
27 0.8289 55 0.8297 82 0.8297 110 0.8289 138 0.8291 
28 0.8237 56 0.8290 83 0.8267 111 0.8323   
29 0.8255 57 0.8306 84 0.8265 112 0.8289   
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Feature Set A + C (65 Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.8688 15 0.8693 28 0.8690 41 0.8676 54 0.8686 
3 0.8745 16 0.8706 29 0.8684 42 0.8676 55 0.8666 
4 0.8773 17 0.8694 30 0.8689 43 0.8682 56 0.8671 
5 0.8760 18 0.8682 31 0.8690 44 0.8673 57 0.8675 
6 0.8754 19 0.8673 32 0.8663 45 0.8674 58 0.8666 
7 0.8735 20 0.8672 33 0.8663 46 0.8680 59 0.8689 
8 0.8716 21 0.8676 34 0.8660 47 0.8688 60 0.8688 
9 0.8715 22 0.8680 35 0.8677 48 0.8675 61 0.8670 
10 0.8724 23 0.8691 36 0.8675 49 0.8676 62 0.8684 
11 0.8716 24 0.8675 37 0.8669 50 0.8669 63 0.8678 
12 0.8706 25 0.8676 38 0.8664 51 0.8679 64 0.8677 
13 0.8711 26 0.8676 39 0.8673 52 0.8678 65 0.8677 
14 0.8700 27 0.8691 40 0.8671 53 0.8674   
 
Feature Set B + D (234 Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.8847 49 0.8871 96 0.8863 143 0.8889 190 0.8868 
3 0.8894 50 0.8864 97 0.8899 144 0.8863 191 0.8878 
4 0.8878 51 0.8850 98 0.8876 145 0.8874 192 0.8887 
5 0.8798 52 0.8899 99 0.8870 146 0.8864 193 0.8874 
6 0.8770 53 0.8868 100 0.8885 147 0.8888 194 0.8876 
7 0.8816 54 0.8870 101 0.8879 148 0.8869 195 0.8871 
8 0.8798 55 0.8880 102 0.8858 149 0.8897 196 0.8869 
9 0.8831 56 0.8881 103 0.8870 150 0.8854 197 0.8892 
10 0.8775 57 0.8882 104 0.8844 151 0.8888 198 0.8894 
11 0.8787 58 0.8864 105 0.8866 152 0.8867 199 0.8886 
12 0.8828 59 0.8901 106 0.8902 153 0.8905 200 0.8897 
13 0.8803 60 0.8883 107 0.8885 154 0.8878 201 0.8876 
14 0.8817 61 0.8869 108 0.8854 155 0.8872 202 0.8884 
15 0.8855 62 0.8875 109 0.8868 156 0.8889 203 0.8878 
16 0.8827 63 0.8854 110 0.8880 157 0.8885 204 0.8893 
17 0.8842 64 0.8886 111 0.8872 158 0.8885 205 0.8871 
18 0.8836 65 0.8861 112 0.8880 159 0.8880 206 0.8874 
19 0.8859 66 0.8879 113 0.8845 160 0.8870 207 0.8870 
20 0.8846 67 0.8848 114 0.8878 161 0.8885 208 0.8858 
21 0.8854 68 0.8874 115 0.8902 162 0.8877 209 0.8868 
22 0.8880 69 0.8861 116 0.8874 163 0.8878 210 0.8900 
23 0.8814 70 0.8873 117 0.8855 164 0.8871 211 0.8876 
24 0.8837 71 0.8886 118 0.8883 165 0.8878 212 0.8869 
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25 0.8866 72 0.8853 119 0.8866 166 0.8875 213 0.8891 
26 0.8829 73 0.8861 120 0.8894 167 0.8879 214 0.8893 
27 0.8856 74 0.8865 121 0.8890 168 0.8880 215 0.8890 
28 0.8836 75 0.8863 122 0.8892 169 0.8885 216 0.8861 
29 0.8875 76 0.8878 123 0.8896 170 0.8865 217 0.8885 
30 0.8881 77 0.8880 124 0.8880 171 0.8891 218 0.8873 
31 0.8851 78 0.8869 125 0.8878 172 0.8886 219 0.8898 
32 0.8866 79 0.8889 126 0.8856 173 0.8874 220 0.8888 
33 0.8824 80 0.8843 127 0.8867 174 0.8870 221 0.8854 
34 0.8865 81 0.8870 128 0.8864 175 0.8851 222 0.8872 
35 0.8875 82 0.8863 129 0.8879 176 0.8883 223 0.8909 
36 0.8867 83 0.8882 130 0.8874 177 0.8873 224 0.8870 
37 0.8869 84 0.8851 131 0.8867 178 0.8870 225 0.8881 
38 0.8844 85 0.8882 132 0.8869 179 0.8866 226 0.8861 
39 0.8876 86 0.8879 133 0.8869 180 0.8887 227 0.8882 
40 0.8897 87 0.8877 134 0.8903 181 0.8896 228 0.8884 
41 0.8861 88 0.8872 135 0.8870 182 0.8904 229 0.8867 
42 0.8848 89 0.8862 136 0.8885 183 0.8881 230 0.8887 
43 0.8841 90 0.8870 137 0.8873 184 0.8889 231 0.8881 
44 0.8888 91 0.8863 138 0.8880 185 0.8855 232 0.8898 
45 0.8844 92 0.8849 139 0.8876 186 0.8881 233 0.8870 
46 0.8856 93 0.8887 140 0.8881 187 0.8883 234 0.8878 
47 0.8858 94 0.8872 141 0.8874 188 0.8881   

















*HD - Number of hidden neurons, AUC - Area under the receiver operating 
characteristic curve 
 
Feature Set A (24 Content Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.6590 11 0.7083 20 0.7087 
3 0.6730 12 0.7047 21 0.7200 
4 0.6796 13 0.7106 22 0.7127 
5 0.6888 14 0.7033 23 0.7078 
6 0.6862 15 0.7153 
7 0.6936 16 0.7154 
8 0.6995 17 0.7137 
9 0.7012 18 0.7137 
10 0.7055 19 0.7188 
 
Feature Set B (96 Full Content Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.6695 21 0.7514 40 0.7557 59 0.7547 78 0.7533 
3 0.6806 22 0.7498 41 0.7546 60 0.7459 79 0.7552 
4 0.6854 23 0.7440 42 0.7416 61 0.7502 80 0.7537 
5 0.6914 24 0.7471 43 0.7494 62 0.7623 81 0.7503 
6 0.7341 25 0.7475 44 0.7596 63 0.7532 82 0.7438 
7 0.7224 26 0.7565 45 0.7543 64 0.7534 83 0.7598 
8 0.7297 27 0.7453 46 0.7515 65 0.7502 84 0.7485 
9 0.7419 28 0.7454 47 0.7561 66 0.7517 85 0.7638 
10 0.7399 29 0.7491 48 0.7535 67 0.7636 86 0.7567 
11 0.7440 30 0.7410 49 0.7537 68 0.7293 87 0.7543 
12 0.7415 31 0.7429 50 0.7514 69 0.7551 88 0.7503 
13 0.7508 32 0.7596 51 0.7542 70 0.7532 89 0.7518 
14 0.7383 33 0.7525 52 0.7514 71 0.7402 90 0.7507 
15 0.7495 34 0.7521 53 0.7561 72 0.7548 91 0.7498 
16 0.7361 35 0.7503 54 0.7480 73 0.7639 92 0.7571 
17 0.7339 36 0.7535 55 0.7586 74 0.7482 93 0.7461 
18 0.7427 37 0.7548 56 0.7487 75 0.7566 94 0.7413 
19 0.7482 38 0.7579 57 0.7587 76 0.7525 95 0.7531 
20 0.7438 39 0.7457 58 0.7612 77 0.7477 96 0.7532 
 
Feature Set C (41 Link-based Features) 
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HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.6247 11 0.6162 20 0.6233 29 0.6195 38 0.6248 
3 0.6218 12 0.6142 21 0.6236 30 0.6192 39 0.6234 
4 0.6087 13 0.6143 22 0.6196 31 0.6242 40 0.6229 
5 0.6025 14 0.6184 23 0.6224 32 0.6206 41 0.6229 
6 0.6103 15 0.6191 24 0.6164 33 0.6191   
7 0.6027 16 0.6193 25 0.6216 34 0.6218   
8 0.6125 17 0.6180 26 0.6242 35 0.6191   
9 0.6149 18 0.6130 27 0.6212 36 0.6226   
10 0.6169 19 0.6193 28 0.6226 37 0.6240   
 
Feature Set D (138 Transformed Link-based Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.6583 30 0.6536 58 0.6641 85 0.6690 113 0.6663 
3 0.6553 31 0.6549 59 0.6637 86 0.6686 114 0.6679 
4 0.6561 32 0.6539 60 0.6673 87 0.6599 115 0.6701 
5 0.6602 33 0.6559 61 0.6724 88 0.6650 116 0.6741 
6 0.6280 34 0.6575 62 0.6614 89 0.6630 117 0.6696 
7 0.6258 35 0.6583 63 0.6594 90 0.6713 118 0.6720 
8 0.6394 36 0.6513 64 0.6679 91 0.6684 119 0.6715 
9 0.6256 37 0.6498 65 0.6639 92 0.6687 120 0.6671 
10 0.6384 38 0.6325 66 0.6678 93 0.6692 121 0.6660 
11 0.6371 39 0.6330 67 0.6657 94 0.6604 122 0.6709 
12 0.6290 40 0.6549 68 0.6632 95 0.6691 123 0.6740 
13 0.6330 41 0.6524 69 0.6603 96 0.6699 124 0.6671 
14 0.6352 42 0.6612 70 0.6607 97 0.6685 125 0.6674 
15 0.6407 43 0.6610 71 0.6580 98 0.6669 126 0.6695 
16 0.6400 44 0.6609 72 0.6658 99 0.6740 127 0.6682 
17 0.6458 45 0.6630 73 0.6665 100 0.6680 128 0.6643 
18 0.6491 46 0.6527 74 0.6697 101 0.6639 129 0.6698 
19 0.6430 47 0.6672 75 0.6642 102 0.6664 130 0.6696 
20 0.6411 48 0.6677 76 0.6568 103 0.6690 131 0.6720 
21 0.6467 49 0.6629 77 0.6696 104 0.6632 132 0.6561 
22 0.6442 50 0.6566 78 0.6700 105 0.6660 133 0.6699 
23 0.6517 51 0.6560 79 0.6654 106 0.6720 134 0.6699 
24 0.6523 52 0.6616 80 0.6620 107 0.6669 135 0.6661 
25 0.6492 53 0.6642 81 0.6615 108 0.6658 136 0.6677 
26 0.6534 54 0.6587 82 0.6596 109 0.6708 137 0.6678 
27 0.6502 55 0.6532 82 0.6762 110 0.6652 138 0.6624 
28 0.6550 56 0.6724 83 0.6628 111 0.6630   




Feature Set A + C (65 Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.7451 15 0.7536 28 0.7290 41 0.7298 54 0.7179 
3 0.7343 16 0.7526 29 0.7442 42 0.7246 55 0.7388 
4 0.7220 17 0.7411 30 0.7328 43 0.7337 56 0.7481 
5 0.7374 18 0.7447 31 0.7361 44 0.7275 57 0.7424 
6 0.7464 19 0.7464 32 0.7305 45 0.7463 58 0.7347 
7 0.7375 20 0.7234 33 0.7336 46 0.7470 59 0.7304 
8 0.7229 21 0.7506 34 0.7257 47 0.7532 60 0.7364 
9 0.7248 22 0.7436 35 0.7299 48 0.7306 61 0.7416 
10 0.7255 23 0.7356 36 0.7345 49 0.7521 62 0.7274 
11 0.7326 24 0.7402 37 0.7272 50 0.7166 63 0.7249 
12 0.7302 25 0.7397 38 0.7367 51 0.7289 64 0.7331 
13 0.7340 26 0.7226 39 0.7371 52 0.7193 65 0.7423 
14 0.7325 27 0.7375 40 0.7457 53 0.7275   
 
Feature Set B + D (234 Features) 
HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC HD AUC 
2 0.7843 49 0.7545 96 0.7440 143 0.7516 190 0.7421 
3 0.7807 50 0.7625 97 0.7548 144 0.7374 191 0.7256 
4 0.7640 51 0.7572 98 0.7441 145 0.7401 192 0.7325 
5 0.7648 52 0.7503 99 0.7433 146 0.7516 193 0.7412 
6 0.7722 53 0.7392 100 0.7447 147 0.7378 194 0.7419 
7 0.7627 54 0.7406 101 0.7547 148 0.7273 195 0.7445 
8 0.7631 55 0.7479 102 0.7339 149 0.7320 196 0.7229 
9 0.7574 56 0.7375 103 0.7355 150 0.7433 197 0.7373 
10 0.7561 57 0.7473 104 0.7386 151 0.7159 198 0.7270 
11 0.7539 58 0.7399 105 0.7591 152 0.7437 199 0.7412 
12 0.7698 59 0.7359 106 0.7534 153 0.7302 200 0.7443 
13 0.7634 60 0.7465 107 0.7358 154 0.7451 201 0.7368 
14 0.7624 61 0.7549 108 0.7406 155 0.7406 202 0.7346 
15 0.7740 62 0.7551 109 0.7381 156 0.7267 203 0.7491 
16 0.7537 63 0.7377 110 0.7368 157 0.7292 204 0.7230 
17 0.7635 64 0.7495 111 0.7337 158 0.7308 205 0.7383 
18 0.7574 65 0.7532 112 0.7352 159 0.7361 206 0.7341 
19 0.7731 66 0.7362 113 0.7538 160 0.7385 207 0.7376 
20 0.7624 67 0.7435 114 0.7390 161 0.7340 208 0.7396 
21 0.7538 68 0.7409 115 0.7512 162 0.7452 209 0.7256 
22 0.7643 69 0.7418 116 0.7326 163 0.7345 210 0.7340 
23 0.7597 70 0.7511 117 0.7511 164 0.7537 211 0.7377 
24 0.7661 71 0.7510 118 0.7400 165 0.7492 212 0.7383 
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25 0.7448 72 0.7474 119 0.7437 166 0.7280 213 0.7452 
26 0.7558 73 0.7493 120 0.7451 167 0.7442 214 0.7344 
27 0.7727 74 0.7429 121 0.7536 168 0.7488 215 0.7340 
28 0.7637 75 0.7728 122 0.7421 169 0.7315 216 0.7458 
29 0.7629 76 0.7532 123 0.7429 170 0.7448 217 0.7344 
30 0.7583 77 0.7397 124 0.7366 171 0.7474 218 0.7186 
31 0.7560 78 0.7518 125 0.7460 172 0.7307 219 0.7391 
32 0.7545 79 0.7422 126 0.7388 173 0.7436 220 0.7467 
33 0.7503 80 0.7545 127 0.7427 174 0.7290 221 0.7426 
34 0.7628 81 0.7332 128 0.7611 175 0.7423 222 0.7323 
35 0.7482 82 0.7414 129 0.7417 176 0.7310 223 0.7340 
36 0.7725 83 0.7314 130 0.7500 177 0.7449 224 0.7415 
37 0.7590 84 0.7399 131 0.7423 178 0.7480 225 0.7252 
38 0.7646 85 0.7411 132 0.7409 179 0.7432 226 0.7463 
39 0.7509 86 0.7393 133 0.7418 180 0.7353 227 0.7157 
40 0.7546 87 0.7375 134 0.7325 181 0.7609 228 0.7433 
41 0.7506 88 0.7336 135 0.7265 182 0.7327 229 0.7375 
42 0.7606 89 0.7369 136 0.7566 183 0.7495 230 0.7330 
43 0.7684 90 0.7486 137 0.7400 184 0.7430 231 0.7421 
44 0.7544 91 0.7285 138 0.7460 185 0.7218 232 0.7249 
45 0.7580 92 0.7369 139 0.7377 186 0.7546 233 0.7291 
46 0.7533 93 0.7403 140 0.7514 187 0.7440 234 0.7194 
47 0.7583 94 0.7373 141 0.7309 188 0.7302   
48 0.7665 95 0.7322 142 0.7435 189 0.7739   
 
 
 
 
